578 that the two antagonists met and clashed in the "war" which re-
185 sulted in collectivized agriculture.[18]

The problem which the Bolsheviks had to deal with may be briefly stated. NEP had insured the continued political existence of the regime; but salvation had been achieved at a great price. To obtain a sufficient supply of agricultural produce to feed the rising urban population and, if possible, to permit acceleration of industrial growth, it was necessary to provide increased incentives for the peasantry. But to provide incentives for an increased supply of produce to the cities, it was also necessary to create an industry capable of supplying peasants with the consumer goods and agricultural machinery they demanded in exchange. Without recourse to foreign capital, this, in turn, was impossible, unless a steadily increasing supply of agricultural produce was guaranteed.

The problem of breaking this vicious circle occupied the thoughts of the best Party theoreticians throughout the period of NEP. Some, like Bukharin, suggested a solution bearing some resemblance to the pre-Revolutionary policies of Witte and Stolypin – a "gradualist" approach to industrialization, encouragement of the more efficient middle peasant producers, and limited recourse to foreign capital. Trotsky, as the leader of the radical Left Wing, called for an immediate drive for industrialization in which the peasants would absorb the major shock. The theoretical debate rose to its climax in the late twenties, coinciding with the final victory of the Stalinist faction of the Bolshevik Party and the resurgence of the agricultural crisis in a new form.[19]

THE PRE-COLLECTIVIZATION CRISIS

185 The Stalinist "solution" to the agricultural crisis (collectiviza-
471 tion) did not proceed according to a predetermined plan or theory.
423 Rather, it was developed pragmatically as a response to critical

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[18] Lazar Volin, a foremost American student of Soviet agriculture, also assigned priority to the practical, as opposed to the ideological basis of collectivization. He explained the Communist attachment to the *kolkhoz* in this way: "First, the practical or pragmatic reasons . . . [revolving] around the need for large supplies of cheap agricultural products to feed and clothe the growing industrial population and the army . . . Second, an ideological predilection for agrarian collectivism, rooted in the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dogma." Lazar Volin, "Agricultural Organization," *Soviet Economic Growth*, Abraham Bergson (editor), White Plains, N. Y., 1953, p. 286.

[19] A reliable account of the heated Party economic debate may be found in Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development since* 1917 (New York, 1948), pp. 208-229, and of the political implications of the debate in Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 294-304.

economic conditions and the special requirements of the first Five 185
Year Plan. Indeed, the first collectivization drive was expected to 471
bring only 14 per cent of the land into the "socialist sector". The 423 ●
overwhelming success of the drive was as much a surprise to the Communist leadership as to the peasants themselves. And it was only when the drive turned out to be so phenomenally successful that the Communist planners stepped up the targets and pace of the Five Year Plan itself.

The agricultural crisis which inspired the collectivization drive [442]
of the first Five Year Plan had its origins in two situations: First, the acute grain shortage of 1927-28, and second, and more important, the post-Revolutionary structure of the land (see Chart I). As a result of the peasant revolution of 1917-18, the small and medium peasantry occupied almost all the arable land in the Soviet Union. Where they had produced only 50 per cent of nation's grain in pre-war times, they produced 85 per cent in 1926-27. Since the poor and middle peasants marketed a far smaller percentage of the grain they produced than had the great landowners and kulaks of pre-war times, their domination of the land produced a serious drop in marketed commodities.

Thus, while total grain production had declined by only five per cent below pre-Revolutionary levels, marketed grain had declined by *more than* 50 *per cent* — from 26 per cent of five billion poods in 1913 to 13.3 per cent of 4.749 billion poods in 1926-27.[20] The cities received far less grain than they had received in pre-war times; and due to a number of factors (among them the competition between various State purchasing agencies), the cities were paying a higher price for the grain they could obtain. One of the most serious consequences of this new relationship was the fact that little grain was available for foreign export to pay for desperately needed capital equipment.

The basic problem for the regime was to create an agricultural structure which would enable the State to siphon off a *far greater proportion of the total product,* at a price it wished to pay, than was possible under the conditions of NEP. While it is true that the regime wished to increase total agricultural production, and may have expected to achieve the goal through increased mechanization of the farms, this target was secondary. For achieving the primary goal — extraction of a greater *proportion* of the produce —

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[20] A pood equals 36 pounds.

the vehicle of the large-scale collective farm, heretofore neglected, 185
stood ready at hand.[21] 471

The very essence of the *kolkhoz* (collective farm) system lay 423 in the ease with which it facilitated extraction of heavy tribute from the land in the form of extremely cheap supplies of foodstuffs and industrial crops. Thus, the rise of the Stalinist land system was closely connected with the Party's program of break-neck industrialization, massive capital investments, and strategic projects at the expense of consumption. The ever-tightening hold of the regime over the industrial working class made possible implementation of these policies without the development of consumer goods facilities; and therefore the regime could permit a drop in the levels of consumption without jeopardizing its plan. The new agricultural program — designed primarily to *redistribute* agricultural produce rather than to *increase* it — was consistent with this aspect of the plan. Moreover, the political hold collectivization afforded over the peasants assured State control of the rural labor supply and enabled the State to channel manpower into non-agricultural occupation as it deemed necessary.

This was the general rationale behind collectivization. The immediate cause for the first collectivization drive lay, however, in the mounting economic tensions of the late 1920s. As early as 1925-26 the regime had sought to reimpose many of the agrarian controls lifted in 1921, at the time of the inauguration of NEP. To implement this policy, agricultural prices were once again restricted and production itself subjected to heavy taxes. Retaliating in kind, the peasants drove production downward, hoarded again, and consumed what they could not hide or sell.[22] As a consequence State grain collections in 1928-29 dropped more than one-third below the level of two years before. Tension in the countryside mounted. The means by which the new monolithic party chose to meet this situation was of a magnitude equal to the challenge.

THE STALINIST SOLUTION TO THE LAND PROBLEM

The great offensive against the peasantry was launched late 423
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[21] The *artel* was considered the best form of collective agriculture since it combined a sufficient number of communal features to guarantee State control with sufficient household autonomy to make it structurally feasible to the peasants. The State-appointed managers, supported by local party administrators, could enforce peasant cooperation with the Plan; and the continued existence of individual households offered the peasant that minimum of private incentive consistent with the cooperation.

[22] This crisis is well described in Dobb, p. 222.

423 185 in 1928, but it was not until one year later, when Stalin called for "liquidation of the kulaks as a class," that its full weight was felt. Since the actual number of kulaks in post-Revolutionary Russia was not very great, this slogan made it abundantly clear that the frankly military offensive was directed against the peasantry as a whole. The story is well known: the dispatch of Communist shock cadres to the villages, the mass deportations, the herding of peasants into hastily formed collective units, the calculated famine in the Ukraine, the wholesale slaughter of livestock by the desperate peasants, the brief pause ordered by Stalin early in 1930, the renewed offensive in 1931-32, the collapse of the opposition, and the final establishment of a collective farm system in all essential respects resembling that of today. There were many subsequent modifications of the system; but its basic features were firmly established in the "avalanche" of collectivization in the 1928-32 period.

In evaluating the success of the drive and the system it created, it is necessary to reiterate that the primary utility of the collective farm lay in its efficiency as an economic and political *control device*, by which rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union could be facilitated, and not in its efficiency of production. To the extent that it made industrialization possible, it is possible to show that Soviet collectivization "succeeded."

241 423 So far as production is concerned, the efficiency of the collective farm was, and remains, low. It has been estimated that Soviet grain production in 1939 did not exceed that of 1928 by much more than the increase of sown area over the 11 intervening years.[23] Similarly, the gross production value of Soviet agriculture in 1940 exceeded 1928 by only a small fraction, though in the bumper year of 1937 the harvest may have been as much as 14 per cent higher.[24] Throughout the 1930s the Soviets put forth many claims of increased agricultural productivity which were, however, discounted by most Western experts. Western scepticism was vindicated by the 1953 acknowledgement of agricultural deterioration by N. S. Khrushchev, one of the chief architects of later Soviet agricultural policy.[25]

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[23] Naum Jasny, *Socialized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.* (Stanford, 1950), p. 548.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 673.

[25] Jasny's figures, which are cited above, are somewhat lower than official Soviet boasts. He made allowance for statistical falsification involved in such Soviet practices as measuring production in accordance with the "biological yield," a misleading statistical device employed by the Soviets since the early thirties and condemned by Malenkov in his August 8th, 1953 address.

TABLE 1

DIVISION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT IN USSR BEFORE AND AFTER COLLECTIVIZATION †

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YEAR	TOTAL YIELD*	OBLIGATORY DELIVERIES Million Centners	OBLIGATORY DELIVERIES Percent of Total Crop	RETAINED BY FARMERS Million Centners	RETAINED BY FARMERS Percent of Total Crop**
1927/8	605.9	112.2	18.5	493.7	100
1932/3	570.1	185.2	32.5	384.9	77.9
1933/4	677.1	228.7	33.8	448.4	90.8
1934/5	669.5	226.6	33.8	442.9	89.7
1935/6	677.5	249.3	36.8	428.2	86.7
1936/7	612.5	260.0	42.4	353.5	71.4

† Propkopovicz, S. N., *Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets*, (Zurich, 1944), pp. 136, 138.

* Net totals, after seeds deducted from the total yield.

** 100 equals total crop retained by farmer 1927/8. Figures for subsequent years show percentage 1927/8 total retained.

But whatever the failure of collectivization to achieve produc- 241
tive efficiency, and other ostensible goals widely advertised in the 423
propaganda of the time,[26] the Soviet State remained completely loyal 135
to the system, bolstering it by police action and developing its distinctive features over the years. Evidently, the regime considered that for its investment, it was receiving an adequate return. The explanation for this unswerving loyalty to the system, in the face of the massive difficulties encountered, is to be found in the striking change in the pattern of grain collection after collectivization (see Table 1). In 1928 the State collected no more than 18.5 per cent of the total grain crop, while in 1937 an estimated 42.4 per cent was State-collected.[27] That this was a direct result of collectivization may be seen in the fact that, from the start, the collectivized sector

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[26] For example, one of the regime claims was that collectivization wiped out the inequality between the rich kulak and the poor peasant. The hypocrisy of this claim was made evident in the agricultural order that replaced the old one. Thus Jasny writes: "The former *kulaki*, actually the more energetic, harder working peasants, are now replaced by the army of chairmen of the *kolkhozy*, tractor drivers, combine operators, and the like. These workers both number and earn more than the *kulaki* . . ." (Jasny, p. 75).

[27] Harry Schwartz (p. 313) gives the Figure 15 per cent for 1928 and 40 per cent for 1939.

241 produced more for the market per hectare of arable land than did
423 the private sector. In 1932, 60 per cent of all households in the
185 Soviet Union had been collectivized, embracing 66 per cent of the sown area. Yet the collective and State farms (*sovkhozy*) supplied 84 per cent of the marketed grain and 83 per cent of the cotton.[28]

With the reinforcement of the collective farm system the State
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185 was in a position where it could force the peasants to serve as a
471 cushion for harvest shocks. In 1937, a bumper year, the peasants
423 received 35.9 per cent of the total grain crop for division among themselves; but in 1938-39, mediocre crop years, the peasants received only 26.9 and 22.9 per cent of the total, despite the fact that a smaller gross volume was to be shared.[29] In each case primary State needs governed the division of the agricultural yield. The Soviet Government had created an administrative apparatus which insured, in the words of one observer, that "if anyone was to starve, [the peasants] would be the first to do so."[30]

The function of the State farms in the Soviet system is similarly linked to the problem of agricultural deliveries. Though accounting for no more than 10 per cent of the arable area in 1937, the *sovkhozy* delivered 30 per cent of the milk, 25 per cent of the wool, and 24 per cent of the meat delivered to the State in that year. Whereas the grain producing collectives delivered only one-third of their total product to the State in the late thirties, the *sovkhozy* contributed three-quarters of their crop.[31] Hence, it may be said that, from the point of view of the Soviet planner, the State farms bore a superiority over the collective farms similar to the superiority of the collectives over the private farms.

471 The case for collectivization was aptly summed up by N. A.
423 Voznesensky when he revealed that the Soviet government in World War II collected three times the annual amount of grain collected by the Czarist regime during World War I when "72 per cent of all marketed grain was concentrated in the hands of estate owners and kulaks." This threefold increase in marketable surplus

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[28] Dobb, p. 249. There were, of course, other factors which accounted for the meagre quantity of goods placed on the market by the private sector, in particular, the amount of State discrimination against the private farms.

[29] Harry Schwartz, p. 265. Schwartz writes with regard to this question: "Only the government's complete domination of the peasantry through the collective farm system made this sharp change in the amount of grain collected possible." (p. 313).

[30] Leonard Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture* (London, 1939), p. 123.

[31] Harry Schwartz, p. 285.

became possible, he concluded, "only on the basis of large-scale mechanized Socialist agriculture."[23]

THE STALINIST SYSTEM DEVELOPED

Since its establishment during the first Five Year Plan the collective farm system has undergone a period of modification (1933-38), a period of intensified exploitation (1938-41), a period of wartime chaos and relaxation (1941-45), and a period of reimposed controls and further tightening (1945-53).

In the early phases of collectivization, deliveries were fixed by arbitrary "contracts" between the *kolkhozy* and the State – the contracts resembling the compulsory requisitions of War Communism. By 1933 peasant opposition, though generally weak and disorganized, forced the regime to grant minor concessions. Foremost among these was a system of fixed quotas to replace the contractual levies. By this device it was hoped to induce the individual *kolkhoznik* to cultivate more intensively, since any surplus beyond the fixed quota was retained by the collective farm and distributed among its members. The concessionary mood of this era was reflected finally in the Artel Statute of 1935 granting the collective farmer a household plot (one-quarter to one-half hectare) and the right to own a limited number of livestock, permission to sell surplus foodstuffs on the urban free market, a more equitable payment system, and a much restricted voice in *kolkhoz* management.

In the years immediately preceding World War II the Soviet regime had again begun to encroach on the rights granted under the Artel Statute. In 1939 the State decreed severe penalties for infractions of collective farm discipline and in 1940 the workday was lengthened. Similarly the method of computing delivery quotas was made stricter. Henceforth norms were computed not on the basis of actual area sown, but on the basis of arable land owned by the collective farm. Since yield estimates computed by State officials were generally arbitrary, the hardship worked by this new departure was severe.

The main direction of the government on the eve of World War II was thus to restrict further the private sector within the collective farms and to redirect attention to the communal land. The result was that an increasing proportion of the peasants' prod-

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[23] Nikolai A. Voznesensky, *The Economy of the U.S.S.R. During World War II* (Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1948), p. 53.

471 act was taken by the State. The regime was still tightening con-
423 trols when the German Army attacked in June of 1941.

World War II subjected the entire collective system to its severest strain and, as Voznesensky observed, the system continued to supply the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for the war, although the regime had to loosen its hold considerably to guarantee the supply. That this achievement was a tribute to the vitality of the State agricultural administration, rather than the morale of the peasants, is suggested by the fact that in those areas invaded by the Germans - particularly Byelorussia and the Ukraine - large masses of peasants greeted them as liberators with the traditional bread and salt. But the Germans, who were as interested as their predecessors in a high "marketable surplus," maintained the *kolkhozy* intact. This policy and the standard Hitlerian excesses in conquered Slavic territory soon alienated the peasants.

With the defeat of the Nazi invasion and the cessation of hostilities in Europe and Asia, the Soviet regime sought to reimpose the agrarian controls loosened in wartime. In line with this policy,
[66] the government instituted a vast purge of collective farm directors and decreed a monetary reform in 1947 that wiped out at one stroke most of the savings accumulated by peasants during the war.
[65] Taxes on incomes derived from the household plots were raised sharply in 1948, 1950, and 1951; delivery quotas on dairy products and meats produced in the household plots were also raised. The culmination of this development in the *kolkhozy* was the shift from the *zveno* (link, or small unit) work system to large-scale labor brigades. Under an amalgamation program the number of collective farms in the Soviet Union was reduced from 252,000 to 97,000. A further effort in this direction was the plan associated with Khrushchev's name to weld the collective farms into vast "agro-towns" (*agrogoroda*), in which the peasantry would suffer the final transformation into a rural proletariat. Although this effort met with acknowledged failure, the theory behind it was not abandoned. In Stalin's last published work, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, he called for a program of "gradual" transformation of collective into public property - in short, the eventual conversion of all agricultural units into State farms."[33]

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[33] Joseph Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (International Publishers, New York), p. 51. In the same work Stalin called for a "relatively higher rate of expansion of the production of the means of production." The two programs - further statification of the farms and the acceleration of investment - were, in fact, inseparable.

Stalin's last work represented the apex of the agricultural policies initiated under his leadership during the first Five Year Plan. In the period after his death the Communists lost the offensive for the first time since 1928 and began to restructure the system in terms of new realities.[34] But in all the revaluation of time-honored doctrines which followed Stalin's death, the essential necessity of the *kolkhoz* system to the Soviet way of life has never been disputed. For the Soviet leaders, at least, it had proved its worth.

This, then, was the system which the East European Communist Parties, drawing so heavily upon Soviet experience, attempted to introduce into the newly-conquered regions in the aftermath of World War II.

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[34] See below, pp. 116-124.

665 and customs they knew, and of which they were usually natives.[3] As subsequent events were to show, the transplantation of the Soviet system to Eastern Europe proved to be far more complicated than these former Cominternists had perhaps anticipated. Local conditions and traditions of the captive countries were everywhere to balk them, demanding improvisations and flexibilities for which they were unprepared.

The story of land collectivization in the Satellites from 1945 to 1953 is consequently the story of the interaction between a highly developed system of agrarian exploitation torn from its Soviet context, and the indigenous conditions of Eastern Europe which confronted Party political-economic planners at every turn. A brief review of these conditions is in order.

2. *The Rise of the Peasant Proprietor* (1800-1939)

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Although some remnants of an essentially feudal land system survived in areas of Poland and Hungary (particularly the latter) until the eve of World War II, the major features of East European feudalism, contrary to popular belief, died before the beginning of the 20th century.[4] Serfdom was finally abolished by parliamentary legislation or revolutionary action by 1860: in the Austrian "hereditary lands" (including Slovenia, Bohemia and Moravia) as early as 1781; in Croatia in 1848; in Hungary (including Slovakia) in 1849; in Congress Poland in 1861; and in Romania in 1864. Emancipation of the Serbian and Bulgarian peasantry resulted from progressive limitations of the political power of their Turkish overlords, a process which took place throughout the 19th century.

As was the case in Russia, however, emancipation did not solve the basic problems of East European rural society. Indeed, with the growing incorporation of Eastern Europe into the world agricultural market, the problems grew even more severe in the 19th century. Except in Bulgaria and Serbia, where a class of peasant smallholders emerged within the framework of Ottoman society, the abolition of serfdom did not establish a sturdy, independent peasantry such as existed in the West. Even in Bulgaria

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[3] "The East European revolution . . . was imposed from outside and from above . . . [and therefore cannot] justly be compared with the revolutions of 1688, 1789, and 1917." (Seton-Watson, p. vii.).

[4] It is necessary, one writer points out, to stress the incorrectness of the widely-held view that "the feudal system, with the characteristic features of the large latifundia, continued to prevail east of the Elbe until the arrival of the Soviet Army." (Ygael Gluckstein, *Stalin's Satellites in Europe*, London, 1952, p. 13).

565 and Serbia the peasants, though not oppressed, were extremely
423 poor. The peasant was no longer tied to the land, but in a great many cases his emancipation meant only that he worked for the same landlord to whom he was once bound. Furthermore, glaring inequalities in the pattern of land ownership developed after emancipation. (Chart IV indicates the inequalities of land distribution surviving the post-World War I reforms).

The root of the problem lay in the fact that emancipation did not lead to a basic improvement in the technological level of farming (with the possible exception of Bohemia) so that with the late 19th century increase in population, the struggle among the peasants was for more land, not for improved technique.[5] In Western Europe the emancipation of the peasantry had been accompanied by the slow certain growth of commerce and industry, but in Eastern Europe no urban society developed to compensate for, and offset, the agrarian dislocations. The rising competition of American grain on the world market further contributed to steady deterioration of the agrarian situation.

565 In the years prior to World War I there developed — both
423 among city intellectuals and peasantry — a growing consciousness of the need for profound reform of the land system. Groups were created to discuss the problems but little concretely was done before the war. The great peasant revolt which shook Romania in 1907, though rapidly suppressed, climaxed this pre-war drive for basic economic change.[6]

World War I, a social as well as a military convulsion, gave the first real impetus to the drive for reform. Stimulated by the success of the peasant revolution in Russia and by local nationalist ferment, the East European peasants organized the first political parties to promulgate demands in the name of the peasants as a distinct class. Their immediate demand was for sweeping land reforms, and their long-range hope was a share in the rule of their countries. "The peasants," in the words of one historian, "were roused and seemingly had learnt that land without liberty, or liberty without land, would be but a half freedom, and that to gain control of power was necessary."[7] In Bulgaria the Agrarian Party, under the leadership of the radical Alexander Stambouliski, took power 669 after the war. Though his regime was overthrown by the reaction- 565 ary Tsankov-Volkov *coup* of 1923, with every excess and barbarity, 423 Stambouliski's premiership left a lasting social imprint. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe peasant parties were not strong enough to take the reigns of government, but the impact of the "green rising" was reflected everywhere in legislative activity.

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[5] The increase in population density in Eastern Europe in recent years is reflected in the fact that, for example, the average Bulgarian farm occupied 7.3 hectares in 1897, and only 4.5 hectares in 1946. Sharp reductions in land per peasant occurred in each of the East European countries.

[6] See Henry Roberts, *Rumania* (New York, 1949), p. 11-21.

[7] David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1951), p. 121.

In Romania about 50 per cent of the arable land (four million 423 hectares) was transferred to peasant smallholders, reflecting the vigor of the 1907 uprising. In newly-created Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the reforms were less spectacular, but followed the same area-wide pattern. In these two countries the land reforms had a national as well as social character, the majority of the expropriated lands having been Hungarian and German properties.[8]

The same forces were at work in Poland where the issue of land reform was uppermost in the public consciousness at the time of the nation's reestablishment. Despite determined opposition from the land owning classes, limited land reforms were decreed in 1919 and 1920. But partly because the principle of total compensation was accepted, only two and a half million hectares were distributed among the peasants by 1938, only enough to satisfy the land hunger of approximately half the natural increase in population.[9]

In the entire region only Hungary resisted peasant demands for land reform. There the movement was effectively blocked, first by Bela Kun's temporary Communist dictatorship, and then by the Horthy reaction. The land structure that emerged from the post-war reforms is described in Chart IV.

As Chart IV indicates, the post-World War I reforms left much to be accomplished in the direction of equalizing the peasant land tenure. But from the Baltic to the Aegean the reforms signified

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[8] In Czechoslovakia 12 per cent of the arable land, or 1.7 million hectares, was distributed under the reform; in Yugoslavia 12.5 per cent of the arable land, or 1.8 million hectares, was distributed. The Yugoslav reforms were largely confined to Croatia and Slovenia, former provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

[9] Ferdynand Zweig, *Poland Between the Wars* (London, 1944), p. 130. Zweig's analysis of the national discussion of reform in the early 1920s is interesting, partly because so many of the arguments employed by those who opposed breaking up the large estates are those which are today used to justify the modern *kolkhoz*! This is true particularly of the argument that "self-sufficient small holdings are supposed to be unsuitable for compulsory deliveries in war-time." (p. 134).

423 the growing strength of the peasants and a further consolidation of a distinctly peasant culture with its special mores and traditions.[10]

Post-Reform Conditions

423 Despite the undoubted benefits which land reform brought
241 to many formerly impoverished peasants, the agricultural economy of Eastern Europe remained largely stagnant in the inter-war period. The failure of the reforms to work a radical improvement in the standard of living and to raise total agricultural production may be attributed to the fact that the reforms themselves were primarily *political* rather than *economic* in intent. They were motivated very largely by the "green rising," the panic fear of Bolshevism (which seized power in Bela Kun's Hungary in 1919 and swept to the gates of Warsaw in 1920), the social upheaval of the First World War, and the new nationalism. In no case is there evidence that an overall increase of agricultural production was the primary goal. Like the vast revolution in the Russian countryside of 1917-18, the East European reforms were designed to "distribute wealth, rather than to produce it."[11]

In short, if the reforms narrowed the gap between rich and poor, they failed to create the lasting conditions of agricultural prosperity. Indeed, by reducing the area of the landed estates which traditionally produced large marketable surpluses, the reforms hindered urban-industrial growth and restricted cash exports.[12] As a consequence, the agricultural level of Eastern Europe remained far below that of the more advanced countries of Western Europe (see Table 2). Essentially the same picture emerges from computation of the annual per hectare yield of the East European countries (see Chart II).

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[10] *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1944), p. 58.

[11] Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (Geneva, 1945), p. 100. For a similar view, stressing the *political* rather than the *economic* motivation of the East European land reform, see David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania* (Oxford, 1930), Chapter 10.

[12] Data on the relative efficiency of small and large-scale farming in Eastern Europe are scanty, but Seton-Watson concluded that it was generally true that "the smaller the holding, the lower the productivity of the soil." (Seton-Watson, p. 86). Similarly, Moore held that "the large holdings tend to yield a greater product per unit of capital by more nearly maximum utilization of work animals." (Moore, p. 101). But whether or not large-scale farming was more *efficient* than small-scale farming, there is no doubt that the large-scale farms produced a higher proportion of the *marketed* produce, although this factor varied from country to country and from region to region.

241 banks, agro-technical training schools, agricultural machine indus-
211 tries, and rural communications received only minor allocations. The backward condition of rural transportation made the task of competing with foreign grain — especially American — on the world market that much more difficult and the lack of facilities for the fertilizer production helped maintain the low yield.

The institutional organization of agriculture placed strong impediments to improved efficiency and increased productivity. Thus the small size of peasant holdings, frequently scattered in tiny plots, subdivided through inheritance, in debt to local banks, sometimes still held under tenancy arrangements, all combined to blight the hopes raised by the first post-war reforms.

The means and resources of the various national governments were usually devoted to furthering industrial development and the accumulation of capital for favored projects from which the peasants rarely benefited. While in some countries import duties on motor cars might be reduced, duties on agricultural machinery were gradually raised.[13] The blind pursuit of such policies by the inter-war governments inevitably deepened the rift between town and country, and intensified peasant suspicion of the central regimes. In some cases the response of the regimes to such suspicions was to convert themselves into semi-fascist governments, which were not dependent upon that minimum of popular support which their semi-parliamentary predecessors required for continued existence.[14]

3. *World War II and After*

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If World War I set in motion the process of land reform, World War II brought that process to a close. No doubt the sudden emergence of the Communists as a major political force in the area expedited completion of the reforms begun in the 1920s, but

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[13] *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean*, p. 41-2. In Romania prior to 1928 the government imposed export duties on agricultural products. These duties were revoked but the general disregard for the needs of the landed population remained. And while it is true that there were efforts on the part of East European governments to make some administrative services available to the peasants (such as the Hungarian Social Fund, the O.N.C.A.) they were halting and generally short-lived.

[14] The process of excluding peasant parties from any kind of representation in the governments "began with Hungary in 1919, continued with Bulgaria in 1923, with Poland in 1926, with Yugoslavia in 1929, and with Rumania in 1931" (Mitrany, p. 122). Only the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party was able to remain in power, and in Bulgaria the Agrarian Party returned briefly between 1930 and 1934.

423 there were many indigenous forces which played a role as well. The war shook the fragile structure of East European society and made it vulnerable to rapid and drastic change.

Indeed, even in pre-war years the agitation for land reform had begun to take on serious character. By 1939 the rising peasant demands in Poland for further division of the landed estates had posed a critical challenge to the Sanacja regime and there were signs that the Hungarian ruling class were beginning to recognize the inevitability of land redistribution.

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665 The impact of the war on the consciousness of the people was most dramatically expressed in the political reorientation which accompanied it. Tito's Partisan movement drew important support from the ranks of the impoverished peasantry. The sharp upward surge of the Czechoslovak Communist Party after the war may be taken, at least in part, as an indication of a more radical mood in the population as a whole. In Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, the ruling classes, which contracted disastrous alliances with Hitler's New Order, had thereby discredited themselves, and gave way to spokesmen for radical action.

These changes were reflected politically in the fact that the main opposition to the Communists in the post-war era came, not from the remnants of the pre-war ruling classes, but from the more progressive peasant, and to a degree, from Social Democratic parties. The general framework of political and social thought had shifted to the left, and parties such as the Smallholders in Hungary and the Peasant Party in Poland assumed the dominant positions denied them in pre-war political life.[15]

423 Under these conditions the rapid conclusion of land reforms was inevitable and the Communists appeared, not as the instigators of reform, but as its overseer. Indeed, the reforms instituted in 1945-46 were not "socialist" in character, even in Hungary and

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[15] The history of the non-Communist agrarian reform movements in Eastern Europe, prior to, and during World War II is yet to be written. The task is made somewhat difficult by present Communist efforts to blot out all evidence of the very existence of such movements outside the realm of the Communist Parties. The "Village Explorers" in Hungary, for example, who identified the high standards of peasant culture with an expected national renaissance, helped pave the way for the great reforms of 1945. Other groups, such as the Plowman's Front in Romania and the "Pladne" Agrarians in Bulgaria, also played, or might have played, important roles. The Polish Peasant Party is also worth considering in this respect because its role in the wartime resistance gave it roots among the peasantry sometimes lacking in the inter-war official "peasant" parties.

Poland where they were most extensive. On the contrary, like the reforms of the 1920s, they signified a broadening of the property basis of society, not its limitation, and their aim was redistribution of property and wealth, not the reorganization of production. 423

Communist participation in the land reforms must be understood as a part of their political program, not as a part of their social program of "building socialism." The overriding concern of the East European Communist Parties in the post-war period was not the shape of the future economy, but the assumption of the political power. The Communists offered no opposition to the implementation of the reforms, and, in most cases, expedited them to curry favor with the population. The Communists attuned themselves to the popular mood, carefully concealing the focal point of their operations, which lay in the day-to-day process of consolidating power in the State apparatus, particularly in the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Agriculture. To this end they worked, often obscurely, in minority positions, in the post-war governing coalitions and supported land programs which actually impeded their own subsequent collectivization drives. 423 665

The Communists went so far as to support, on countless occasions, the principle of private property. Thus, in 1945, the Hungarian Communist theoretician, Josef Revai, stated categorically: "There exists a material community of interest between the peasantry and labor: the preservation of the distributed land."[16] And two months later Matyas Rakosi echoed his words, declaring, "We do not want kolkhozes, but strong and prospering small farms."[17] And an organ of the Polish Communists, *Glos Ludu*, expressed itself very clearly in the same year:

> The development of the village economy can not and will not be a copy of the Russian development. Our conditions are different; our national traditions are different as well. The difference is in the psychology of the Pole, and without doubt our Polish way of progress will be different.[18]

THE SUBSTANCE OF THE REFORMS

Assured of full Communist support, the reforms were rapidly implemented throughout the region. The most radical land alterations occurred in Hungary, where the land structure had been least 423

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[16] *Szabad Nep*, August 18, 1945.

[17] *Szabad Nep*, October 18, 1945.

[18] *Glos Ludu*. December 18, 1945.

● 423 affected by inter-war reforms. The Communist-dominated Ministry of Agriculture administered the land distribution (decreed March 17, 1945, following the Debrecen Conference), by the terms of which all holdings greater than 57 hectares were to be divided and all estates in excess of 570 hectares were to be expropriated outright. The resulting change was drastic: at one stroke the great Hungarian latifundia were destroyed (see Table 3).

TABLE 3

STRUCTURE OF HUNGARIAN LAND HOLDING BEFORE AND AFTER POST-WAR REFORM *

Category (Cadastral Acres)	1935		1946	
	Percent of Landholdings	Percent of Area (total)	Percent of Landholdings	Percent of Area (total)
1–10	85.0	19.3	86.9	39.0
10–50	13.3	26.1	12.9	32.0
50–200	1.2	11.5	1.0	12.5
200–3000	0.4	21.0	0.2	12.4
Over 3000	0.1	22.1	0.0	3.2

* *Magyar Statistikai Zsebkonyv*, XV. Evfolyam, Budapest, 1948.

Under the terms of the reform 34.6 per cent of the total arable land was seized and redistributed. The land in possession of those peasants holding fewer than 10 cadastral acres doubled in size, and the land belonging to those holding more than 200 hectares was reduced by nearly two-thirds. Despite local excesses and Communist zeal, the peasants supported the expropriations enthusiastically.

An ominous sign of the future, hidden from the mass of the population at the time, was the sequestration of some of the seized lands for the creation of future state, model, and collective farms. Those farms listed in Table 3 over 3000 cadastral acres were already largely converted into State Farms by 1947, and by 1950 all those over 200 cadastral acres had been similarly converted.

The post-war land reforms in Poland were second in magnitude only to the Hungarian reforms. Approximately 4.6 million hectares of agricultural land (18 per cent of the national total) were held by farms of more than 50 hectares. By the decrees of September 6, 1944, and January 17, 1945, these lands were distributed among landless peasants and dwarfholders. But the majority of the lands distributed were seized in the so-called Western Territories, the former German districts of Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia (see Table 4).

TABLE 4

STRUCTURE OF POLISH LAND HOLDING BEFORE AND AFTER POST-WAR REFORM *

	1935		1946	
Category of Holding	Percent of Holdings	Percent of Total Area	Percent of Holdings	Percent of Total Area
1–5	64.2	14.8	61.2	26.6
5–10	24.8	17.0	27.1	38.8
10–50	10.5	20.9	12.6	33.2
Over 50	0.5	47.3	0.1	1.4

* Source: Moore, p. 82; *Rocznik Statystyczny, 1949*. (Warsaw, 1950), p. 53.

The specific Communist bias of the land reforms was evident in Poland as well as in Hungary. Forty per cent of the lands expropriated in the Western territories and 36 per cent in the rest of the new country were withheld from general distribution and set aside for the creation of State and communal farms.

In Romania the post-World War II reform was comparatively modest, affecting only one-third as much land as was affected by the 1919 reform. Eleven per cent of the land was still held by farms of over 100 hectares, and the decree of March 22, 1945, fixing the legal maximum at 50 hectares, did away with these larger estates. The Romanian reform paralleled those of Hungary and Poland in that for the time it respected the integrity of church lands. Royal lands were not expropriated until the monarchy was suppressed in 1947.

The land seized for redistribution in Czechoslovakia was

● 423 largely concentrated in the Sudentenland and southeast Slovakia where large German and Hungarian minorities had dwelt before the war. The expulsion of all German farmers and most Hungarian farmers in the post-war period resulted in the creation of a 2.6 million hectare land fund for distribution among landless peasantry and dwarfholders. It was not until 1947 that a law was passed which expropriated the properties of large Czech and Slovak land owners. A maximum of 50 hectares was decreed for all land holdings, as the result of which an additional 900,000 hectares was made available for general distribution.

Since the structure of rural society in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was relatively egalitarian, the extent of the post-World War II reforms in both countries was small compared to those of Hungary, Poland and Romania. In Yugoslavia 850,000 hectares (six per cent of the land) was parcelled out among the peasantry, much of it derived from expropriated land held by German farmers in the Vojvodina. In Bulgaria, where no sizeable foreign element existed on the land, only 134,000 hectares (three per cent of the land) was redistributed among the poor peasants.

4. *The Results of the Reforms*

423 There is no doubt that the Communists manipulated the reforms to bolster their own position and prestige. In each country they controlled the Ministry of Agriculture and administered the land redistribution so that recipients of land felt obligated to the Communist Party. Communist popularity in the former Sudentenland in Czechoslovakia and in the Western Territories of Poland was very great after the war as a result. Furthermore, the diversion of a good portion of the expropriated lands to model and State Farms indicated that the Communists had no intention of forever relying upon an independent peasantry for their agricultural produce.

At the same time, however, there is no justification for the oft-heard contention that the land reforms were merely a prelude to collectivization, and that by dividing up the land the Communists hoped to create so many small and economically non-viable farms that private farming would become impossible. The lack of validity of this charge is clear from the fact that the post-World War I reforms had precisely the same impact on rural society and certainly the aim of those reforms was not to prepare the land for collectivization. On the contrary, land reform deepened peasant attachment to the land by creating a larger class of land holders. Furthermore, careful study reveals that the *average* size of the East European farm *after* the land reforms was not appreciably smaller than the average of non-estate holdings before the reforms. 423

That the Communists heralded the land reforms as a triumph for their cause only serves to indicate how demagogic and opportunistic was their behavior in Eastern Europe after the war. In fact, they only completed a land reform begun a quarter of a century earlier by non-Communist regimes. But the reform was portrayed in propaganda as a sudden and unprecedented blow to "feudalism" which only the Communists could have administered. In this way the Communists tried to steal the thunder of those parties in Eastern Europe who had for a quarter of a century fought for completion of land reforms. It was part of the cynical and devious route by which the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe were slowly making their way to full state power.

Indeed, there is considerable evidence to show that the Communists preferred to take power without the aid of genuinely revolutionary movements. The calculated policy of permitting the Nazis to destroy the powerful non-Communist but leftist Polish underground in Warsaw was one indication of the Communist fear of spontaneous and deeply rooted reform movements. As Mitrany points out, "When the Soviet armies first occupied territory in Eastern peasant countries, they did not attempt to use the peasants against the existing regime";[4] instead they concentrated on seizing the centers of political power through which, in time, they were to introduce land reform by official fiat. 668

This wide divergence in revolutionary tactics between 1917 and 1944-45 arose from two factors. First, the spontaneous revolutionary forces in Eastern Europe were so weak that the Communists, with the aid of onrushing armies, could either defeat them or take them over. Second, the internal bureaucratization of the Communist movement which has occurred since Lenin's day made it imperative that the Communists rely primarily upon their own organization to affect events rather than upon the power of mass human forces. Consequently, they eschewed raising revolutionary slogans and adopted only those slogans which would help ease the path to organizational control.

These differences are of crucial importance in understanding the general course which the "East European Revolution" took, and the particular character of its agricultural policy.

Although Lenin's seizure of political power in 1917 was accom- 661
panied by a vast peasant-made reform of the Russian land system, 423
he did not sanctify it with affirmations of his belief in independent peasant farming, as his more cynical East European successors were to do nearly 30 years later. Indeed, by decreeing nationalization of the land immediately after assuming power, Lenin made it clear that he considered individual peasant management of the land a transitional stage.[5] Consequently, Bolshevik policy shifts in the

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[4] Mitrany, p. 179.

[5] Theoretical opposition to the land reform as a serious solution to the agrarian problem remained a part of the international Communist policy throughout the twenties, and was abandoned only after the policy shift to the Popular Front (1934-35). Even in the Far East, where the urban proletariat was very small, Comintern agents adhered to this general line. Only in the early thirties, under Mao Tse-tung's leadership, did the Communists in the Far East begin to appreciate the revolutionary potential in the slogan of land reform. During the Popular Front era, when the Communists allied themselves with a variety of previously prohibited groups in Europe and elsewhere, they accustomed themselves to the demagogic opportunism they practiced with such skill after the Second World War. (See Franz Borkenau, *World Communism*, New York, 1939).

661 423 early years did not require the radical reorientations of the official attitude toward the peasantry and the land so characteristic of later policy in Eastern Europe. The concessionary New Economic Policy itself introduced in 1921, was invariably labeled a "retreat" imposed by circumstances, and Lenin left little doubt that "two steps forward" would follow this "one step backward." However, the post-war Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, empirical and opportunistic, swung with the political tides, professing convenient belief in any economic measures which would increase their political control.

661 These differences are not merely in the *tactics* of revolution, but rather in the changing character of Communism itself. In his volume, Mitrany emphasizes the increasing degree to which contemporary Stalinist Communists were preoccupied with the question of power.[6] Whereas Bela Kun's dictatorship in Hungary in 1919 sacrificed political power partly because it refused to permit or encourage land reforms, Rakosi's post-war dictatorship appealed to popular support by expediting the reform of the land.[7] Indeed, it was Rakosi himself who gave classic elaboration of the new political methods and spirit of Communism in his famous 1952 discussion of "salami tactics." Rather than defeating the Smallholders Party by frontal attack, he explained, they were defeated by ceaseless internal manipulations:

> This gradual, day-by-day 'slicing off' of the reaction lurking within the Smallholders' Party was . . . termed 'salami tactics.' In the course of our incessant struggle against the enemy, its strength was gradually frittered away, and its impact on the working class was waning.[8]

"Salami tactics," then, describe the method by which opposition was suffocated by slow strangulation rather than by outright struggle. This policy demanded a degree of hypocrisy rarely required by Lenin's more forthright methods. Thus, the Bulgarian Communist, Anton Yugov, could declare in 1944 that "this Government, of which I am a member, and on whose behalf I speak, categorically denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist regime 661 in Bulgaria." And Imre Nagy, the Hungarian Communist, was able to state in 1946 that the main struggle was not between "capitalism and socialism," but between "democracy and reaction *within* capitalism."[9] Within a year or two both Yugov and Nagy were to repudiate these statements completely; but repudiation was impossible until the necessary maneuvers had taken place within the Government which made the Communists no longer dependent upon a minimum of popular acceptance.

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[6] Mitrany, p. 170: "Whatever the theoretical pretenses that still surrounded" the Communist movement, he writes, "the issue [had] narrowed down to a question of sheer power."

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 186: "In 1919 the Socialist groups victorious in Munich, Vienna, and Budapest had proclaimed the Marxist agrarian program and, so, quickly lost power; the new regimes controlled by the Communists after 1945 elaborately buried the program so as to retain power."

[8] *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), March-April, 1952.

This policy of revolution *from above* and *by degrees* influenced every aspect of East European Communist policy, and distinguished it from the earlier Soviet experience. It reflected the degree to which the East European Communist Parties were not indigenous groupings of revolutionary idealists, but agents of an expanding imperial system, bureaucratically organized, and highly regimented. Even in Czechoslovakia, where the Communists had important working class support, the seizure of power was engineered from the Ministry of Interior rather than fought in the streets. Elsewhere, working class support was either non-existent, as in Romania, or minimal, as in Poland, where 1946 shop elections showed the Socialists three times as popular among the workers as the Communists.

This absence of any genuine national support, and the close attachment of these bureaucratized parties to the Soviet military apparatus, made the use of "salami tactics" in the political realm absolutely necessary. The same factors applied to the Communist land policy. The Satellite Parties were no more capable of a Stalinist "offensive on the land," a frontal attack on peasant economy and society, than they had been of a Leninist assault on the centers of governmental power. The same process of "slow suffocation" which had brought the Communists to political power was the only weapon by which the Communists could alter the land structure.

2. *The Pattern and Pace of Collectivization*

The transfer of the Soviet agricultural system to Eastern Europe 423 ● 661 is a complex and many-sided story, the details of which vary greatly from one country to the next. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, for example, efforts to impose the Soviet pattern were begun immediately after the close of the Second World War, while in Poland and

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[9] See Gluckstein, pp. 131-142, for a full account of the Communist attempt to pose as defenders of the *status quo* in 1944-45.

Czechoslovakia no serious attempts were made until four years later. In Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, collectivization has profoundly altered the structure of agrarian economy, while in Poland the pre-Communist land system still remains substantially intact. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the collectivization drive, or at least the major effort, was compressed into a relatively short period of time, though elsewhere in the Satellite sphere the land offensive was diffused over several years. In Hungary, and to a lesser degree in Czechoslovakia, the 1953 agrarian crisis has forced the dissolution of an appreciable number of collective farms; but in Poland and Bulgaria the effects of this area-wide crisis, though real, are scarcely as inclusive. These variations in pattern are a reflection of the degree to which Satellite collectivization is a function, not primarily of Communist doctrinal predilections, but of specific local forces and conditions. The general goal was everywhere the same—subordination of free agriculture to the demand of urban-industrial Communist society—but in practice agrarian policies have never been entirely uniform. Among those forces and conditions affecting the pace and intensity of Satellite collectivization were such variables as the strength of the peasant traditions of independent farming, the position of the individual Satellite in the over-all Soviet economic design, the structure of the prevailing land system, the degree of planned industrialization, and the size and dynamism of the national party.

The intimate connection between Communist agricultural policy and the demands of a totalitarian industrial economy was first elaborated by Stalin himself in 1928, when he acknowledged indirectly that the primary goal of collectivization was the increased State share in agricultural production. The Satellite theoreticians were not as blunt as Stalin and usually clothed their economic designs in elaborate ideological terminology. Perhaps the most direct statement on the subject, however, was made by the Yugoslav economic planner, Boris Kidric, in 1947, at a time when his country was the most orthodox and militant of the Satellite states. "The business of agriculture in a Socialist society," he stated, "is to supply the towns and industrial centers with food."[10]

The variety of policies put forward in the ensuing years were derived from this basic goal. Much as the Communists attempted to demonstrate that their policies were motivated by concern for the peasantry, it was clear that the question of ensuring "supply" of "food" for the cities remained the cornerstone of Communist agrarian policy. And though Kidric argued that to achieve this goal the Party was faced with the "categorical imperative of undertaking urgent measures to raise work productivity in agriculture," the hypocrisy of this statement was revealed by the simultaneous decision to allocate the barest minimum of national funds for the effort. Indeed, as the policy itself unfolded, it became clear that what Kidric meant was that it was the "business of agriculture in a Socialist society" to supply goods to the city at a price which the new urban bureaucracy was willing to pay, and that price was very low. Kidric's superior, Tito, was quite frank with regard to this problem:

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[10] *Borba*, (Belgrade), April 25, 1947.

> In the same way as we must do our best to make ourselves independent of weather conditions in agriculture, so we must never allow ourselves the luxury of depending on the good will of private food producers. We must undertake measures to secure the necessary food for our industrial population and for carrying forward our Socialist projects. We must protect our food supply against chaos in production and distribution caused by the existence of tens of thousands of small and independent farms.[11]

It was precisely to this extent that the Communists were interested in agriculture. If, in the process of "protecting" themselves from the "chaos" of "tens of thousands of small and independent farms," the level of argicultural production increased, the Communists would indeed be overjoyed; but such an improvement would be peripheral to the basic goal, which was redistribution of the crop rather than its improvement.

To implement this redistribution two courses were open to the State, only one of which was consistent with power realities in Eastern Europe and Communist industrial plans. 1) By increasing the flow of industrial goods from the city to the country, the Communists could stimulate the peasantry to place a greater share of their produce on the market. 2) By creating an agricultural structure through which the State could exercise direct administrative control, the Communists could force the peasantry to increase the share of goods marketed. It was the latter course which was consistent with the Eastern European political situation; and the Com-

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[11] *Ibid.*, November 4, 1952.

423 661 munists, with the Russian experience guiding them closely, followed it. The decision to collectivize was essentially the decision to pursue this path, for the increased exploitation of the peasantry implicit in it was the only path consistent with "carrying forward of our Socialist projects." The basic preparation for collectivization was therefore in the seizure or creation of those organs of repression through which the Communists could exercise the necessary political control.

The groundwork for post-war collectivization was consequently not laid in the countryside, where Communist influence in these early years was small and generally limited to the new State Farms, but in the cities, where the Parties slowly extended their control over the State apparatus. Once the levers of governmental power were secured, the Communists were able to exert relentless pressure on the farms.

The tactics of the East European Parties in this "offensive" phase were never military, except perhaps in Yugoslavia, where political conditions most closely paralleled those of the Soviet Union in the early Stalinist era. And even in Yugoslavia the chief weapon was slow economic strangulation of the peasantry, an erosive process designed to break the will to resist and in the end leave the class disunited, despairing, and helpless. The offensive tactics of the bureaucratically-minded Satellite Parties deserve more detailed exposition.

ECONOMIC PRESSURE

661 471 This was the most direct means by which the Satellite Parties sought to destroy the independent peasant. Everywhere in the sphere compulsory tax and crop delivery schedules were promulgated, discriminating heavily against the independent sector, and particularly against middle and rich peasants. Collecting revenue was never a primary end of the tax decrees, though funds forced from the countryside were often considerable. Confiscatory delivery quotas served the additional and important function of guaranteeing supplies of foodstuffs for the urban-industrial centers. The primary economic end – the eventual bankruptcy of the individual producer, who in the early post-war years was still thriving by selling on the free and black markets–is well illustrated by the 1953 delivery schedules for Czechoslovakia. On the best land in the country a peasant with five hectares had to deliver three times as much grain to the State *per hectare* as a peasant owning two hec-

661 well-to-do peasants had survived the post-war reforms, the size of this group was minuscule compared to the propaganda concentrated upon it. As the collectivization drive gained momentum, it became increasingly clear that the slogan of the "struggle to liquidate the kulaks" was largely an ideological cover under which a general onslaught against the entire peasantry was being waged.

"The distinguishing feature of this [agricultural] revolution," Stalin once said concerning Soviet collectivization, "is that it was accomplished *from above*, on the initiative of the State, directly supported *from below* by the millions of peasants."[19] His formula was designed to distinguish the "agricultural revolution" from the "socialist revolution" of 1917, which presumably took its initiative *from below*. Therefore, one may assume that the emphasis in his formula is to be placed on its first clause (from above) rather than on the second (from below). The constant state of tension between the peasantry and the State in the years of collectivization is testimony to the reluctance of the peasantry to believe that the drive to "liquidate the kulaks" was being waged in their favor.

[668] The means by which the peasants expressed their antagonism to the agricultural policy were varied and the material on them is voluminous. The Romanian Party organ, *Scanteia*, described the forms which peasant resistance took in this fashion:

> At the present time, the resistance of the capitalist elements [the peasantry] in our country takes various forms: the sabotage of the cultivation and sowing plan, the refusal to complete compulsory delivery quotas and to pay taxes, plotting against the collective farms and peasant partnerships, black market operations and artificially raising prices – going so far as the communication of rumors of the criminal character of arson and murder.[20]

But the most direct evidence of the failure of Communist propaganda to win peasant support for collectivization was the economic apathy of the peasants and the continued impatience and fury of Communist propaganda. Since the regimes did not themselves resort to outright violence, neither did the peasants. But to the policy of slow economic suffocation the peasants countered a policy of passive resistance traditional among the backward peasantry of Eastern Europe.

3. *The Economic Strategy of Collectivization*

● 423 The effort to transform the East European countryside was

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[19] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short Course)*. (International Publishers, New York, 1939), p. 305.

[20] Scanteia (Bucharest), April 12, 1953.

PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS AND ACREAGE AROUND 1949*

(Percentagewise Distribution)

I. Private Agricultural Holdings According to Size of Property.

Holdings (in ha.)		Czechos.	Poland	Hung.†	Romania‡	Bulgaria	Yugos.§
Midget:	0-2	46.5	28.8	68.6	53.1	29.2	65.0
Small:	2-5	23.5	32.5	18.9	22.9	38.6	
Medium:	5-10	17.1	27.1	8.5	17.9	25.4	21.3
Med. Large:	10-20	10.6	10.4	3.4	5.0	6.8	5.6
Large:	20-50	2.3	1.2	0.6	1.1		4.0
TOTAL		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	95.9

II. Respective Share in Total Private Farmland Acreage.

Midget:	0-2	7.9	6.0	23.1	–	6.7	34.0
Small:	2-5	17.9	21.5	27.3	–	30.9	
Medium:	5-10	27.2	38.8	22.4	–	41.5	31.3
Med. Large:	10-20	32.1	27.3	18.3	–	20.9	14.6
Large:	20-50	14.9	6.4	8.9	–		19.4
TOTAL		100.0	100.0	100.0	–	100.0	99.3

† Hungary: divisions are from 0-2.8 ha.; 2.8-5.7 ha.; 5.7-11.4 ha.; 11.4-28.7 ha.; 28.7-57.5 ha.

‡ Romania: divisions are from 1-3 ha. (instead of 1-2 ha.) and 3-5 ha.; (instead of 2-5 ha.).

§ Yugoslavia: divisions are from up to 5 ha.; 5-10; 10-15 (instead of 20 ha.) and over 15 ha.

*C: J. Stejskal: Program Scitani Zemedelskych v.g. 1950 (Programe of the Census of Agricultural Holdings in 1950) in *Statisticky Zpravodaj*, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Prague), 1950, p. 46.

P: *Rocznik Statist.* 1949 (Statistical Yearbook), (Warsaw), 1950, p. 54.

H: *Gazdasagstatisztikai Tajekoztato* (Econ. & Stat. Bull.) Vol. 1, No. 13 (Budapest), Dec. 1947, p. 696.

R: N.A. Golopentia & P. Onica: *Recensamantul Agricol, Rep. Pop. Romana* (The Agricultural Census) (Bucharest), 1948, p. 7.

B: *Mesechni Izvestiia na Glavnata Direktsia na Statistikata,* (Monthly Bull. of the Gen. Direct. of Statist.) (Sofia), July 1947, p. 27.

Y: Milun Ivanovic: Cooperatives and Agricultural Development, *Review of Intern. Affairs,* Vol. IV, No. 13 (Belgrade), July 1953, p. 17 sq.

5: Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe E2
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423 severely limited by the special character of East European Communism. Bureaucratic in spirit and cautious by temperament, it was neither able, nor did it seriously attempt, to destroy the basic configuration of rural society. As late as 1953, the peasant population remained essentially stable, though the regimes had siphoned off surplus rural manpower to the rapidly expanding industrial centers. The land massing of the farms, on the Soviet model, radically altering the peasant social structure, lay far in the future. The problem facing the Communist planner was the much simpler one of altering the social structure sufficiently to destroy the peasants' capacity to sabotage industrial "grandeur" planned for the new cities.

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423 The land structure prevailing in Eastern Europe after the reforms—the raw substance from which the Communists were to create collective farms – is described in Table 5. The following pattern emerges:

> The number of "producing-consuming" units—agricultural holdings of five hectares and less, producing little surplus for the urban market – represented well over three-quarters of the total in Romania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and perhaps two-thirds in Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. In this category, approximately 30 percent of the total holdings in Poland and Bulgaria, 50 percent in Czechoslovakia and Romania, and as much as 65-70 percent in Yugoslavia and Hungary were dwarf farms, barely capable of covering the needs of the family in possession.
>
> The group of medium peasant holdings—peasant farms of approximately 5-10 hectares—were a significant category chiefly in Poland and Hungary where they represented approximately one-quarter of the total. These farms were of lesser importance elsewhere in the region.
>
> The group of medium-large holdings—farms of 10-20 hectares—comprised six percent or less of the total throughout the region, reaching 10 percent only in Czechoslovakia and Poland.
>
> The large peasant holdings, or "kulak" farms—of 15-20 hectares and more—varied throughout the region, ranging from one to four percent of the total.

As for the proportionate share of the total arable land, the structure of private ownership had the following characteristics (see Table 6):

423 The "producing-consuming" units generally comprised
311 one-quarter to one-third of the farmland throughout the region, but in Hungary almost one-half the total.

The medium units, of five to 10 hectares, occupied between one-quarter and one-third of the farm area.

The medium-large holdings controlled 20 percent, or less, of the farmland in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and approximately 25 percent in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Finally, the large holdings—upwards of 15-20 hectares—totaled 10-15 percent of the private farmlands, except in Bulgaria where they did not exist, and in Yugoslavia where they formed close to 20 percent.

661 Since the Communists' primary problem was the extraction of
423 agricultural produce from the countryside, the focus of the contemplated agrarian reorganization had to be those viable, surplus-producing farms which traditionally supplied the cities with the produce necessary to their existence. And because it was precisely these farms which were best able to withstand the slow economic pressures of the State, and least interested in economic reform, the Communists had to prepare for a formidable struggle. In order to impose collective structure on these farms, it was necessary to discriminate against them in favor of the collectives. But this very discrimination—the refusal to supply credits, mechanical equipment, and fertilizers, and the collection of higher taxes and delivery quotas —tended to destroy their vitality and decrease the surplus produce in which the Communists were interested. So long, therefore, as these farms remained outside the collective structure, their value to the Communists was decreased as collectivization progressed. Similarly, the favorable treatment afforded the collective farms tended to decrease their basic value to the State. It was difficult to extract a high surplus of produce from farms with lower delivery quotas. These internal contradictions would inevitably continue so long as the *process* of collectivization itself was not completed, and the use of discriminatory tactics was necessary.

It is not altogether surprising that the Satellite planners never pursued an entirely consistent policy in this regard. In the early years, they tended to concentrate on absorbing the poorer farms into the collectives because they were most vulnerable to Communist pressure and appeal. Later, they tended to concentrate on those larger farms whose collectivization was crucial to the success

of their land policy. But no matter how they proceeded—and the 661
pattern differed from one country to another—they could not re- 423 ●
solve the dilemmas posed by a slow paced collectivization. Had they been able to follow the Soviet model of full collectivization in several rapid and brutal campaigns, they might conceivably have avoided some of these pitfalls.

The chief surplus producing sector—the middle farms between 423
10 and 20 hectares—comprised some 900,000 units (See Table 6). 311
The systematic dissociation of this stratum from the upper stratum of owners holding over 20 hectare holdings, and its methodical "fractionalization" represented one of the essential characteristics of the collectivization drive. It was *this* stratum of the farm population which the regime frequently labeled "kulak," adjusting its definition as it became necessary in each situation. By 1950 it was clear that this stratum represented a challenge to the Communists not—as it was alleged—because its members hired farm labor to help work their lands, but because it constituted the producing backbone of the nation, a source of productive strength which the Communists were determined to turn to their own ends.

4. *The Strategy Unfolded*

The post-war expulsions of the *Volksdeutsche* and other German minority groups from Eastern Europe and the expropriation of their lands, together with those of Nazi collaborators, gave the early Communist-dominated regimes their first hold over the agrarian economy. Particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia the former German holdings formed the nucleus of the State Farms. Confiscation of the great latifundia in Hungary and of royal lands in Romania similarly created a reserve land fund on which the State could draw. In general, forest lands throughout the region were nationalized and administered by managerial panels created for that purpose. In addition, much pasture and meadowland was expropriated by a variety of legal devices, the over-all total equalling some two million hectares of first quality land. The State share in the combined forests, pasturage, and arable land of Eastern Europe ranged from 17 percent in Yugoslavia to 36 percent in Poland, and to as much as 41 percent in Czechoslovakia. Until 1949, the State farms still continued to play a minor role, except in Poland and Czechoslovakia where experiments along these lines were pushed very early.

During 1949-50 the State sector of agriculture expanded rapidly,

● 423 either by the simple process of extending existing land reserves, or
311 by acquisition—sometimes outright expropriation—of "kulak" lands or communally-organized "model" farms. By the close of 1949, State farms in Czechoslovakia, for example, had increased by 600 percent. By and large, however, the areas controlled by the State farms—particularly in Hungary—contained a disproportionate share of non-cultivated land (see Chart V).

In Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, the State sector comprised an area of considerable importance, and it was on the State farms—theoretically, at least, the highest existing form of "Socialist agriculture"—that the chief Communist hopes rested. It is, in fact, the case that in the East European Satellites, State Farms achieved a higher level of development in general than in the Soviet Union at a comparable stage, since the initiative of the Russian peasantry in 1917-18 prevented the large-scale land seizures on which a State farming system could be based.

423 But in the Satellites, as in the Soviet Union, the primary effort
474 was devoted to the collective farm. In the Satellites, where the land offensive had a thoroughly bureaucratic character, the collective farms offered the additional advantage of *flexibility*. A variety of collectivized farms were created to facilitate the peasants' progress from independent farming to full collectivity. Even the terms used to describe the collective farms—"Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives" in Poland, for example—were designed to blur the true implications and to mask the ultimate purpose of collectivization. Similarly, in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the very name for collective farms—*zadrugi*—was a calculated attempt to evoke memories of the ancestral communal traditions of the southern Balkans.

Thus the regimes trod softly in the early years. In Czechoslovakia, for example, four types of "Uniform Agricultural Cooperatives" (UAC) were established from which the peasants—in accordance with the "voluntary" principle—might choose:

Type I	Joint tillage of the land, but retention of title in real property contributed, as well as in draft animals, farm equipment, and the harvested crops.
Type II	Joint tillage of the land, but title retained in real property, draft animals, and farm equipment; all boundaries plowed over, and plots grouped in "land

	compounds"; rent received on land, livestock, and equipment contributed.
Type III	Joint tillage of the land and joint care of livestock; basic means of production *purchased* by the cooperative; rent still recognized, but limited to 10-20 percent of the total farm income—the remainder of income distributed according to work done.
Type IV	Land and means of production common property; land rent abolished as "unearned income," and each member paid according to work units.

Type I is little more than a peasant partnership. Type IV is the true *kolkhoz*, patterned after the Soviet *artel*.

Similarly, in Poland four types were created, in Hungary and Romania three, in Bulgaria only one. The form stressed at any one period might vary from country to country as the needs of the State and the local strategy of collectivization demanded.

The proportion of collectives which are of the most advanced, or kolkhoz, type varied from one country to another. (See Table 7). In Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the vast majority of collectives were of an intermediate character as late as 1951; in Romania and Poland, on the other hand, a majority were of the most advanced type.

TABLE 7

DISTRIBUTION OF KOLKHOZES IN COLLECTIVE SECTOR*
1949 - 1952

COUNTRIES	NUMBER OF KOLKHOZY			% OF TOTAL PROD. COOP.		
	1950	1951	1952	1950	1951	1952
Czechoslov.	136	259	—	2.6	4.1	—
Poland	1,275	—	2,113	57.9	—	63.0
Romania	1,027	1,089	1,796	100.0	52.1	56.5
Yugoslav.	808	1,049	—	11.6	15.0	—

* *C:* 1950-1951, *Czech. Econ. Bull.*, Feb. 1, 1953, p. 264. 1952, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), Dec. 17, 1952.

* *P:* 1950, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Jan. 7, 1951, 1952 (June), *Wies Liczbach. op. cit.*, p. 131.

* *R:* *Probleme Economice* (Econ. Problems), No. 5-6 (Bucharest), May-June 1953. Also: Gh Gh.-Dej in *For a Lasting Peace, etc.* (*Bucharest*), May 29, 1953.

* *Y:* G. J. Konrad, *op. cit.*

Though the multiplicity of collective forms might be taken to indicate a degree of concern for the individual predilections of the peasantry, the erratic course of Satellite collectivization—the fitful starts, jolts, and abrupt halts from year to year—indicates that the initiative always remained with the Bureaucratic Center. (See Chart VI. Had the peasants in fact ever desired collectivization, or had regime propaganda made appreciable headway in the countryside, a steady rise from 1948 through 1953 might have been expected. Instead, even a cursory study reveals a tendency toward "shock" collectivization and land massing in some years, and an equally abrupt levelling of the curve in other years. (See Table 8 and Chart VI).

BULGARIA

Cooperative farms, in rudimentary forms, existed in Bulgaria even before the First World War. With the advance of Soviet power into the Balkans, collectivization began afresh; with the exception of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria revealed itself as the most vulnerable of the Satellites. Thus, nationalization of basic industries, virtual suffocation of small enterprise, and firm establishment of a one-party regime were achieved by 1947. The political opposition was crushed, the people subjected to an oppressive State apparatus, and mass collectivization begun in earnest before the actual Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia had even begun.

Bulgarian collectivization may be characterized by three distinct stages: the first (1945-48) witnessed the rapid organization of the collective farm system and the establishment of at least one kolkhoz in each community; the second (1949-50), a period of "shock" collectivization without parallel elsewhere in the Satellite sphere, saw the expansion of existing collectives and the creation of hundreds of new collectives, and the third (1951-53) was a period of deliberate consolidation in which only slight efforts were made to extend agrarian control.

For Bulgaria the year 1950 was the turning point, the "spinal year" during which the pace of collectivization approached that of Soviet collectivization. More than 60 percent of the entire task of collectivization was completed in that brief 12 month period; the arable area controlled by the collectives rose from 11.3 to 40 percent of the total national land. The most striking feature of the 1950 Bulgarian offensive was not, however, the number of *new* farms added to the existing system, but the increase in *average size* of

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TABLE 8

PERCENT OF ARABLE LAND COLLECTIVIZED*

1945 - 1953

	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	June 1953	Dec. 1953
Bulgaria	3.0	3.5	3.7	6.0	11.8	43.0	47.5	51.0	51.7	51.7
Romania					0.1	2.7	3.1	7.2	7.5	7.5
Hungary					0.5	2.6	8.1	18.2	24.6	20.0
Czechoslovakia**					5.4	16.5	19.0	37.9	40.0	33.0†
Poland					0.8	2.2	3.5	4.8	6.7	6.7
Yugoslavia**		0.9	1.5	2.3	13.3	16.1	18.8	11.4	9.5†	–

* Sources for these figures are given in Tables 11 to 20.

** Agricultural land, not arable land.

† The exact dimensions of the kolkhoz dissolutions which have taken place in 1953 in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia have not been made public; the figures given above are based on scattered evidence and official hints *Szabad Nep* [Budapest], Dec. 30, 1953, *Rude Pravo* [Prague], 19 December 1953, and G. J. Conrad, *Die Wirtschaft Jugoslawiens*, [Berlin, 1952].)

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CHART VI

COLLECTIVIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE*

(Percent of arable land collectivized)

1945-1953



* Data in tables 9 through 17.

TABLE 9

COLLECTIVIZATION IN BULGARIA*

1944 - 1953

YEAR	NUMBER OF COLLECTIVES	NUMBER FORMED YEARLY	NUMBER HOUSEHOLDS	HOUSEHOLDS PER COLLECTIVE†	AVERAGE SIZE COLLECTIVE†	HECTARES PER HOUSEHOLD†	NUMBER HECTARES COLLECTIVIZED	PERCENT OF FARMS	PERCENT ARABLE LAND
1944	110								
1945	382	272	34,362	90	383	4.2	146,570	3.1	3.0
1946	480	98	41,027	85	359	4.2	172,498	3.7	3.5
1947	549	69	44,100	80	327	4.1	180,040	4.0	3.7
1948	1,100	551	78,900	72	265	3.7	292,380	6.7	6.0
1949	1,608	508	156,483	97	343	3.5	551,572	14.3	11.3
1950	2,587	979	525,628	203	809	4.0	2,092,215	46.0	43.0
1951	2,739	152						51.0	47.5
1952	2,739	0						52.0	51.0
1953	2,747	8	568,989	207	915	4.4	2,512,500	52.3	51.7**

* *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), May 29, 1950, January 1, 1951, October 28, 1951, January 6, 1953; *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), December 3, 1952, December 2, 1953.

** The figure given by the regime since 1952 for the percentage of arable land is 60.5, and this figure has gained general acceptance among Communist theoreticians and many Western observers. However, it is clear that the figure 60.5 measures a different arable land area than was used in computing the earlier percentagewise figures. The percentages given for 1949 and 1950 indicate that the arable land at the time was approximately 4.9 million hectares; but the 1952 percentage indicates arable land of only 4.15 million hectares. Since the regime has frequently claimed a steadily expanding area of cultivation, this statistical juggling does not make any sense. Therefore, this chart bases its 1952 and 1953 percentagewise calculations upon the same arable land figure used by the regime prior to 1952.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

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the collectives themselves, a rise of some 200 per cent. In this respect Bulgarian collectivization parallels subsequent events in Hungary, where the creation of new farms was accompanied by the rapid growth in the size of the average unit.

Bulgarian collectivization was largely concentrated in the fertile plains north and south of the Balkan Mountains, particularly in the black-earth region of the Southern Dobrudja acquired from Romania after the Second World War. (See Chart IX). Nevertheless, the average size of the farms incorporated into the collectives appears to be little larger than the average of those poorer farms still free. On the face of it, the facts are difficult to explain since the regime continues to concentrate on the richer farms—those producing effectively for the market, though less vulnerable to economic attack—and these, in turn, might be expected to be the middle-sized farms, and larger, in accordance with the general rule throughout the area.[21] The explanation for this paradox is perhaps to be found in the special conditions of local agriculture. In Bulgaria, the most valuable farmlands are not necessarily the holdings of largest acreage.

Thus, in Bulgaria, variations above or below the average are seldom extreme. The uniform structure of the pre-war agrarian economy has impelled the regime to mass small *rich* units, rather than proceed against holdings of any one class.

Significantly, the country which has had the most success in collectivization was the one which found it unnecessary to resort to a wide range of collective forms. Bulgaria has only one form—approaching the Soviet *kolkhoz*.

ROMANIA

To date collectivization in Romania has proceeded more cautiously than in any other Soviet Satellite, excepting only Poland. The paradox of Romanian collectivization is thus that the nation is geographically and politically subject to the most direct and ponderous of Soviet pressures. Yet the "Socialization" of agriculture is little advanced. It is clear from the Romanian evidence that Sovietization is in no sense a uniform process nor collectivization entirely a doctrinaire program; politically Romania fell to the Communists very early in the post-war struggle, but evidently the nation

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[21] According to a Soviet source, "in Bulgaria the majority of the members of the . . . cooperatives are middle peasants." (V. Tikhomirov, *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, Nov. 10, 1953, p. 89).

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
7.2
SLOVENIA
20.0
CROATIA
41.5
VOJVODINA
16.4
BOSNIA
HERZEGOVINA
2.5
SERBIA PROPER
29.4
MONTENEGRO
25.3
KOSMET OBLAST
41.2
MACEDONIA

CHART VII

COLLECTIVIZATION in YUGOSLAVIA by REPUBLIC*
1950

(Percentage of Agricultural Land)

* Statistički Bilten Poljoprivreda (Belgrade), No. 6, 1951, p. 3.


76.
USTI nad LAB.
82.1
LIBEREC
59.2
HRADEC KRAL
53.5
KARLOVY VARY
66.4
PRAHA
59.2
PARDUBICE
56.8
OLOMOUC
62.4
OSTRAVA
62.2
PLZEN
61.0
JIHLAVA
60.3
BRNO
72.
GOTTWALDOV
48.4
ČESKE BUDEJOVICE
BOHEMIA and MORAVIA
SLOVENIA

CHART VIII

COLLECTIVIZATION in CZECH REGIONS*
(Percentage of Communities
with Collective Farms)
-1952-

* Svet Prace (Prague), March 5, 1953

p. 66

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CHART IX

COLLECTIVIZATION IN BULGARIA BY DISTRICT*
[illegible]
[illegible]



* Statistics from *Report on Bulgaria*, Institute National d'Etudes et Economiques (Paris), November 1, 1950.

CHART X

COLLECTIVIZATION IN POLAND BY PROVINCE*
1953
(Percentage of Villages with Collective Farms)



* [illegible] (Warsaw) 3rd quarter, 1953.

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TABLE 10

COLLECTIVIZATION IN ROMANIA*

1949 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective§	Average Size Collective§	Hectares per Household§	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Arable Land
1949	56	56	4,058	72	—	—	12,500†	0.1
1950	1,027	971	67,719	66	261†	4.0	268,000	2.7
1951	1,069	42	75,065	70	277†	—	300,000†	3.1
1952	1,796	727	165,411	92	360†	—	700,000†	7.2
1953 (June)	1,980	184	185,000	90	369	4.1	732,000	7.5

* Speech of Minister of the Army Botnaras, *Scanteia* (Bucharest), December 31, 1953; *Scanteia*, April 12, 1953; Speech of Premier Gheorghiu-Dej, *Scanteia*, August 23, 1953; *Scanteia*, March 1, 1953; *Probleme Economice*, (Bucharest), No. 5-6, May-June, 1953; *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, (Moscow), No. 10, 1953.

† These are estimates, calculated on the basis of known ratios between number of collectives, number of hectares collectivized, and number of households.

§ Calculated on the basis of official data.

has presented its rulers with singular economic and organizational problems. 423 474

The two crucial years of Romanian collectivization were 1950 and 1952; these two offensive years alternated with periods of quiescence. In 1952, more than 50 percent of the total area collectivized to date was brought into the "Socialist sector," and in the same year the size of individual collective farms themselves increased rapidly. Though the number of new collectives increased by only 75 percent, the area brought into collectives increased by over 130 percent.

In accordance with the general East European patterns, the Romanian collectives were composed of a high percentage of medium farms, a percentage which increased each year (see Table 11). In 1953, the middle farmers comprised 57.8 percent of the total, the small farmers 35.2 percent, and landless farmers the remaining 7.0 percent. While the average size of all Romanian farms is 3.6 hectares, the average size of farms brought into collectives is 4.0 hectares.

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS WITHIN ROMANIAN COLLECTIVE SECTOR*

1949 - 1953

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	1949-50	1951	1952	1953
Medium farmers	32.0	29.4	53.0	57.8
Small farmers	62.4	39.0	37.4	35.2
Landless farmers	5.6	31.6	9.6	7.0

* *Probleme Economice* (Bucharest) No. 5-6, May-June, 1953; *Nova Mysl* (Prague), No. 10, 1953.

A unique feature of Romanian collectivization is the establishment of a very "primitive" type of collective, the "Agricultural Associations." Whereas the other countries issue agricultural decrees with a single standard for the entire collective sector, the Romanian agricultural decrees usually distinguish between "Agricultural Associations" and collectives. Including the "Agricultural

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TABLE 12

COLLECTIVIZATION IN HUNGARY*

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size of Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Arable Land
1949	1,520	980	37,000	24	137	5.7	208,000	3.7
1950	2,500	1,233	90,000	36	176	4.1	440,000	8.2
1951	4,652	2,152	236,500	51	187	3.7	865,000	16.0
1952	5,315	663	318,500	59	258	4.3	1,374,000	24.6
1953 (April)	—	—	340,000	–	–	4.4	1,494,000	26.8
1953 (Dec.)	4,677	–638	238,000†	51	250	4.7	1,117,000**	20.0

* *Statisztikai Szemle* (Budapest) — various numbers, 1950; *Szabad Nep,* January 25, 1950, January 21, 1951, October 27, 1950, February 26, 1951, December 2, 1951; December 16, 1952, May 11, 1953; Radio Budapest, December 29, 1953.

** Estimated on the basis of the known arable land.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

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Associations", and the State Farms, the "Socialist sector" in Romania comprises 25 percent of the arable land.

HUNGARY

Collectivization in Hungary proceeded at a steadier pace than elsewhere. The tempo accelerated in 1952 and 1953, but land policy was not characterized by the abrupt twists and turns so pronounced in Romania and Czechoslovakia. Hungarian collectivization paralleled the Romanian and Bulgarian in that acceleration of the drive was accompanied by rapid expansion of the average size of the collectives themselves. Thus, the average collective organized in 1949 comprised an area of only 135 hectares; in 1952 the average new collective was 770 hectares — an increase of over 500 percent!

Again, in accordance with the general rule, the primary target of Hungarian collectivization was middle-sized farms. The average number of hectares per collectivized household (4.4) surpassed the national pre-collectivization average (2.8). Before the wholesale dissolutions attending the Hungarian New Course, the collectivized sector occupied 26.8 percent of the arable land. Three types of collective farms exist in Hungary; the highest class, however, is not as "advanced" as the Soviet artel.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In terms of pace at least, Czechoslovak collectivization represents a remarkable achievement—if East European rather than Soviet standards are applied. Despite a late start, the agricultural offensive proceeded more rapidly in Czechoslovakia than in any other Satellite, excepting only Bulgaria.

The land offensive was mounted in two waves, one in 1950 and the second in 1952. Unfortunately, reliable statistics on Czechoslovak collectivization are extremely sparse so no clear picture emerges. Only 1953 figures are available for the number of households collectivized, and these indicate that the land drive was aimed at absorbing the larger, more productive units. At the end of 1952, more than 56 percent of the middle farmers were in collectives of Types III and IV, while only 40 percent of the small farmers were members. For the actual distribution of farm-types in the collective sector as it changed between 1949 and 1953 see Table 14 and for the geographical distribution of the collectives see Chart VIII.

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TABLE 13

1949 - 1953
COLLECTIVIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA*
(*Types II, III, and IV*)

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Agricultural Land
1949	1,700§	1,700	–	–	–	–	375,000	5.4
1950	3,760	2,060§	–	–	302	–	1,134,392	16.5
1951	4,452	682	–	–	293	–	1,305,610	19.0
1952	7,290	2,838	–	–	356	–	2,598,073	37.9
1953**	8,284	994	343,911	41	–	8.4	2,900,000§	40.0

* J. Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), February 15, 1953; *Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin* (Prague), February 1, 1953, pp. 15-16; *Rude Pravo*, December 17, 1952.

** This figure represents the high point in Czechoslovak collectivization; by the end of 1953 the number of collectivised households had fallen off slightly (see speech of Agricultural Minister Uher, printed in *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 19, 1953).

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

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TABLE 14

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAK COLLECTIVE SECTOR*

— 1953 —

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FARM UNIT (IN HECTARES)	PERCENT OF TOTAL FARMS COLLECTIVIZED
0 - 0.5	10.8
0.5 - 2	22.4
2 - 5	26.9
5 - 10	23.5
10 - 15	13.0
Over 15	3.4
	100.0

* *Zemedelske Noviny* (Prague), May 1, 1953.

POLAND

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For a variety of reasons, the impact of collectivization in Poland has been slight. The State farms, organized immediately after the Second World War, controlled nearly twice as much arable land as all collectives formed by mid-1953. In central Poland—that is to say, in the regions of Poland's pre-war territories still remaining (excluding the formerly German districts in the West)—collectivization has hardly been invoked. The majority of Polish collective farms are situated in the old German regions of Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia—where the transfer of populations, confiscation of German properties, and firm Party political control made collectivization far easier.

Whether the vigorous land drive launched in early 1953 (and since slowed down in accordance with Satellite-wide political and economic policies) would have resulted in the rapid expansion of the collective sector is now impossible to say. In Poland, the average size of farms collectivized far exceeded the early post-war national average—approximately 7.5 hectares per holding as against 5.9. Thus, the weight of the Polish farm offensive was directed

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TABLE 15

COLLECTIVIZATION IN POLAND*

1949 - 1953

YEAR	NUMBER OF COLLECTIVES	NUMBER FORMED YEARLY	NUMBER HOUSEHOLDS	HOUSEHOLDS PER COLLECTIVE†	AVERAGE SIZE COLLECTIVE†	HECTARES PER HOUSEHOLD†	NUMBER HECTARES COLLECTIVIZED	PERCENT OF FARMERS	PERCENT OF AGRICULTURAL LAND
1949	243	243	–	–	226	–	54,830	–	0.3
1950	2,199	1,946	49,500	23	213	9.4	467,611	1.4	2.2
1951	3,054	855	71,000	23	239	10.1	728,561	2.1	3.5
1952	4,900	1,846	100,000	20	204	10.0	1,000,000	3.1	4.8
1953§	7,982	3,082	189,000	24	175	7.4	1,400,000	5.9**	6.7

* Instytut Ekonimiki Rolnej, *Wies w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1952); *Economista* (Warsaw), III, 1953; *Zycie Gospodarzce* (Warsaw), September 6, 1953.

§ Official collectivization statistics for 1953 are extremely confused and contradictory. The figures presented here are for June, 1953; in subsequent months different figures were released, but they were so inconsistent that the June estimates are employed here. During the summer of 1953 collectivization came t[illegible]alt in Poland, and hence the situation remained approximately static throughout the rest of the year.

** Estimate.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

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CHART XI

COMPOSITION of COLLECTIVIZED and NON-COLLECTIVIZED SECTORS in POLAND 1953*

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

* Nowe Drogi, (Warsaw) No. 10, 1953, p. 183.

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against the efficient, surplus-producing farm units. A comparison of the collectivized and free sectors in 1953 is set out in Table 16. While only 40 percent of the independent farms were larger than five hectares, slightly more than 75 percent of those collectivized were drawn from this category.

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TABLE 16

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS IN POLISH COLLECTIVE SECTOR*

— 1951 —

Farm Unit	Percent of Farms Collectivized
Landless	5.8
0 - 2	6.1
2 - 5	14.2
5 - 10	62.8
10 - 15	10.2
Over 15	0.9

* *Wies w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 131.

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In Poland the collective sector controls 6.7 percent of the total arable land, as against almost 12 percent organized into State Farms. Four types of collectives exist in Poland; the most developed type approaches the Soviet artel.

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YUGOSLAVIA

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Yugoslav collectivization is concentrated in two regions: the rich Vojvodina plain, north of Belgrade, traditionally the source of the greatest farm surpluses, and the poor mountainous regions of Macedonia in the South, where land hunger and poverty were extreme (see Chart VII). The collectivization of the Vojvodina was important precisely because of its capacity to produce a marketable surplus for the expanding cities. The collectivization of Macedonia was possible because peasant resistance was slight. In this two-pronged attack, the Yugoslav Communists adhered to the general lines of agrarian policy throughout the Soviet orbit.

Collectivization in Yugoslavia presents an interesting picture of paradoxical extremes. Prior to its 1948 expulsion from the Cominform, and for a short time thereafter, the Yugoslav regime was the most "advanced" of the Soviet Satellites, swiftly smashing the political opposition, launching a massive program of heavy industrial development, and nationalizing the major economic facilities at an early date. But in 1951, after an interval of indecision, the regime embarked on a program of concession and retrenchment which, in many significant respects, anticipated the New Course later adopted by the entire Soviet sphere.

In common with Bulgaria, the first organizational basis for collectivization was laid down immediately after the war, and the major offensive launched in 1948-49. Moreover, like Bulgaria, the first break in the offensive occurred in 1950. However, the pause in Bulgarian collectivization represented nothing more than a period of consolidation, while the Yugoslav halt grew into the first slow recognition that political and social conditions in Eastern Europe would not permit repetition of the Soviet experience.

The first reaction of the Yugoslav regime to the break with the Cominform was to accelerate the pace of collectivization. Virtually 60 percent of Yugoslav collectivization was achieved in 1949 alone (See Table 17). And if the tempo of collectivization did not reach the pitch attained in neighboring Bulgaria, the struggle between the regime and the peasantry was, if anything, more intense. But it is clear by now that the stubborn resistance of the Yugoslav peasantry—partly responsible for the catastrophic agricultural failure of 1950—was not the only factor working for revision of agrarian policy. A great deal of the dynamism which animated the East European Communists was derived from its Soviet connection.

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TABLE 17

COLLECTIVIZATION IN YUGOSLAVIA*

1946 - 1952

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective**	Average Size Collective**	Hectares per Household**	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Agricultural Land
1946	494	494	25,062	51	246	4.8	121,518	0.9
1947	779	285	40,590	52	270	5.2	210,986	1.5
1948	1,318	539	60,158	46	246	5.4	323,98[illegible]	2.3
1949	6,625	5,307	340,739	52	278	5.4	1,839,978	13.3
1950	6,968	343	418,659	60	318	5.3	2,226,166	16,1
1951	6,994	26	429,784	62	371	6.0	2,595,000	18.8
1952	6,908	–86	–	–	267	–	1,580,000	11.4

Informationi Prirucnik, (Belgrade), Vol. I, p. 767; *Review of International Affairs*, (Belgrade), Sept. 16, 1952, pp. 16-18; October 1, 1952, pp. 17-18; G. F. Conrad, *Die Wirschaft Jugoslawiens* (Berlin, 1952).

**Calculated on the basis of official figures.

When these ties were severed in 1948, the Yugoslav Party began to lose much of its initial fanaticism and grew more complacent about its "historic tasks."

The revision of Yugoslav agarian policy in 1951-52 coincided with a relaxation of strenuous efforts to industrialize the country and a slight liberalization of the centralized dictatorship. When Tito stated in 1952 that long-neglected agriculture was to receive increased State assistance, the drive for collectivization inevitably lost much of its original meaning and force. The kolkhoz was primarily an administrative device to insure increased extraction of produce from the land at low State-determined prices, and if the State intended to increase investment in agriculture, the collectives were no longer a prime necessity.

5. *Summary*

A. This paper has made note of many of the important differences between collectivization in Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia —the greater reliance upon persuasion as opposed to force, the reluctance to open a full-scale offensive against the peasantry, the greater variety of collective forms and the greater flexibility of their usage. However, these were deviations from an historical norm to which the East European Communists were obligated for most of their inspiration. The enormous influence which the Soviet experience exercised upon them was evidenced not merely in the internal structure and organization of the emerging collective farms, but in their basic proportions (see Chart XII). With the exception of Bulgaria and Poland, the basic lines of the East European farms adhered to the pattern set by the Soviets. In the USSR the average collective covered 490 hectares of arable land; it was composed of 78 households; and each household tended 6.3 hectares of land.[22] The size of the Soviet collectives, and the area per household, slightly exceeds the average for Eastern Europe, but the proportions are so close to one another that the direct influence of the Soviet model cannot be doubted (except possibly in Bulgaria and Poland).

The peculiarity of the Bulgarian collective structure is explained by the centralization of each collective around one rural community with the subdivisions of control stemming from that community. The extremely small proportions of the Polish collec-

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[22] Harry Schwartz, pp. 286-287.

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CHART XII

AVERAGE SIZE of COLLECTIVES 1953†



AVERAGE NUMBER of HOUSEHOLDS in a COLLECTIVE 1953



AVERAGE HECTARES per HOUSEHOLD in a COLLECTIVE 1953



* 1952
** 1951
† Data in tables 9 through 17.

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tives can only be explained by the great difficulties encountered in the whole Polish collectivization effort.

It should be noted that the countries with the largest average area per collectivized household are Poland and Czechoslovakia, while the countries with the smallest are Bulgaria, Romania, and finally, Hungary. The reason for this wide range does not lie in the original land structure, since the average collectivized property does not correspond to the average household area of the non-collectivized farms in the respective countries. The difference, then, probably reflects the success of the Polish and Czechoslovak regimes in collectivizing the larger, and more productive, holdings.

TABLE 18

SPHERE-WIDE COLLECTIVIZATION*

June, 1953

Country	Hectares of Arable Land	Hectares of Collectivized Land	Percent of Land Collectivized
Bulgaria	4,860,000	2,513,500	51.7
**Czechoslovakia	6,860,000	2,900,000	40.0
Hungary	5,550,000	1,500,000	26.8
**Yugoslavia	13,800,000	1,500,000***	10.9
Romania	9,750,000	732,000	7.5
Poland	20,760,000	1,400,000	6.7
Total	61,520,000	10,545,000	17.2

*Data in Tables 11 through 20.

**For both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the figures are given in hectares of agricultural land, not arable land, because the most consistent and reliable data are given in these terms. The effect on the percentage figures in the right-hand column is slight, if any.

***Estimated on the basis of regime statements. See G. J. Conrad, *Die Wirschaft Jugoslawiens*, (Berlin, 1952).

B. In mid-1953, when collectivization was simultaneously halted throughout the Soviet sphere, approximately 17 percent of the arable land of Eastern Europe had been brought into the collectivized

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sector (see Table 18). Roughly another 10 percent belonged to the State Farms, bringing the total arable land in the "Socialist sector" to approximately 27 percent.

In other words, in over four years of feverish effort the Communist governments of Eastern Europe had not achieved what the Soviet government had accomplished in less than four months of its collectivization drive in 1929. As Table 18 indicates, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia achieved the most significant results; Romania and Poland lagged far behind. Yugoslavia and Hungary, which had done moderately well at one time, were to see the results of years of labor washed away in the onrushing New Course.

This failure was all the more notable for the fact that the Satellite governments had at their disposal not only the lessons of the Soviet experience but direct Soviet supervision as well. Certainly the bureaucratic methods employed by the Eastern European Communists, both in taking power over a silent people and in the process of collectivization itself, were partly responsible for this failure. In the next chapter some of the economic mechanics of the new agricultural order will be discussed and perhaps additional light will be thrown on the emerging debacle.

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CHAPTER IV

THE BALANCE SHEET OF COLLECTIVIZATION

1. *General Factors*

Earlier in this study[1] it was pointed out that the Stalinist 471
"solution" to the agricultural problem in the Soviet Union, despite 423
its cost in human suffering, satisfied the basic agricultural needs of an expanding heavy industrial machine and the State which rested upon it. The new land structure was no more efficient or productive than the one it had replaced; but it was better suited to guarantee urban food supplies and the rapid accumulation of capital which was the prerequisite for the heavy industrial development upon which the new Soviet State was based. That certain readjustments in that land structure are being called for today, more than a quarter of a century after its initial establishment, does not indicate that, in terms of its original goals, the program was a total failure.[2]

In Eastern Europe, however, the agricultural picture is far more complex. A conclusive assessment of the results of collectivization in terms of the Communists' own goals is therefore more difficult. The extensive agricultural readjustment begun in the middle of 1953 has frequently been interpreted as proof of its failure. However, since the New Course in Eastern Europe was promulgated simultaneously with a similar program in the USSR, its origins may lie as much in the political crisis caused by Stalin's death as in a mounting economic crisis. Indeed, the vast economic disproportions which the New Course was designed to reduce had

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[1] See above pp. 21-2.

[2] These readjustments were announced in September 1953, by the Soviet leader Khrushchev in the same address in which he acknowledged the dismal condition of Soviet agriculture, and in particular the livestock inadequacies (*Pravda*, [Moscow], September 15, 1953).

● 423 existed for a considerable period before the new measures were introduced.[3]

To assess the results of collectivization in Eastern Europe it is necessary to apply the same measuring rod applied to the Soviet Union: to what degree did collectivization facilitate the task of increasing the State's share of the total agricultural product without a proportionate increase in agricultural investment?

This was, in fact, the exact criterion to which Boris Kidric, the Yugoslav economic planner, was referring when he declared in 1947 that the "business of agriculture in a Socialist society is to supply the towns and industrial centers with food."[4] If, despite every other failure, collectivization has expedited this "supply," it has justified itself in Communist eyes.

311 423 As in the USSR, land reorganization in Eastern Europe has not resulted in an appreciable increase in East European farm productivity; in many instances, the reverse has been true. That the pre-war levels of agriculture have not yet been regained in Hungary is now freely admitted by Hungarian Communist spokesmen.[5] The Polish theoretician, Stefan Jedrychowski, in a revealing analysis of post-Stalin policies, acknowledged that "in Romania, as well as in Czechoslovakia, agricultural production as a whole has not yet reached the pre-war level, although, for example, it has in the case of cattle."[6] Polish Premier Bierut confessed that the situation in Poland was not very healthy compared to pre-war standards.[7]

241 Indeed, the conclusions of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), issued in 1952 long before the New Course policies, and based upon many unofficial sources, seems generous in retrospect: "All countries in the region," the FAO report stated, "with the exception of Poland, were at, or only slightly below, the pre-war level of agricultural production, and for the

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[3] It has been suggested by many that the New Course of 1953 was the consequence of a mounting, ever-deepening economic crisis. However, it is difficult to support such a thesis because, with the possible exception of Hungary, the economic problems which the Communists are now attacking with such vigor have existed for a long time. A more plausible hypothesis is that the political crisis caused by Stalin's death made intolerable the continuation of the vast economic disproportions which had hitherto been mastered.

[4] See above p. 46.

[5] Jozsef Revai, *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), October-November, 1953. The crowning indictment of Hungarian agriculture was Revai's declaration that its livestock situation was "worse than it is in the USSR."

[6] Stefan Jedrychowski, *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1953.

[7] Report of Premier Bierut to the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party, *Trybuna Ludu*, November 6, 1953.

In pre-war Soviet Plans the targets for consumer goods and 433 agricultural products were invariably underfulfilled, despite the 185 fact that the targets were always set much below those for industry. Indeed, so slight was Communist concern for consumer goods and agriculture that the same targets were frequently repeated in successive Plans.[12] Since we have seen that the Eastern European Communists were deeply influenced by the Soviet experience, it can be assumed that they had few real illusions concerning their capacity to fulfill even those relatively modest targets set for consumer goods and agriculture. "While industrial production in 1953 compared with 1948," said the Czechoslovak Premier Viliam Siroky, "will increase two-fold, agricultural production during the same period will increase only one-third, and will still be below pre-war levels."[13] But the frankest admission of this planned economic disproportion was made by the then Premier, Antonin Zapotocky, in 1949.

> We must rid ourselves of any fond illusions that a rise in the standard of living may be regarded as a necessary corollary, or even ought to precede the successful implementation of the Plan. The exact opposite is the truth: In order to make it possible that our material and cultural level be raised, it will first be necessary to fulfill the Plan . . .[14]

Zapotocky's concise formula was carried out to the letter, as the chronic inadequacy of the urban food supply showed. A similarly candid discussion of the alternatives was given by Hilary Minc, Chairman of the Polish State Planning Commission. His effort to speak frankly on these questions was part of a debate among Polish Communist leaders during the winter of 1951-52. Collectivization [423] had been halted some time in mid-1951; and the question of regaining Communist initiative on the land was evidently being discussed. Minc told a meeting of the activists of the Party Central Committee on October 9th, 1951 that the low level of agricultural production was due to the growing discrepancy between agricultural and industrial production, and therefore he concluded that the acceleration of collectivization (and the further widening of the gulf which it implied) would only intensify the difficulties.[15] Minc was answered on January 9th, 1952, by Eugeniusz Szyr, his deputy

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[12] See, for example, Dobb, p. 292.

[13] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 16, 1953.

[14] Quoted in *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press, New York), December, 1953, p. 6.

[15] Report to the meeting of activists, Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party, October 9, 1951.

231 tinues to be bred and raised by the traditionally backward East European methods.

TABLE 26

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LIVESTOCK IN SOCIALIST SECTOR IN 1952*

COUNTRY	PERCENT OF LAND IN SOCIALIST SECTOR	CATTLE	SHEEP	HOGS	HORSES
Czechoslovakia	48.0	33.0	39.7	38.0	–
Poland	17.0	7.8	–	9.2	7.1
Bulgaria	53.0	25.2	29.9	17.6	43.5

* Sources: Czechoslovakia, Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo*, February 5, 1953; Poland, *Wies w Liczbach*, p. 25 (Warsaw, 1951); Bulgaria, Chervenkov, *For a Lasting Peace*, September 11, 1953.

241 While animal husbandry lagged, industrial crops crept ahead. Even in this realm, despite increased investments, results have not been spectacular. Few reliable production statistics are available. Table 27 shows only the increase in area given over to industrial crops.[27]

2. *The Return on the Investment*

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475 In its basic features the picture thus far drawn of East European agriculture resembles the one drawn earlier of Soviet agriculture: a strenuous effort to force the peasantry into a farm system over which the State could exercise direct administrative control; a feverish effort to build modernized industry at a pace which precluded much investment in agriculture; a resultant stagnation of and, in some instances, a deterioration of, agricultural production; and a constant tension between State and the peasants arising from their unending struggle over the fruits of the peasants' labors.

In the USSR, however, the victory of the State over the peasantry was concluded with far greater finality than in Satellite Eastern Europe; the system held together over a quarter of a century which included the most severe war-time trials. Collectivization in the USSR possesses stability because it has managed to provide the State with the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for its economic

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[27] It is significant that among the many steps taken to implement the New Course in several East European countries was the reduction of the area sown with industrial crops.

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TABLE 27

AREA UNDER INDUSTRIAL CROPS 1949 - 1951/52*

(1000 hectares)

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	1949						1951/52					
	C	P	H	R	B	Y	C	P	H	R	B	Y
Cotton	–	–	37	60	–	42	–	–	40	150	–	16
Flax	28	109	22	–	–	14	–	–	–	–	–	10
Hemp	5	13	28	–	–	108	–	19	–	–	–	58
Sugar beets	194	250	113	62	31	89	219	275	115	81	32	100
Tobacco	6	14	22	9	30	35	–	20	–	–	–	37

* Data from unpublished manuscript of Dr. Nicholas Spulber (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

program. The question with respect to Eastern Europe is whether 423
collectivization has provided the same agricultural cushion as it did 456
for the USSR. Specifically, does the collectivized sector in the Satel- 475
lites provide the State with a higher proportion of the total produce marketed per hectare than the private sector? As was shown, the capacity of the Soviet collectivized sector to produce for the market was its very reason for existence.

The evidence available from Eastern Europe is too scattered and unreliable to justify the type of definite conclusion drawn from the Soviet materials.[38] However, on the basis of an examination of each country in Eastern Europe, some tentative conclusions can be reached.

Throughout the following comparison of the "Socialist" and private sectors, the variety of advantages which the "Socialist sector" enjoys should be kept in mind. First, on the whole the "Socialist sector" comprises better and more fertile land. It is composed of larger farms, capable of supporting more people. In particular, State Farms are frequently, though not always, located on the prosperous lands once belonging to nobles, aristocrats, or German landholders. Second, the "Socialist sector" has at its dis-

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[38] The transformation of statistics from an objective science into an arm of State propaganda occurred in the USSR in 1930-31, but several years were necessary for the completion of the task. As a result, there is a great deal more information available concerning the first and second Five Year Plans in the USSR than concerning the Satellite economic developments after 1947. The Satellite Communists, after all, borrowed their techniques of falsification when they had been thoroughly developed in the USSR.

423 posal most of the available farm machinery, either confiscated or
656 purchased after the Second World War and also what has since been manufactured. In Poland in 1951, for example, the "Socialist sector," comprising some 17 per cent of the arable land, had at its disposal 98 per cent of the nation's tractor supply.[39] In Bulgaria in 1948 the "Socialist sector," then comprising only eight per cent of the arable land, already had at its disposal 81 per cent of the tractors and threshing machines.[40] Third, the "Socialist sector" received a high portion of the meager State credits extended to the farm population for constructing new buildings, purchasing fertilizers, seed, and fodder. And fourth, the "Socialist sector" generally received more favorable trade terms from government agencies, and benefited from official tax and delivery quota discrimination against the private sector. The agricultural structure of each country will be analyzed in terms of the above-stated criteria.

BULGARIA

241 As everywhere, pertinent information is sparse and only sug-
475 gestive. The State Farms, occupying 2.5 per cent of the arable land,
423 market 1.5 per cent of the nation's grain crop. The "Socialist sector," occupying 52.0 per cent of the arable land, markets 65 per cent of the grain; and the private farms, composing 45.5 per cent of the arable land, market 33.5 per cent of the grain crop.[41] In the light of the aforementioned advantages accruing to the "Socialist sector," and considering the fact that in Bulgaria the "Socialist sector" is concentrated in the fertile valleys (See Chart IX), this division is not altogether surprising. The proportion of marketed grain derived from the "Socialist sector" is greater than its arable land, and almost as much greater as that which the USSR achieved when approximately half of its arable land was collectivized.[42] It should be noted, however, that, as in the USSR, the modest success of the "Socialist sector" as a grain producer was achieved at the cost of neglecting animal husbandry, since a high percentage of the nation's livestock remained in the private sector. But if the "Socialist sector" neglected animal husbandry, it emphasized a few semi-

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[39] *Wies w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 25.

[40] *Pari i Kredit* (Sofia), No. 2, 1948, p. 8.

[41] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, (Sofia) February 26, 1953.

[42] In the Soviet Union in 1932, 66 per cent of the arable land was in the "Socialist sector"; and it supplied 84 per cent of the marketed grain. (Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, New York, 1948, p. 249).

industrial crops. In 1953, 75 per cent of the nation's cotton and 84 per cent of its sugar beets were produced in the "Socialist sector."[43] 241 475 423

POLAND

Communist authorities in Poland have frequently asserted the superior productivity of the "Socialist sector" of agriculture. But since the claims so frequently contradict each other and contradict general claims concerning the productive capacity of the entire sector, they must be treated cautiously. For example, although the Communists have, at various times, claimed from 15 to 20 per cent greater yield per hectare for collective farms, they do not claim a higher proportionate yield for the sector as a whole.[44]

On the central question of the deliveries made by the two sectors, statistics are equally uncertain. In the year 1950, the Communists seemed confident of the superior capacity of the "Socialist sector" to market its grain. The statistics in Table 28 seem to bear out this confidence.

TABLE 28

PROPORTION OF GRAIN MARKETED IN POLAND IN 1950*

	WINTER WHEAT	SPRING WHEAT	RYE
Production Cooperatives	67.0	49.0	31.4
Private Farms	34.3	34.3	28.7

* *Wies w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1952), p. 132.

And in 1951 the regime claimed that the "Socialist sector," comprising only 15 per cent of the land, accounted for 23.2 per cent of the marketed grain, while the private sector, comprising 85 per cent of the land, accounted for only 76.8 per cent of the marketed grain. According to these reports, both State Farms and collectives contributed far more than their proportionate share to the market.[45]

However, there is reason to doubt the validity of these statistics. The marketing report in 1953 shows the "Socialist sector" in a

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[43] *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), December 2, 1953.

[44] For example, according to *Wies w Liczbach* (1952), the productive cooperatives have an approximately 20 per cent higher yield than the individual holdings. But other regime statistics indicate that the total produce of the productive cooperatives is no greater – per hectare – than the individual holdings.

[45] *Wies w Liczbach* (1952).

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TABLE 29

PROPORTION OF GRAIN MARKETED IN POLAND BY SECTOR IN 1953*

Sector	Percent of Marketed Grain	Percent of Arable Land
State Farms	17.0	11.9
Production Cooperatives	6.5	6.5
Small Peasants	7.5	11.5
Middle Peasants	50.0	59.0
Kulaks	19.0	11.1
	100.0	100.0

* *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), December 31, 1953.

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much less flattering light (see Table 29). However, even in 1953 the "Socialist sector" contributed more than its share to the market, and thus economically justified itself. Holding 18.4 per cent of the arable land, the "Socialist sector" contributed 23.5 per cent of the marketed grain. It should be noted, however, that the superiority was confined solely to State Farms. The collective farms, which comprised six per cent of the countryside, marketed no more than six per cent of the total grain.

The important role the State Farms play is made clear in Table 30, where it is demonstrated that, despite the low productivity per hectare, the State Farms outdid others in marketed production.

TABLE 30

PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF POLISH STATE FARMS 1949 – 1952*

	1949	1950	1951	1952 *(Planned)*
Percent of Total Production (in current prices)	5.4	6.1	7.5	9.6
Percent of Total Marketing	–	6.8	10.5	15.1

* *Wies w Liczbach*, (Warsaw, 1952), p. 116.

433 231 475 farms are not altogether true.[53] At the same time, the greater confidence the regime has in the capacity of the collectives to fulfill quotas is not altogether unjustified.

[231] Although the bulk of livestock in Poland is in the private sector, a sizeable portion of the livestock in Czechoslovakia is in the "Socialist sector." In 1952, 33.8 per cent of the cattle, 37.7 per cent of the hogs, and 38.7 per cent of the sheep were in the "Socialist sector."[54]

Although the Czechoslovak regime may have gained some market advantages from collectivization, its victory remains quite inconclusive. With the New Course, the regime, in turning to the private sector for agricultural reinforcement, acknowledged that the advantage gained was insufficient for its purposes.[55]

HUNGARY

● 423 433 The transformation of the agricultural structure in Hungary in 1945-46 was the most drastic of the post-war land reforms; and there is unquestionably a connection between the semi-revolutionary character of that agrarian reform and the special gravity of the Hungarian farm crisis in mid-1953. Whether this crisis had its roots in peasant hyper-sensitivity to the imposition of an overlordship resembling former conditions, or to the destruction of traditional trade relationships between town and country is not altogether clear; but that a close connection exists between the 1945-46 reform and the 1953 crisis is difficult to doubt.[56]

The impact of the 1945-46 reforms on the traditional trade relationship between town and country has received little attention, but evidence suggests that its effect was much the same as that caused by the peasant upheaval of Russia in 1917-18.[57] Pre-war Hungary's agricultural sectors participated in the market as outlined in Table 31. As in pre-revolutionary Russia, the large landowners accounted for a share of the market in excess of their share of total arable land. This superior capacity to market goods reflected, as in Russia, not greater production, but the ability to sell a greater proportion of what they produced. While the peasants marketed 47 per cent of their crop, the large landowners marketed 67 per cent.[58]

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[53] For example, *Rude Pravo* (December 4, 1953), asserted that the collective farms had fulfilled their quotas for grain by 103 per cent while the private farms had fulfilled their quota by only 77 per cent. A similar differential held for the fulfillment of meat, pork, and milk quotas.

[54] Cited in *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), April 19, 1953, p. 484.

[55] As in Poland, the Czechoslovak New Course placed special emphasis upon protecting the productive capacity of the kulaks while at the same time, of course, limiting his alleged urge to engage in speculation and exploitation. "It would harm our agricultural economy," said Minister of Agriculture Uher, if the land which the kulaks occupied was not "fully utilized by them" (*Rude Pravo*, November 10, 1953).

[56] A subjective factor such as the peasants' degree of class consciousness is difficult to incorporate into an analysis of this type. However, without some recourse to this factor, it is difficult to explain the special depth of the 1953 Hungarian crisis, so much more pronounced was it than similar crises in the sphere. The series of articles in the Hungarian press during the fall and summer of 1953 portraying the countryside during the period of kolkhoz dissolutions certainly suggested that the Hungarian peasantry felt a hatred for their oppressors of an intensity hardly rivaled in the Sphere. It should not be forgotten that the strongest of the post-World War II peasant parties in the sphere was the Smallholders' Party of Hungary, which received 57 per cent of the vote in 1947 elections.

By dividing the land more equitably, the 1945-46 reforms upset the equilibrium of the pre-war system. As a result, a larger portion of the total product was consumed by the peasants, and a smaller portion sent to the cities. To rectify this situation, and to restore the cities to the dominant position they had once enjoyed, first the compulsory deliveries system, and then collectivization, were imposed by the Communists.[59] The rapid development of industry and growth of urban population made it imperative that a greater proportion of the produce be siphoned off the land than before the war.

But the Hungarian Communists have acknowledged that they were unable even to restore the pre-war level of land exploitation. The collective farm structure could not compensate for the loss of the large landholdings; and with the bad harvest of 1952, the agricultural situation grew desperate.

This failure was the subject of an extremely interesting analysis by the Communist theoretician, Mrs. Aladar Mod, published some two months prior to the official introduction of the New Course

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[57] It is perhaps significant that the two European countries which experienced a successful Bolshevik seizure of power at the time of World War I were Russia and Hungary.

[58] Mrs. Aladar Mod, *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953. Most of the material concerning Hungarian market relations is taken from Mod's extremely interesting study published on the eve of the New Course explosion.

[59] In some countries (Czechoslovakia and Poland) the system of compulsory deliveries was taken over directly from the German administration after the war. It is interesting that the totalitarian regimes, faced by the same problems, so frequently work out similar solutions. Just as the Communists in Eastern Europe incorporated Nazi techniques into their apparatus, so the Nazis, when occupying Communist Russia, kept the kolkhozes intact and exploited them as the Communists had done. Like the Soviet planners, the Germans found the collectives to be eminently suited to the economic demands of a totalitarian state.

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TABLE 31

PRE-WAR AGRARIAN TRADE PATTERNS IN HUNGARY*

Sector	Percent of Holdings	Percent of Arable Land	Percent of Total Crop	Percent of Own Crop Marketed	Percent of Total Marketed
Small Holdings (Under 25 cad. acres)	94.0	48	51.6	47.2	43.6
Medium Holdings (25-200 cad. acres)	5.5	28	24.2	63.6	27.4
Large Holdings (Over 200 cad. acres)	0.5	24	24.2	67.0	29.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	55.9	100.0

* *Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkonyv*, (Budapest, 1948), p. 103; *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953; *Hungarian State Yearbook*, Special Agricultural Issue (Budapest, 1935).

into Hungary in July 1953. In it she pointed out that the "Socialist sector" produced approximately 10 per cent less for the market than the former landholdings of 200 cadastral acres. "The percentage of grain production for the market," she flatly concluded, after lengthy analysis, "is much lower than it was prior to liberation." As a result, grain exports had been drastically curtailed; yet even after this, the cities were still poorly supplied. Taking 1938 agricultural production as 100, current production has reached the following levels sector-by-sector:

	1938	1951	1952
Working Peasantry	100	130	109
Kulaks	100	46.7	23.4
Large-scale farms	100	73	74.3

The working peasants had increased their total yield because the land under their control had grown by 25 per cent. But theirs was the one sector incapable of substantially contributing to the market. The two sectors capable of supplying the market with a large surplus had declined seriously—the kulak sector in amount of land under its control, and the large landowners (now "Socialist") in general efficiency. The resulting trade relations are described in Table 32.

In each year the percent of the crop delivered by the kulaks excelled that of the "Socialist sector;" but in each year the kulak share of the total crop declined as the result of State encroachment on his land. Inevitably the total amount of grain delivered to the State declined because the "Socialist sector" was unable to make up the loss. Mrs. Mod herself summed up the crisis implicit in the situation these statistics describe:

> The number of small producers is now much larger than it used to be. The producer who used to produce for the market, produces doubly less today; and today they consume much more, and market much less than in the past. Our Socialist large-scale farms, partly for the same reasons and partly on account of their still-existing infantile disorders (inadequate management, lax labor discipline) are for the time being unable to make up for the shortage.

Mrs. Mod refrained from mentioning a third factor in the curtailment of marketed production: the stern refusal of the Communist industrial order to provide incentives for greater production and

TABLE 32

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POST-WAR AGRARIAN TRADE PATTERNS IN HUNGARY*

1949 - 1952

SECTOR	PERCENT OF ARABLE LAND	PERCENT OF TOTAL GRAIN CROP PRODUCED	PERCENT OF CROP DELIVERED TO STATE	PERCENT OF TOTAL GRAIN DELIVERY
1949				
Working peasants' farms	75.5	82.1	38.3	75.3
Kulak farms	17.0	16.4	59.9	23.5
Socialist sector	7.5	1.5	31.7	1.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	41.7	100.0
1951				
Working peasants' farms	**	72.5	46.9	66.9
Kulak farms	**	10.1	66.2	13.2
Socialist sector	26.0	17.4	58.2	19.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	50.8	100.0
1952				
Working peasants' farms	**	69.6	41.7	61.4
Kulak farms	**	5.5	61.0	7.2
Socialist sector	34.5	24.9	59.6	31.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	47.4	100.0

* *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953.

** Data unavailable.

greater trade with the cities. The drastic economic reforms initiated during the summer of 1953 were part of a frantic effort to correct this imbalance, an imbalance pronounced in Hungary and terribly aggravated by the disastrous 1952 harvest.

ROMANIA

The Romanian Government has been more secretive about internal market relations than any other Satellite, making conclusions even more difficult to draw. The "Socialist sector," including the "primitive" agricultural associations, comprise 25 per cent of the arable land. According to Premier Gheorghiu-Dej, this sector produces no more than 25 per cent of the total crop,[60] no more than its proportionate share of the arable land. This suggests that the

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[60] Gheorghiu-Dej, *Scanteia*, August 23, 1953.

"Socialist sector," despite its advantages, has given little benefit to 475
the State in terms of marketed produce. The Romanian Council of 423
Ministers frequently complains, as it did on January 28, 1952, that 433
"in spite of all the important benefits given to the peasantry by the State . . . the market was not sufficiently supplied with agricultural products necessary to consumers and to industrial production."[61]

YUGOSLAVIA

The history of collectivization in Yugoslavia is so complex, and differs in so many respects from the course followed elsewhere in Eastern Europe, that comparisons are difficult. However, in certain fundamental respects, the initial collectivization drive (1948-1950) had the same goals as those guiding the Cominform bloc. No data on produce marketed are available; but production data indicate that in the years of collectivizing, the Government was successful at least in obtaining higher yields on its State and collective farms than from the private sector, and presumably was able to extract a large portion of that yield from the farms. Undoubtedly, this result was due in part to the ability of the Yugoslav regime to collectivize the fertile Vojvodina region (see Chart VII), where yield per hectare was traditionally high. But the "Socialist sector" also included a good deal of the poor and relatively unproductive land of Macedonia, and therefore Table 33, in which the proportion of grain produced by each sector is compared with the proportion of land held, is significant.

OVERALL MARKET PERSPECTIVE

Despite the sparseness and frequent unreliability of the statistical data employed in this analysis, some conclusions may be drawn.

1. In varying degrees, depending upon the country, collectivization in Eastern Europe has actually expedited extraction of agricultural produce from the countryside at the low price consistent with Communist industrial designs. While the system of compulsory deliveries at State-regulated prices was effective to this end, it left enough initiative and power in the hands of the peasantry to hamper the development of industry.

In Bulgaria collectivization results are the most impressive; in Czechoslovakia the gains are less impressive, but still significant. In Poland the regime has had to rely a great deal upon the surplus

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[61] *Scanteia*, January 29, 1952.

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TABLE 33

GRAIN PRODUCTION IN YUGOSLAVIA – 1948 - 1951*
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR

(In percent of total production)

YEAR	SECTOR	WHEAT	RYE	BARLEY	OATS	TOTAL**	PERCENT OF ARABLE LAND***
1948/49	State	2.3	1.8	7.4	8.5	3.4	3.0
	Cooperative	14.2	11.6	15.1	16.4	14.4	10.0
	Private	83.5	86.6	77.5	75.1	82.2	87.0
1949/50	State	3.2	2.0	14.5	12.4	5.0	4.0
	Cooperative	23.2	24.0	25.4	28.7	23.9	16.0
	Private	73.6	74.0	60.1	58.9	71.1	80.0
1950/51	State	2.8	2.4	17.4	14.5	5.5	4.0
	Cooperative	25.3	28.4	28.3	30.0	26.3	19.0
	Private	71.9	69.2	54.3	55.5	68.2	77.0

[*] *Bulletin of Information and Documents,* (Belgrade), Vol. 1, No. 4, 1952, pp. 21-26.

[**] The total is derived from the combined tonnage of the wheat, rye, barley, and oats. Since the caloric value of a ton of wheat is greater than a ton of barley or oats, combining them all in one sum is deceptive. However, for the purposes of the above comparison the rough approximation of the "total" given, based entirely on tonnage, is sufficient. If potato production had been included in this table, then a caloric measurement such as the FAO used in establishing its "Wheat Equivalent Unit" (See Chart XIII) might have been employed, since the caloric content of a given weight of potatoes is only one-fifth that of an equivalent weight of wheat, whereas barley and oats are three-fifths.

[***] The figures given for arable land in this table are estimates. Since grain production is given according to the agricultural year and the progress of collectivization according to the calendar year, it was necessary to interpolate the latter figures to accord with the former.

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production of State Farms rather than the collectives, and, as in 475
Hungary, kulaks and middle farmers continue to constitute a major 423
source of marketable produce. In Romania the positive results of 433
collectivization appear to be negligible, and, consistently enough, its industrial expansion has been quite modest. And in Hungary collectivization seems to have aggravated an already critical town-country relationship. But even in Hungary, and to a lesser extent Romania, the degree of peasant exploitation was sufficient to insure considerable urban development.

2. At the same time, it must be stressed, the evidence indicates that collectivization was by no means as successful as it was in the Soviet Union. This seems to be true both quantitatively (in terms of percentage of arable land absorbed) and qualitatively (in terms of reorientation of the market). It was not sufficiently comprehensive or intensive to facilitate the rapid increase in peasant exploitation which, from the regimes' viewpoint, justified the bloodshed and brutality of Communist agrarian policy.

656 3. Consequently, the policy of collectivization, designed to
178 insure a steady supply of goods to the cities without much payment
185 in return, loses a large part of its meaning, and the collectivization
● 423 drive itself is halted. While it is true that collectivized farming is still officially considered the highest form of agrarian organization,[9] the revised economic plans of the Satellite regimes do not intend appreciable extension of the "Socialist sector." Indeed, the goal of increasing the standard of living precludes, for some time, the resumption of any Communist land offensive.

4. Similarly, the New Course has made something of an anomaly of the traditional practices of the Communist land offensive: the division of the peasantry into antagonistic groups, the discrimination against the independent peasantry as a whole, the compilation of "kulak lists." These techniques, which were so well adapted to the collectivization campaign, lose much of their meaning in the new atmosphere. Again and again Communist leaders admonish their bureaucracy to cease treating the peasant as an "enemy" and everywhere but in Bulgaria it is now openly declared that the independent peasantry must be relied upon for the major portion of the agricultural produce.[10] Violent anti-kulak campaigns must also be relinquished as long as the regimes are interested in agricultural production and not merely in agricultural redistribution. Therefore, the post-Stalin regimes call for "limitation" of the "kulak" rather than his "elimination."[11]

5. Since increased agricultural production is the urgent and immediate necessity, and since increased administrative force cannot be used to obtain it, incentives for the peasant must be broadened. Delivery quotas are reduced; delivery prices are increased; taxes and fees of all sorts are lowered; and arrears in many categories are canceled. The pattern is nowhere identical; but in each country most of the same devices were employed.

"We must understand," said Berman, [that the new policy] "is going to cost a large sum of money. If the peasant gets this money but doesn't get any goods for it, including those which he really wants . . . there will be no increase in [agricultural] production." Therefore, a dual policy of increased payment for agricultural goods and increased production of vitally needed farmers' commodities is instituted. 656 178 185 423

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[9] See, for example, the Bierut speech at the 2nd Congress of the Polish Workers Party (PZPR), March 10, 1954.

[10] "We shall not and must not force anybody to join agricultural cooperatives, and we also do not think that the private farmer represents our enemy, we consider him our ally" (Czechoslovak President Antonin Zapotocky, *Rude Pravo*, February 23, 1954).

[11] See, for example, Gheorghiu-Dej., *For a Lasting Peace*, November 6, 1953.

6. An attempt is being made to redress the balance so far as the concentration of techniques is concerned. A vigorous effort to detach technicians from cities and urban industries and to send them to farms for whose direction and assistance they were ostensibly trained, is being made in conjunction with the new plan.[12] This is true everywhere in the Soviet sphere, especially in Poland the USSR, and Romania.

7. If the New Course is designed partly to consolidate the existing agricultural structure, it must be revaluated in terms of long-range perspectives. Hence, those collective farms which have the least social stability and economic viability are permitted to return to the private sector. In Czechoslovakia, where some 40 per cent of the farms were not paying their own way, according to Premier Siroky, a small percentage of the farms were permitted to disband in the fall of 1953.[13] In Yugoslavia, where hundreds of collectives in mountainous areas produced very little and served only as a drain on the State treasury, almost half of these farms have been dissolved since 1951.[14] And in Hungary, where peasant dissatisfaction was so great that, even with a police-State normally equipped to handle discontent, it constituted an element of such basic instability that almost half of the collectivized households have left the "Socialist sector."[15]

Above all, the New Course represents an effort to stabilize and consolidate the system of relationships carved out by the East European regimes. The next few years are likely to witness a concentrated Communist effort to make a smoothly-functioning economic order out of the conquests already gained, rather than sweeping away present problems by posing future challenges, as they have done in the past.

The New Course does not, by any stretch of the imagination,

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[12] The program of reinforcing the technical assistance to the countryside has encountered considerable resistance from the technicians themselves, and, indeed, in the USSR, the government complains that many technicians who go to the countryside refuse to take their families with them, so convinced are they that the new assignments are temporary (*Pravda*, November 27, 1953).

[13] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), November 10, 1953.

[14] *Borba* (Belgrade), February 29, 1953.

[15] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), December 31, 1953.

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represent a repudiation of the agricultural organization pioneered by the Soviet planners in the early 1930s and brought to Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. The basic characteristics of this organization cannot be abandoned without the most thoroughgoing reorientation of the whole economy. The New Course cannot therefore be compared with the New Economic Policy of early Soviet history. The NEP was declared before the Soviet industrial and bureaucratic system had been built, and a retreat to a relatively free market system was possible. The New Course, on the other hand, has been promulgated within the framework of an already fully-elaborated industrial and bureaucratic system, and the regimes can no longer rely upon the free market for agricultural produce.

Having built this social system and enclosed themselves within it, the East European Communists have lost much of the freedom of choice and flexibility which aided them so greatly in their post-war assumption of power. Therefore, they are subject to the internal laws of the system, and it is doubtful whether they can make a success of their efforts to reorient its basic relationships. The authoritarian order is well adapted to the leadership of a rapidly expanding heavy industrial, semi-military economy, but it is badly equipped to handle the problems of small-scale agriculture and consumer demand. In nine months of operation, the New Course has already made it clear that the greatest obstacle to stabilization of the Stalinist social order comes from the social order itself, and its voracious demands.[16]

Prior to the introduction of the New Course, it was widely assumed that the East European Communist drive to emulate Soviet achievements was inexorable, and required only time for completion. In particular, it was assumed that the Satellite regimes could not rest until collectivization was completed, as if the Communists could not face themselves ideologically with one independent farm remaining. But the events of 1953 have highlighted the degree to which Communist agricultural policy has been, from the start, conditioned by the bedrock economic needs of a developing social structure, rather than by the abstract demands of rigid doctrine. Indeed, even the Soviets, whose collectivized agriculture had attained the state of "near-perfection" and completion toward which

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[16] For an extensive discussion of internal bureaucratic resistance to the New Course see "The Bureaucracy Wavers," *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press, New York), January, 1953.

the East European Communists were striving, are in the process 656
of readjusting the structure in line with the new political relation- 178
ships. 185

No doubt the present *modus vivendi* between the peasantry 423
and the Communist regimes is precarious and unstable, at best an uneasy truce between essentially antagonistic social forces. But there is good reason to believe that the Communists are determined to keep this mid-way course for some time to come, with only minor wavering within the ranks.

3. *"Salami Tactics" and the New Course* 423

The development of East European Communism since World War II has been dominated by the pragmatic methods of "salami tactics," the theory expounded by Hungarian ex-Premier Rakosi, which justified pursuit of any social or economic program that reinforces Communist political power. The advocacy of land reform facilitated Communist absorption of the State machine in 1945-46, and therefore became approved Communist "agrarian policy." Similarly, since advocacy of a productive middle peasantry may help to facilitate Communist retention of power in 1953-54, it has become approved Communist "agrarian policy." At each stage, the Communists speak as if no other policy had ever been considered, and as if no other policy could possibly be.[17] As always, however, their primary concern is with power, and their ideological pronouncements tailored to suit it. The New Course is a development very much within the spirit of the "salami tactics" philosophy.

The success and failure of Communist agriculture policy in Eastern Europe may be attributable to these same "salami tactics." This strategem of slow suffocation made possible the seizure of power under circumstances unsuited to "classic" revolutionary forms; and it was well suited to a political apparatus incapable of a frontal revolutionary attack. The policy of slow, piecemeal land collectivization made possible the extension of the "Socialist sector" at a pace which did not arouse the united antagonism of the peasantry at any one time, thus avoiding the type of militant resist-

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[17] See above 91-2 for a brief discussion of official explanations of change in policy. Considering the importance of changes in policy emphasis in 1953, it is remarkable that the Communists have made so few attempts to analyze their past performances. The official definition of "Socialism" itself was altered during 1953 (see Fogarasi, *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), September-October, 1953), and to this date not a single Communist theoretician has acknowledged the fact.

423 ance to collectivization which only a party of the strong Soviet type could have withstood.

However, those factors which made "salami tactics" suitable for the seizure of power and the beginning of collectivization made them inappropriate for completion of the task and the final subjugation of the independent peasantry. These disadvantages may be summarized as follows:

423 668 1. Piecemeal collectivization encouraged a type of peasant resistance which, it turned out, was more effective than Soviet peasant resistance. In the USSR collectivization took place so rapidly, and with such tremendous force, that the vast majority of peasants were already well enclosed within the "Socialist sector" by the time a full-scale counter-attack could be prepared. Leonard Hubbard, the English authority, described the Soviet victory in this way:

> The struggle over collectivization ended distinctly in favour of the Soviet Government, unlike the confiict [between the Government and the peasantry] that brought War Communism to a close. The peasants were no longer able to starve the Government into yielding, because the Government had now created an efficient organisation for obtaining the foodstuffs necessary for subsistence of the urban and industrial population.[18]

While it is true that the Soviet peasantry, in retaliation, destroyed a good portion of the nation's livestock, their bargaining power was not improved as a result. The vital shipments of surplus grain were insured, and all means of resistance had been thoroughly destroyed. The famine of 1932-33, mainly affecting the grain-growing regions of Ukraine and South Russia, demonstrated beyond doubt that, in Hubbard's words, "if anybody was to starve, [the peasants] would be the first to do so."

423 661 In Eastern Europe, however, the slow, cautious collectivization precluded the possibility of so calculated and brutal a policy. A sufficient proportion of the peasantry remained outside of the "Socialist sector" to wreak havoc with the Government's general economic plan. The East European regimes could not gain a strong enough position in relation to the peasantry to withstand the tremendous pressures which would be generated by rapid collectivization or a disastrous drought such as 1933. One poor harvest was, consequently, a sufficient jolt to destroy the entire rhythm of the

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[18] Leonard Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture*, London, 1939, p. 123.

Satellite industrial program. The oustanding case in point is, of course, Hungary, whose extremely poor harvest of 1952 provided the impetus which paved the way for the crisis of 1953.[19] 423 668

2. The reliance upon slow economic strangulation rather than direct administrative force in collectivization inevitably meant greater reliance on the voluntary will of the peasantry than was necessary in the Soviet collectivization drive. Therefore, the regimes had to take some account of the individual tastes of the peasantry. The variety of intermediate types of collective, the special privileges granted kolkhoz members, reflect the Communist desire to soften the impact of collectivization.[20] The strenuous efforts made to demonstrate to the peasant the economic superiority of collectivism were also part of this effort.

This policy made collectivization possible but at the same time detracted from the very usefulness originally intended for the collectivized farms; that is, the effort to render the collectives attractive to the independent peasant (limited as they were) did not facilitate exploitation of the peasants which was their major economic justification. As was evident from the analysis presented in Chapted IV, the degree of exploitation of the "Socialist sector" was not much greater than the exploitation of the private sector. The difference was, in any case, smaller than that achieved in the Soviet Union, where a prolonged period of persuasion and intrapeasantry discrimination had been unnecessary.

4. *The East European Peasant* 565

Peasant resistance is a social force extremely difficult to measure either quantitatively or qualitatively. It expresses itself in many forms and guises, both in open revolt and passive resistance. This is partly because peasant sentiment rarely expresses itself in organizational form but more commonly in individual economic acts. In modern history, governments have found it difficult to elicit fanatical loyalty from the peasant; at best he is obedient. For the same reasons, the peasant has rarely been drawn into the organized revolutionary movements of the time. He has succumbed to few 829 668

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[19] There was, of course, other factors involved in the Hungarian agricultural crisis of 1953 (see above pp. 109-10).

[20] Mention should be made here of Communist efforts throughout the sphere to flatter the peasant by a superficial glorification of his traditional dance, costumes, handiwork, and other expressions of the peasant culture which once graced the covers of pre-World War II East European tourist guides.

Yugoslav peasants; the special position which Romania occupies in 565
the Soviet empire. These differences are important, and explain 829
many of the variations within the framework of agricultural policy. 668
But these variations fall into that historical experience which distinguishes East European peasantry from its Russian counterpart. These historical differences are of the utmost importance in explaining the failure of the East European Communists to emulate successfully the Soviet example.

5. *The Communist Role in Eastern Europe*

The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe consider themselves 829
progressive forces of the area. In agriculture, they assert that by 668
lifting the backward peasantry out of its traditional lethargy and provincialism, they are performing a service for the peasants and the entire society. The opposition of the peasantry to Communist plans for the rationalization of the land stems from stubborn allegiance to outmoded customs and habits. Vulko Chervenkov, the Bulgarian Premier, gave the classical formulations on this point:

> The Bulgarian peasant has two souls. One is the love of work and the other is the sense of private ownership. His spirit of private ownership brings him close to the capitalist. His spirit of work brings him close to the working class. Therefore the peasant is hesitant. We Communists, through our tactics and by the collective method, should kill their spirit of private ownership and build our socialist world.[21]

It is precisely this conception of the Communist role in Eastern Europe which the material gathered together here calls into question.

No doubt it is partly true that peasant resistance to collectiviza- 423 ●
tion is based on their passionate attachment to the land they till 829
and own. But as has been pointed out, the major issue in the struggle between the Communists and the peasants was the question of the *distribution* of the fruits of the land, rather than the more abstract question of conflicting ideologies.

The peasants fight not only to protect their ancient traditions but even more to protect their economic rights, and they frequently employ the ancient traditions in defense of their own economic interests. The Communists, for their part, struggle against these traditions not merely out of doctrinaire antagonism but because these customs stand in the way of further exploitation of the

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[21] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) September 9, 1953.

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829 peasants and their full incorporation into the state-industrial machinery.[20]

423 Like the great land reforms which followed the First and Second World Wars, the Communist "solution" to the land problem of Eastern Europe is no real solution at all, and since it does not attack the problem at its roots, is not intended to be one. Rather, like the great reforms, the Communist agricultural program is only a means of redistributing the products of the land to suit new political realities. The chief difference between the two movements lies in the fact that while the reforms redistributed the wealth among the peasants themselves, collectivization was designed to redistribute a portion of the national wealth in favor of the new urban Communist bureaucratic class.

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[22] The working class has been already incorporated into that structure. But that does not mean that, despite the absence of traditional ties, they are any less opposed to the Communist regimes than the peasants. On the contrary, as the East German and Czechoslovak revolts of mid-1953 demonstrated, the workers are likely to play the leading role in anti-Communist agitation and revolt.

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CHAPTER I

CHANGES IN PROPERTY: THE LAND REFORM

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● 423 A DESCRIPTION of the economic condition of Stalin's satellites must begin with a consideration of the changes brought about in property relations after the overthrow of the rule of Hitler and his vassals in the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. As most of the population in these countries earn their living in agriculture* it is convenient to begin with an examination of the changes in land ownership.

There is a widely held belief that the feudal system, with the characteristic feature of the large latifundia, continued to prevail east of the Elbe until the arrival of the Soviet army. The prevalence of this idea is due partly to ignorance, but also to the propaganda spread since the war by the governments of this region, who try to paint as black a picture as possible of the property relations which previously prevailed there in order to magnify the importance of the land reforms they have carried out. This view is incorrect, since before World War II, and in some areas even before World War I, a series of land reforms had already to a large extent changed the system of landholding in the countryside. On the other hand it would not be correct to minimise the extent of the land reforms carried out since the war.

ODO To arrive at a balanced estimate of the extent of land reforms each country will have to be dealt with separately, even though for lack of space only a brief statement of the facts can be given. The countries will be dealt with in order, beginning with those in which the changes in the ownership of land after World

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*Of the total population those engaged in agriculture, fishing and forestry made up: in Bulgaria (1934) 80 per cent; Yugoslavia (1931) 79 per cent; Rumania (1930) 78 per cent; Poland (1931) 65 per cent; Hungary (1930) 53 per cent; Czechoslovakia (1930) 38 per cent.

[Text starts on p.13]

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000 War II were the least, and ending with those in which the changes were the greatest. This order illustrates the course of historical development, since the countries in which the changes were very small after World War II were those in which the greatest changes had been wrought in the past, and those where big changes took place had known but few before.

Bulgaria

423 The national uprising of the Bulgarians in 1878 destroyed feudalism. The Turkish beys fled for their lives and left the Bulgarian serfs in full and free ownership of the land they tilled. [656] The few feudal remnants that were not eliminated in 1878 were swept away by the Agrarian Union Government of Alexander Stamboliisky (1920–23). This government fixed a maximum of 30 hectares of land for any one household (i.e., an area smaller than that fixed as a maximum by the land reforms in any country except Bulgaria herself after World War II). The political instability of this government, ending in its overthrow by a military *coup d'etat* and the murder of its leader as well as of tens of thousands of peasants and workers, resulted in the law of the maximum not being fully applied, so that a certain concentration of ownership took place after 1923. Nevertheless, Bulgaria remained a country with very few 'estates' of more than 30 hectares, a country of small peasant ownership par excellence:

LAND OWNERSHIP IN BULGARIA BEFORE THE 1944 REFORM
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	*Below 5 ha.**	*5-10 ha.*	*10-30 ha.*	*30-50 ha.*	*50 ha. and over*
Number of Owners	63.1	26.2	10.3	0.3	0.1
Area	30.0	36.9	29.5	2.0	1.6

(L. Bojkoff, *Bulgaria is not the Land of Roses Only*, Sofia, 1946, p. 69.)

Wilbert E. Moore, in *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (League of Nations, Geneva, 1945), gives an even lower percentage for the big properties: in 1934 only 2.7 per cent of the land was in the hands of people owning more than 30 hectares each (p. 251).

There were very few tenants in Bulgaria. According to an official report of 31st December, 1926, the cultivated rented land comprised only 1 per cent of all privately owned land. (O. S. Morgan, editor, *Agricultural Systems of Middle Europe. A Symposium*, New York, 1933, p. 50). The number of agricultural workers was also negligible. 423

**ha.* = hectare = 2.4711 acres.

After World War II the Communist government fixed a new maximum of 20 ha. for all parts of the country except Dobrudja where the maximum fixed by Stamboliisky was in force. But although the government hoped to increase its influence among the peasants, the real results of this land reform were not considerable. In his Report to the Second Fatherland Front Congress (Feb. 2-3, 1948) Premier Georgi Dimitrov said that '127,000 families received 1,258,000 decares of land (1 decare = 1/10 hectare—Y.G.) in compliance with the agrarian reform, while 7,863 families were housed and given about 12,000 decares of land. 71,000 decares of land were distributed among 381 State farms, establishments and institutions'. (*Second Fatherland Front Congress*, Sofia, 1948, p.42). Thus altogether 1,341,000 decares, or 134,100 hectares, were distributed. Since the total arable land in 1947 was 7.8 million hectares, the redistribution was relatively small. The land reform affected only about three per cent of the agricultural land. [656]

The limited extent of the last land reform in Bulgaria is shown by the statistics of land ownership before and after it:

	CULTIVATED LAND (IN PERCENTAGE)		
	1926	*1934*	*1946*
Small farms	28.62	28.90	30.70
Medium "	41.63	41.13	40.60
Large "	29.75	29.97	28.70

Professor Petko Spirkov, who cites this table, draws the obvious conclusion from it: '. . . during the period 1926-1946 there are practically no changes in the distribution of land'. ('Class Structure of our Village,' *Free Bulgaria*, Sofia, March 15, 1949).

Yugoslavia

Serbia achieved virtual national independence in 1830 and full sovereignty in 1877. Then the Turkish feudal lords fled from the country and as in Bulgaria the land remained the property of the former serfs, so that many years before World

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423 War I, Old Serbia was a country of small peasants with very few tenants or agricultural workers. A similar situation was created in Montenegro and Dalmatia by their union with Serbia (1918). Only in Croatia and Slovenia, which were torn from the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Empire and added to Yugoslavia in 1918, did there remain big estates to be divided in the inter-war years. There, as a result of the agrarian reform law of 1919 and a number of subsidiary laws which followed, 1,805,000 hectares were distributed among 497,000 peasant families. (O.S. Morgan, op. cit. p. 361). This area made up about a quarter of the total area of Croatia and Slovenia, and about 12.5 per cent of the total agricultural area of Yugoslavia.

The agricultural area of Yugoslavia, prior to World War II, was distributed thus:

	Up to 2 ha.	*2-5 ha.*	*5-10 ha.*	*10-20 ha.*	*20-50 ha.*	*50 and over*
Area ..	6.5%	21.5%	27.0%	22.3%	13%	9.6%

423 A series of laws was passed by the Federated Republic of Yugoslavia in August 1945 by which the maximum land allowed to any individual was 45 hectares, of which either 30-35 hectares were to be arable and 10-15 hectares forest, or 45 hectares arable. All the German settlers and quislings were expropriated and the land owned by the banks, joint stock companies and the Church* taken over by the state.

The final result of the reform was not very great. About 850 thousand hectares changed hands, i.e., about 6 per cent. of the agricultural land of Yugoslavia (of which about half was the property of German peasants who were expelled although they had lived in Yugoslavia for hundreds of years).

Rumania

In the Old Kingdom of Rumania as well as in the territories added to it as a result of the first World War (Transylvania, taken from Hungary, and Bessarabia from Russia), a land reform on a very large scale was carried out after the first World War. Altogether 20,976 large estates with an area of 6,008,098 hectares were expropriated and handed over to 1,368,978 peasants. The agricultural area was distributed thus:

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*except that each congregation was allowed to keep 10 hectares.

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	Before the Reform		After the Reform	
	Less than 100 ha.	*More than 100 ha.*	*Less than 100 ha.*	*More than 100 ha.*
Ancient Kingdom	4,593,148	3,397,851	7,369,549	621,450
Bessarabia ..	2,337,811	1,844,539	3,829,731	352,619
Transylvania ..	4,689,855	2,751,457	6,363,664	1,087,648
Bucovina ..	405,000	115,000	480,967	39,033
Total ..	12,025,814	8,108,847	18,033,911	2,100,750
In %	59·77	40·23	89·56	10·44

(O.S. Morgan, ibid. p. 323).

In the provinces annexed to Rumania after the first World 563
War, social and national differences were largely identical, 423
since the landlords were Hungarians and most of the peasants Rumanians. The peasants belonging to the national minorities were not excluded from the land distribution carried out by the Rumanian governments, even though these governments were far from internationalist in outlook. In Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bucovina 206,165 peasant families belonging to national minorities received land in the redistribution side by side with 532,700 Rumanians.

After the first world war a considerable amount of land again 423
changed hands: the poor peasants lost a lot of their land to the rich peasants. But even so landownership was much less concentrated than before 1918.

The second World War resulted in the loss of Bessarabia and Bucovina to Russia. Within the new boundaries of Rumania, estates of more than 100 hectares (calculated from the table given above) comprised an area of 1,709,098 hectares, or 11.07 per cent of all the land. Properties of more than 50 hectares, (about 1,970,300 hectares in all) comprised 17.5 per cent of all the agricultural land. (Rumania, Ministère de l'Information, *La Réforme Agraire en Roumanie*, 1946, p.16).

The land reform law of 22 March, 1945, fixed the maximum land holding allowed at 50 hectares. People owning more than 50 hectares had to give up all land over this amount. Church property, state property and the royal estates were excluded, but the last-named, an area of 132,112 hectares, was expropriated after the abdication of King Michael (December, 1947). All German owners (the German peasant colonies of [563]
Transylvania) were expropriated, as well as all 'traitors and war criminals'.

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● 423 Up to September, 1947, land reform affected about 1.4 million hectares, and afterwards, with the distribution of the royal estates, etc., altogether 1.6 million hectares, i.e., about 10 per cent of the agricultural area of Rumania, or a third of the relative extent of the land reform after World War I.

Czechoslovakia

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As a result of the Battle of the White Mountain (1620) the Czech nobility was almost completely wiped out and replaced by German Catholic landlords. Thus, when the Czechoslovak Republic was established, there were German landlords and Czech peasants in the Czech areas, and in the Sudetenland—the Border area—mainly German peasants and German landlords. In Slovakia (taken from the Hungarian part of the Hapsburg Empire) there were Magyar landlords and Slovak peasants, and, in the region bordering on Hungary, Hungarian peasants and Hungarian landlords. So that here, the land question and the national question were one, as in other parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire: Magyar landlords exploited Slovak, Rumanian, Croat and Ruthenian peasants; German landlords exploited Czech, Ruthenian, Slovene and Polish peasants.

In 1919 the Land Reform Act was passed. It provided for the dividing up of all large estates of more than 100 hectares. But this law was only partially and half-heartedly carried out. Yet, as a result of the land reform, 1.7 million hectares, or 12 per cent of the area of Czechoslovakia, were expropriated, and by 1 January, 1937, 1,272,934 hectares had been redistributed. At the same time in 1930, 13.8 per cent of the agricultural area still remained in properties of over 100 hectares. It was mainly Hungarian and German landlords who were expropriated, but the German and Hungarian peasants, tenants and agricultural workers not only were not excluded, but even benefited from the redistribution. As Miss L. E. Texter writes: 'The German farmer received land even from a Czech landowner'. (*Land Reform in Czechoslovakia*, London, 1923, quoted by E. Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, London, 1938, p. 152).

In 1945 (as a result of the decrees of 19.5.45, 21.6.45, 20.7.45 and 3.9.45) an area of 2.6 million hectares was taken from Germans, landlords and peasants alike. Practically no

land belonging to non-Germans was touched in Bohemia and 423
Moravia. As a result of the agrarian reform in Slovakia, three 563
hundred thousand hectares were expropriated, of which two- 656
thirds belonged to Hungarians and Germans.

For two years the property of Czech and Slovak landowners was left untouched by the government. Land reform was identified with the national struggle of all the Slavs—Czechs and Slovaks alike—against all the Germans and Hungarians.

Later on it was necessary to reduce the maximum holding in order to pave the way for the total annihilation of the bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia, and the integration of Czechoslovakia in the Russian Empire. On July 11, 1947, the maximum of 100 hectares fixed in 1919 was reduced to 50 hectares, and as a result another 919 thousand hectares were redistributed.

Thus until July, 1947, land redistribution was aimed at achieving an internal colonisation by the expropriation of 'foreign' proprietors, and the extent of the second wave of land redistribution was only about a quarter of the first.

Poland

After the First World War, Polish governments carried out, 423
if somewhat timidly, certain land reforms. A maximum holding [563]
of 180 hectares of arable land was fixed with two exceptions—in suburbs the area allowed to a household was 60 hectares and in the Eastern districts it was 300 hectares. The landlords in the Eastern districts were treated gently because their peasants belonged to the national minorities—Ukrainians and White Russians. The administration was empowered to decide annually what estates should be divided. In fact, Polish landlords were able, by pulling strings, to escape the land reform, and in general only the estates of Russian landlords in Eastern Poland were redistributed. Altogether between 1919 and 1938, 2,654,000 hectares were divided up. (F. Zweig, *Poland between Two Wars*, London, 1944, p. 133).

In spite of this measure of land reform, a not inconsiderable proportion of land remained in the hands of big landowners. In 1931, about 4.6 million hectares, 18.0 per cent of all agricultural land, belonged to farms of more than 50 hectares. But as a single owner might own several farms, each of less than 50 hectares but totalling more than 50 hectares, the area

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● 423 comprised by properties over 50 hectares after the land reform was even greater than 4.6 million hectares. The lack of statistics on the subject (resulting from the Polish government's attempt to gloss over the reactionary and half-hearted way in which the land distribution was carried out) makes it impossible to estimate more exactly what area was covered by properties of more than 50 hectares. It is, however, evident that the redistribution of land carried out between the two world wars affected 2.6 million hectares, and left about twice that area untouched.

The frontier alterations resulting from World War II fundamentally changed property relations. Eastern Poland, an area of big estates, was lost to Poland, and a new area was gained in the west which—after the expulsion of 8.5 million Germans—was only very sparsely populated.

656 423 By the decrees of 6 September, 1944, and 17 January, 1945, all Germans and traitors were expropriated, and 50 hectares of arable land was fixed as a maximum individual holding in Old Poland and 100 hectares in the 'Regained Territories'. The Church land was not affected. Polish landlords who had more than 50 hectares received very little compensation for the area they ceded—the equivalent of one year's yield of grain. According to the terms of these decrees, in Old Poland the area to be redistributed was more than 3 million hectares, of which agricultural land (excluding forests) made up 2,131,285 hectares. About 1,256,000 hectares of this belonged to Polish landlords, and 875,000 hectares belonged to Germans. In the Western Territories more than 5 million hectares of agricultural land was taken from Germans and either distributed to Polish peasants (4.5 million) or converted into state farms, agricultural schools, etc.

Thus internal colonization, or expropriation on a nationalist basis, is the key to the change in land ownership in Poland, even more than in Czecholslovakia.

Hungary

423 Unlike her neighbours, Hungary did not undergo any land reform after World War I. The communist government of Béla Kun (1919) did not divide the large estates among the peasants —one of their serious mistakes which made the victory of the

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White Terror easier. If the land had been divided, it would have remained peasant property even after Béla Kun had been overthrown. No power on earth could have changed this. But by a paradox of history, the only country of Eastern and South Eastern Europe that had a Communist government at that period was the only one in which the feudal land structure remained intact. 423

The pattern of land distribution in Hungary is revealed by the following table:

DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDINGS ACCORDING TO AREA, 1930

Groups of holdings according to area	*Number of Farms*		*Total Area*		*Average area of holdings yokes*
	Thousands	*% of total*	*Thousands of yokes**	*% of total*	
Up to 1 yoke	552	34.5	287	1.8	0.52
1-2 yokes	278	17.4	428	2.7	1.54
2-5 „	313	19.6	1,034	6.5	3.30
5-10 „	200	12.5	1,460	9.2	7.30
10-20 „	157	9.8	2,241	14.0	14.27
20-100 „	84	5.3	3,093	19.4	36.82
100 and more yokes	14	0.9	7,390	46.4	527.88
Total	1,598	100	15,933	100	10.00

(International Agrarian Institute, *Six Years of the Agrarian Crisis*, Moscow, 1935, p. 109)

Thus, on the one hand there were 1,143,000 lilliputian holdings (71.5 per cent of all the farms), each less than 5 yokes, making up 11.0 per cent of the total area, and on the other hand, 14,000 large estates (0.9 per cent of all the farms), making up 46.4 per cent of the area.

After World War II the time was overripe for the abolition of large estates oppressing the mass of agricultural workers and tenants.

On 17th March, 1945, the Hungarian government passed 423
a law confiscating the land of gentry with estates of more than 656
50 hectares, as well as the estates of the Church bodies of more than 50 hectares, and of peasant land over 100 hectares. The maximum individual land holding was fixed at 100 hectares, except for those who distinguished themselves in the war against Germany, in which case the maximum was 150 hectares. The so-called 'model farms', that is, vineyards, orchards and other intensive cultures, were exempt from redistribution. As a result, an area of 5.7 million yokes,† i.e.,

*yoke = 0.575 hectares = 1.422 acres

†Of this area, only 456 thousand yokes were expropriated from Germans who were expelled from the country. The rest was the property of big Hungarian landlords.

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423 more than a third of all the cultivated land of Hungary, was
656 distributed among 640,000 families. Thus in Hungary there was a real revolution in agricultural property relations.

To sum up the changes in land ownership brought about
423 since the end of World War II: in Hungary the transformation of property relations in land by the elimination of large estates was tremendous, and a progressive step; the land reform in Rumania, which was the completion of a much wider land reform after World War I, was less extensive but of the same character; in Czechoslovakia and Poland the changes constituted in the main an act of internal colonisation and of the expropriation of millions of Germans and Hungarians; in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the changes were very small indeed.

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369 standard of life and culture. Conversely, if the village supplied the agricultural products and labour necessary for the towns, industrialisation would have been much accelerated. These two conditions are mutually dependent. But the bureaucracy cannot tolerate a gradual development of agriculture and industry, and prefers to try to escape from the vicious circle by forced 'collectivisation'.

●423 474 All previous land reforms had, for a number of years at least, the effect not only of not increasing the agricultural surpluses available for the towns, but actually of reducing them. This is because large estates, based either on tenants' or workers' labour, obviously have relatively larger surpluses than the small peasant farms, even if both have the same productivity. Land reform, by dividing the large estates into many small peasant farms has, as an immediate consequence, a decline in the marketable agricultural surpluses. The surpluses necessary for industrialisation could be obtained by the encouragement of *kulak* farming, but this would be unwise from the standpoint of the bureaucracy, as socially and politically it would raise a new ruling class clinging tenaciously to private property, and economically it would lead to a demand by the kulaks for industrial goods in exchange for their surpluses. The bureaucracy needs a cheaper way of getting this surplus. It might have recourse to taxation and requisitions. But this too can hardly be relied on to provide large enough quantities of agricultural products for quick industrialisation, for the disgruntled peasant can 'go on strike' and decrease his sowing area, or neglect his fields, so that the surplus available for requisition decreases, or he can hide part of his yield, for it is impossible to supervise millions of small peasants scattered in thousands of villages. These drawbacks are virtually eliminated and the obligatory deliveries much more easily secured if millions of peasants are concentrated in some tens of thousands of large farms. The peasants, it is true, may react to their expropriation and herding in semi-serf camps by slaughtering their livestock. This may reduce the total agricultural production for a number of years and famine may stalk the land bringing death in its train, but no matter. If the quantity of agricultural goods in the hands of the state increases, everything is satisfactory. 'Collectivisation' also enables the state

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to supervise the labour power in the countryside, and, if the wages in the towns are not high enough to attract people from the countryside, they will be drawn there by the mechanisation of agriculture and the elimination of superfluous mouths in the 'collective farms'. Further, if capital construction is being undertaken, which demands very little skill and can be done by a large number of workers with very little or no machinery (for the bureaucracy likes to 'waste' as little of the expensive machinary needed for industrialisation and militarisation as possible) the 'collective farms' can provide an ample supply of this cheap labour from the 'kulaks,' i.e. all who dare to show any resistance to the bureaucracy. As yet it is scarcely possible to prove from experience that this will be the fate of agriculture in the satellites, because the process is only in its early stages. That this is the tendency, however, is clear enough, from the developments so far and from the history of agriculture in Russia since 1928. 423 474 ●

The Example of 'Collectivisation' in Russia

The influence of the collectivisation of agriculture on the agricultural output in Russia is clear from the following table: 423 474 241

Year	*Sown Area*			*Gross Output of Grain*	*Cattle*
	Total	*Grain*	*Technical Crops*		
	million hectares			million centners	million heads
1928	113.0	92.2	8.6	733.2	70.5
1929	118.0	95.9	8.8	717.4	67.1
1930	127.2	101.8	10.5	835.4	53.9
1931	136.3	104.4	14.0	694.8	47.9
1932	134.4	99.7	14.9	698.7	40.7
1933	129.7	101.6	11.9	808.2	38.4
1934	131.4	104.7	10.7	804.6	42.4
1935	132.8	103.4	10.6	810.9	49.2
1936	133.8	102.4	10.8	744.6	56.7
1937	135.3	104.4	11.2	1,082.6	57.0
1938	136.9	102.4	11.0	854.9	63.2

(S. N. Prokopovicz, *Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets*, Zurich, 1944, p. 133).

This shows that, ten years after the drive towards 'collectivisation' began, the number of cattle was 10 per cent lower than before, while gross grain output was 16 per cent higher. The main reason for the rise was the cultivation of new steppe lands which required agricultural machinery. The total

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423 sown area rose by 21 per cent and the grain area by 11 per
474 cent.

241 That the productivity of labour in Russian agriculture, despite the mechanisation, was not higher in 1931-5 than in the countries of Eastern Europe is confirmed by the following calculation made by W. E. Moore:

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER PERSON DEPENDENT ON AGRICULTURE AND PER MALE ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE, 1931-5 AVERAGE

	Per Person Dependent on Agriculture Crop Units	*Per Male Engaged in Agriculture* Crop Units
Czechoslovakia ..	45	146
Hungary	33	96
Poland	21	72
Rumania	21	67
Bulgaria	20	70
Yugoslavia	17	55
Albania	10	32
U.S.S.R.	17	53

(op. cit. p. 35)

Even if the improvement in Russian agricultural production after 1931-5 is taken into account, it is clear that her output per male engaged in agriculture was not more than that of Rumania, Bulgaria or Poland, and must have been far short of that of Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

Does this mean that the rulers of Russia failed to achieve what they aimed at by 'collectivisation'? This question can be answered by examining the proportion of the agricultural output taken by the state in the form of obligatory deliveries:

Year	*Total Yield*		*Obligatory Deliveries*			*Retained by Agriculturists after obligatory deliveries*	
			Quantity	*% of Total*	*% of Total*		
	gross	net*	million centners	gross	net	million centners	Index
1927/8	728.0	605.9	112.2	15.4	18.5	493.7	100
1932/3	698.7	570.1	185.2	26.5	32.5	384.9	77.9
1933/4	808.2	677.1	228.7	28.3	33.8	448.4	90.8
1934/5	804.6	669.5	226.6	28.1	33.8	442.9	89.7
1935/6	810.9	677.5	249.3	30.7	36.8	428.2	86.7
1936/7	744.6	612.5	260.0	34.9	42.4	352.5	71.4

*After deduction of seeds from gross yield.
(Prokopovicz, op. cit. pp. 136, 138).

From 1927/8 to 1936/7 these obligatory deliveries taken by the state from agriculture increased from 112.2 million centners to 260 million (i.e., by 131.8 per cent) and the proportion in the gross yield of agriculture which they represented from

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15.4 per cent to 34.9 per cent, and of the net yield from 18.5 423
per cent to 42.4 per cent. 474

The obligatory deliveries are virtually direct taxes, as the 241 prices paid by the government for the products delivered is only a small percentage (not even 5 per cent) of the price which the government charges the consumer.

It is interesting to note that Lenin writes in his book, *The Agrarian Question in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century* (1908): 'The horseless and one-horse peasants (i.e., the very poor peasants—Y.G.) pay in the form of taxes *one-seventh and one-tenth* respectively of their *gross* expenditure. It is doubtful whether serf dues were as high as that . . . ' The agricultural toilers in the 'Socialist Fatherland' pay much more than that!* [651]

Collectivisation not only transformed into proletarians those who came into industry, but also those who remained in agriculture. The overwhelming majority of agriculturists are in reality, if not in theory, people who do not own any of the means of production: they are compelled to work an ever-increasing number of days on the kolkhozes for very low payment, below even that of the unskilled worker in the towns. The constant rise in the number of days that every household works in the kolkhoz compared with the quantity of grain per household remaining to it after the obligatory deliveries is shown in the following table :

[461]

Year	*Average Number of 'Labour Days'† per Household*		*Grain Retained per Household after Obligatory Deliveries*	
	Number	*Index*	*Centners*	*Index*
1932 ..	257	100	15.8	100
1933 ..	315	122.5	19.3	122.1
1934 ..	354	133.4	20.1	127.2
1935 ..	378	147.1	20.5	129.7
1936 ..	393	152.8	17.3	109.5

†A 'Labour Day' is equivalent to the physical labour day of an unskilled kolkhoznik. The physical labour day of a skilled worker is equivalent to two, three or more 'Labour Days'.

(*Prokopovicz*, op. cit. pp. 136, 138, 164).

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*Although the total quantity of products retained by the agriculturists in 1936/7 was lower than in 1927/8 (352.5 million centners and 493.7 million centners respectively) the quantity per household did not decline, and per capita of the agricultural population even rose. This happened because the number of households declined from 25.0 million in 1927/8 to 20.4 million in 1936/7, i.e., by 24 per cent, and the agricultural population decreased from 122.4 million to 78.6 million, i.e., a decline of 35.8 per cent. The fact that the per capita quantity of agricultural products retained by the peasants after making obligatory deliveries rose, does not mean that the conditions of the majority of agriculturists improved, because it was distributed more unevenly to the disadvantage of the masses. This cannot be dealt with here.

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461 To add to the difficulties of the poor agriculturists, not every-
241 one has to give the same number of labour days. The higher
● 423 strata of kolkhozniki give far fewer labour days than the poor
474 kolkhozniki. The reward for their labours, however, is in inverse
proportion to the time contributed.

There is less justification in calling the Russian agriculturists of today owners of the means of production than the serfs of the nineteenth century.

Miss D. Warriner in 1940 noted as regards the productivity of Russian agriculture: 'Russia both before and after collectivisation had a lower productivity than Eastern Europe . . . Russian collectivisation has not really achieved much increase in productivity through reforming the peasant system. Yields are still lower in Russia than in every part of Eastern Europe, cattle density is still much lower . . . ' (*Eastern Europe after Hitler*, London, 1940, p. 4). In another place Miss Warriner writes: ' . . . the physical output per man in corn is slightly higher in Russia than in the very poorest regions of Eastern Europe, and the value in terms of industrial products certainly lower'.
511 (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, London, 1939, p. 188). As
423 regards the standard of living of the Russian agriculturists in
474 relation to those of Europe Miss Warriner says: 'As things are
241 at present, on the basis of purchasing power, the Russian
farmer is certainly not so well off as the peasants in Poland'. 'On the Russian farms meat consumption must be much lower than in Poland, and milk consumption must be lower also'. (Ibid. pp. 188, 189).* To gain a rough idea of what the standard of living of the Polish peasant was before the war, we quote the following passage: The Polish peasants' 'poverty was proverbial. It was said that during the depression the peasant would split a match four or five times, and would boil potatoes over and over again in the same water to save the salt . . . According to the Polish Minister of Finance the average cash income of the peasant in 1934-5 was eleven groszy (about one penny) a day . . .' (Henryk Frankel, *Poland, The Struggle for Power 1772-1939*, London, 1946, p. 134).

Miss Warriner's analysis, based on Soviet statistics, conforms

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*It is regrettable that Miss Warriner in her new book *Revolution in Eastern Europe* (London, 1950) in the chapter 'Collective Farming' overlooks what she herself wrote on the question of collectivisation in Russia in *Economics of Peasant Farming* and also in *Eastern Europe After Hitler*.

with the conclusion Victor Serge reached from his direct [511]
contact with Russian toilers: 'The vast majority of the peasants 241
live more poorly than before the collectivisation, that is, on 423
the whole, at a level lower than pre-war' (i.e., pre-World War I) 474
(op. cit. p. 37).

The peasants did not gain anything out of the 'collectivisation', but that does not detract one iota from the success of 'collectivisation' from the standpoint of bureaucratic state capitalism.

Miss D. Warriner was quite right when she said of the results of 'collectivisation' in Russia: 'Apparently, then, most of the increase in output could have been achieved by extending the State farms in the sparsely settled and uncultivated regions, without collectivizing the peasant villages in the already settled parts; had there been no collectivization, then all the loss of capital through livestock slaughter would have been avoided and corn production in 1931 and 1932 would have been maintained'. (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, op. cit. p. 174). This is true. But then the state would not have got such a large part of the agricultural output for nothing!

The Satellites Follow in the Footsteps of Russia

Undoubtedly the circumstances in which the collectiviza- 423
tion of agriculture is being and will be carried out in the 474
satellites are to some extent different from those in which it was carried out in Russia. In part they will moderate its results, and in part will render them more severe. The moderating influence will be the lesson learnt from the experience of Russia, which will prevent the Communist Party from making similar mistakes in the satellites; namely, rushing through 'collectivisation' at a feverish pace, far outstripping the development of the necessary technical basis for large-scale farming, and then hastily retreating;* and secondly taking all the livestock—cows, sheep, poultry—away from the peasants and putting them into the kolkhozes, and then reversing their policy after half the livestock had already been slaughtered.

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*In October, 1929, 4.1 per cent of all the peasants were included in kolkhozes. Five months later, on 10th March, 1930, 58.0 per cent were. There followed a hasty retreat, and in September of the same year only 21 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes. Only after this mismanagement did the tempo of collectivization begin to be less erratic, even though the compulsion to enter the kolkhozes remained very strict for the peasants.

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● 423 The Eastern European governments will avoid such damaging twists and turns.¹/A According to the Plans, the technical
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[185] basis for collectivisation will be much better prepared than it was in Russia. In 1933 in Russia, when 65.6 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes, there was one tractor per 615 hectares of arable land. When the current Plans are completed, the *minority* of peasants in the satellite countries will be in co-operative farms while there will be one tractor per 290 hectares. The co-operative farms in the 'People's Democracies' are leaving the majority of the livestock to the peasants as their private property, and are even compromising with the private interests of the peasants on the question of co-operative cultivation of the land, as can be seen from an examination of the types of co-operative farms in these countries.

In Hungary there are three types of co-operative farms:

1. The lowest, in which ploughing and sowing alone are done collectively while further cultivation and harvesting are done by the individual peasants. Draught animals or machines for the ploughing and sowing are obtained from the members or from the nearest State Tractor Station. In the former case, the members who own the draught animals or machines are paid a customary rent for them. Each member pays the cost of ploughing and sowing according to the quantity and quality of land he owns.

2. The intermediary type is similar to the lowest type except for the fact that harvesting and threshing are also done collectively.

3. In the highest type all the land is pooled for common cultivation, except for about two acres which are kept by each member as his private plot. Members are paid wages according to the amount and quality of work they do and rent according to the quantity and quality of land they contributed. No more than 25 per cent of the profit may be set aside for rent.

In Russia the peasant belonging to the lowest form of 'co-operative farm'—the kolkhoz—is allowed less private property than members of the highest form in Hungary. In many districts no kolkhoznik is allowed to own more than 0.6 acres, in others 1.2 acres and, in a small number of districts,

¹/A [See category 11b, p. 115 -- Analyst]

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2.4 acres, and no rent is paid for the land contributed to the kolkhoz. 423
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In Yugoslavia there are four types of co-operative farms. In the first and second types, the land remains the private property of the co-operative member, and rent is paid for it. In the third type the land remains private property but no rent is paid for it. The fourth type is like the Russian kolkhoz. At present the overwhelming majority of co-operatives belong to the first two types.

In the Bulgarian co-operative farms the net income is generally divided thus: 60 per cent is distributed among the members according to the number of working days they contribute, 30 per cent is paid out in rent in proportion to the quality and quantity of land brought by each peasant into the collective farm. The 'Model Statute of the Co-operative Farms' (adopted by the Second National Conference of Co-operative Farm Representatives, held on April 5–7, 1950) describes another mode of distribution of the income: '. . . a number of working days, from 1 to 5 per decare (1 decare= 1/10 hectare—Y.G.) of land, depending on the quality of the land, fixed by the General Meeting as rent is given as a bonus to every co-operative member. In this way the working days given to every co-operative member for his pooled land are added to the working days contributed by him with his labour, and for the sum of these working days he receives agricultural and animal products and cash'. (Article 17b). For a hectare the owner gets a rent of 10 to 50 days. Since the maximum amount of land permitted a person is 20 hectares (except for Dobrudja where it is 30 hectares), a peasant who gives 20 hectares to the co-operative farm will receive a rent equal to the wages of 200 to 1,000 working days. The co-operative farm thus does not equalise the peasants and abolish exploitation (even if we discount the exploitation of the co-operative as a collective by the state bureaucracy through obligatory deliveries, the fixing of prices for agricultural goods, etc.).

There is another important difference between the agricultural working co-operatives in Eastern Europe and the kolkhozes in Russia. When a peasant leaves the kolkhoz or is expelled from it he loses all rights to the kolkhoz's property;

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● 423 474 when a peasant leaves the agricultural co-operative, he is allowed, at least according to the law, to detach or sell the property he contributed or the plot he received in exchange.

On the other hand there are two factors which will render the results of 'collectivisation' in the satellites more severe than in Russia: 1. As we have seen, the increase in the grain output which followed upon 'collectivisation' in Russia was due in the main to the great extension of the area cultivated; but such an extension is out of the question in the countries of Eastern Europe. 2. Although Eastern Europe is not as suitable for meat and milk production as Western Europe, but, like Russia, is much better for growing corn, it already has many more branches than Russia of intensive farming (milk, pork, vegetables, wines, tobacco, etc.) whose prosperity is dependent on the existence of an urban population with a high and rising standard of living. The present regimes do not augur well for such a development.

Peasant Resistance

423 474 668 Although 'collectivisation' has hardly begun in the 'People's Democracies', the agricultural policy of the governments has already met with a peasant resistance which is on the increase. It is partly resistance to requisitioning and a protest against the lack of industrial goods and partly resistance to 'collectivisation' (of course these two reasons cannot be separated in practice).

Just as it was natural that the resistance of the working class to the industrial policy of the governments of Eastern Europe appeared earliest and was strongest in Czechoslovakia, the most industrialised country in the region (except for the Soviet Zone of Germany and Austria), so is it natural that the peasant resistance to their agricultural policy is boldest in Bulgaria. The reasons for this are: first, Bulgaria is the country least affected by the land reform, so that the peasants have not much to thank the Government for on this score; secondly, Bulgaria has the highest percentage of peasants engaged in small-scale intensive farming—tobacco, grapes, roses—so that the inducement needed to break their opposition to

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'collectivisation' is the greatest; thirdly, the basis upon which the 423
industrialisation of the country is taking place is the weakest 474
(except for Albania), and the industrialisation plan is the most 668
ambitious (except for Yugoslavia), so that the need to squeeze the peasant is the most desperate.* This last point is clearly illustrated by the targets of the various Plans, all of which aim at the 'collectivisation' of only a minority of the peasants—except the Bulgarian plan, which by 1953 aims to have 60 per cent of the peasants in co-operative farms.

The peasant resistance took the characteristic form of non-delivery of their quota of products. Despite the good harvest in 1948, by October 10th only one district had delivered its quota, 13 districts had delivered between 80 and 90 per cent, but many more had not even fulfilled half the quota. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, organ of the Communist Party, October 15th and 17th, 1948). 1948 was bad enough, but 1949 was much worse. The sowing quotas were nowhere near completion on the final date, March 15th. Only 56 per cent of the wheat quota was completed, 45 per cent of the rye, 55 per cent of the barley, 51 per cent of the oat, and 14 per cent of the sunflower quotas. (*Otechestven Front*, 25th March, 1949). The Ministry of Agriculture reported that many villages met great obstacles in collecting grain. In the village of Dimitrievo, for instance, the Village Council showed no effort to fulfil its duty and barely 1,200 kilos of grain were turned in. The co-operative of Yaborovo village refused to give up its allocation. Many villages had very inadequate granaries, etc., etc. (*Otechestven Front*, 31st July, 1949).

That even members of the Communist Party were taking part in the resistance of the peasantry to the Government's agricultural policy was made clear in Dimitrov's speech at the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party (December 19th, 1948): 'In some villages there were "Party members" and even Party leaderships who did not head the campaign for ensuring food to the people and even de facto sabotaged the delivery of cereals. The same holds true for some village Communists who do not help and sometimes impede the creation

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*Yugoslavia, too, did not undergo an extensive land reform, and its very ambitious plan for industrialisation is also based on a very low technical level. But there the peasants are much more tolerant towards the government, because of the threat of Moscow to it.

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● 423 of co-operative farms'. (G. Dimitrov, *Political Report to Fifth*
474 *Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, Sofia, 1948, p. 80).*
668 The extent of the peasant resistance and its causes were admitted to at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party on June 11th and 12th, 1949, where in an excess of 'Bold Self-Criticism', the Party laid bare its 'mistakes' and promised to relax its stringent policy towards the peasantry.

Shortly before the Plenum the Acting-Premier had said that 'no progress was registered since September 9th, 1944, in the output of cereals despite the import of tractors and other agricultural machinery and considerable agro-technical improvements'.

One of the reports to the Plenum says:

'We must admit that we have fastened the screw too tightly in our relations with the medium farmer . . . We must unloosen the screw and switch over to methods which will induce the farmer and especially the medium peasant, by an appeal to his self-interest, to improve and increase his production.'

The Plenum Resolution says:

'Excesses have occurred in the system of quota purchases, which have led to the requisitioning of practically the entire

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*Two years later, in his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee (7th and 8th October, 1950) the new General Secretary, Vulko Chervenkov, gave many more details about the sabotage of the agricultural deliveries by Communist Party members and organisations. He said: ' . . . the former Minister of Home Trade last year, under pressure of various appeals from local organs, arbitrarily, quite irresponsibly, without the permission of the Central Committee of the Party and the Government, reduced three and a half times the plan for state grain deliveries. He was unable to grasp the fact that the appeals of the local organs reflected the pressure of private landowners and kulaks against the interests of the state.' ' . . . the party organisations in the districts of Bourgas, Gorna Oryakhovitsa, Rousse and Kolarovgrad . . . yielded to the pressure of a number of primary organisations which expressed private and kulak interests and attempted to wreck the plan for collecting the deliveries . . . ' The same crimes are attributed by Chervenkov to the first secretary of the Stalin District Party Committee, the vice-chairman of its People's Council and the representative of the Central Committee of the Party and Government whose special task was to inspect the collection of the state grain deliveries in the district. 'The District Party Committee and the District People's Council' of the Pleven district 'fell into the hands of the kulaks'; 'the inspector of the Central Committee of the Party attached to the Pleven district played an unenviable role'. In every possible way he supported the local leadership in its 'attempt to attain a reduction of the plan . . . ' The same crimes are attributed to the leadership of the Party and People's Council in Vratsa district and the representative of the Central Committee there, Dimiter Dimov, who was at the same time a secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and a member of the Political Bureau. And this happened after the big 'purge' of 'Kostovists' in 1949!

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marketable part of the produce at fixed low prices. This applies 423
especially to grain farmers, who constitute the huge majority 474
of our peasantry. In this way agricultural producers have been 668
to a large extent deprived of their personal interest in developing and increasing production, improving its quality and generally raising the productivity of agricultural labour . . .'

'In the formation of the co-operative farms, instead of strict compliance with the laws, Government directives and Party instructions, throughout almost the whole country there have been irresponsbile requisitionings of the best and most favourably located land, which is incorporated in the co-operative areas, while the private farmers are given in exchange distant and barren plots. Farmers are not being compensated in accordance with the quantity and real value of the land.' ' . . . peasants are forced to join co-operative farms while they are still unconvinced of their advantages . . .

'To this end the Plenum decides:

'1. That fundamental changes be made in the system of quota purchases so that, while preserving the principle of progressive quotas, agricultural producers shall be left the greater quantity of their excess stocks to sell them freely to the state, cooperatives and consumers at free prices.

'2. That a real and fair correlation be established between the price of cereals and the price of other agricultural products, industrial goods and artisan services; that the prices of cereals be raised . . .

'5. That producers be guaranteed the freedom to sell their surpluses directly to consumers, after delivering their quota to the state . . .

'8. That the supply of the village with staple industrial products, both from local industry and from abroad, be improved . . .

'10 . . . . returning in certain places fields wrongly requisitioned from private farmers who received in exchange land of less value'. (Quoted by *Free Bulgaria*, 1st July, 1949).

The extent to which the Government overdid the exploitation of the peasantry was revealed even more clearly both by the evidence given during the Kostov Trial about the position of the agricultural population, and from the rise in the official prices for agricultural products after the June Plenum.

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● 423 474 In the Trial the defendant Nikola Pavlov stated that for some years up to the end of 1948 there had been 'a strict quota system which oppressed the peasants'. ' . . . the quota system attained such proportions, that almost everything produced by the peasants was taken away from them, according to this order, and only such a part was left to them, which could only cover the current needs of their families. The quota system included almost all rural produce which served for direct consumption by the population, such as wool, eggs, meat, milk, potatoes, even including apples, chestnuts and peanuts . . . ' This produced a sharp reaction. 'The peasants not only did not sow all areas that they had sown till then, but began to diminish them'. The deposition of Kostov showed very clearly that the poor peasants suffered no less from the quota system than the rich and medium peasants, and were no less discontented. 'The discontent of the poor peasants was also caused by the decree for the collection of wool . . . according to which even peasants owning 1 or 2 sheep were not exempted from the delivery of wool'.*

435 474 423 The extreme hardship the quota deliveries imposed on the[1] peasants is illustrated by the fact that in 1948 they totalled about 11 milliard leva, while free market sales totalled only 715 million.

How low had been the prices paid for the products taken from the peasants is revealed by the extent to which they were raised after the June Plenum: hard wheat was raised from 19 leva per kilogram to 25 (31.6 per cent); ordinary wheat from 17 to 23 leva (35.3 per cent); rye and oats from 15 to 20 leva (33.3 per cent); barley, millet seed and corn from 13 to 18 leva (38.5 per cent); sunflower seed from 25 to 30 leva (20 per cent); dried beans from 30 to 60 leva (100 per cent); lentils from 44 to 55 leva (25 per cent). (*Otechestven Front*, 2nd July, 1949).

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*The question arises why we accept this part of the evidence when we consider the Trial as a whole to be a frame-up. (See pp. 301-2). It is one thing to believe in the reality of the meat shortage, the obnoxious character of the quota system and so on—which are known to everyone who lives in the country—and another to believe that only Kostov and his co-defendants were responsible for it, while the rest of the leadership saw nothing of it for three or four years. If we look back at the 'trials' of 'witches' in the middle ages, we may disagree with the 'prosecutor' when he accused the 'witch' of causing the outbreak of a plague, but still accept the accusation as evidence of the existence of a plague at the time.

[1] [Bulgarian --- Analyst]

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The resistance of the peasantry has also compelled the 474
government to slow down its drive for 'collectivisation'. On 423
November 15th, 1949, *Otechestven Front* said that eighty-six government commissions had been set up to remedy mistakes in connection with the collective farms. They had to inquire into the activities of 1,264 co-operative farms (two-thirds of all the co-operative farms in the country) and examine 61,854 complaints of illegal requisition of land from peasants who had not joined the co-operatives. In 35,311 cases the land had been restored to its previous owners and those responsible for the mistakes punished.

The Bulgarian government is, it seems, compelled to go gently with the collectivisation drive, but it nevertheless does not renounce its aim. While on January 1st, 1950 there were 1,600 co-operative farms with 156,500 families and 1,377,050 acres, on October 1st, the number of co-operative farms reached 2,249, with 474,800 families and 4,707,700 acres. Thus 43.4 per cent of the agricultural population is in co-operative farms. (Vulko Chervenkov's Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, October 7th and 8th, 1950).

Bulgaria is not the only country to experience peasant 423
resistence to government policy. There is a food shortage in 474
Czechoslovakia. The Russians are not responsible for this, as 668
they buy scarcely any agricultural products from Czechoslovakia. Nor does Czechoslovakia export much food to other countries. There was a drought, it is true, but that was two years ago, and even at that time the number of livestock compared with pre-war was better than in any of the other satellites. Moreover the population was much below its pre-war number owing to the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. The reason for the shortage must therefore be ascribed, at least partly, to the resistance of the peasants to delivering their products to the Government. The peasant resistance also expresses itself in the slowness of the progress of collectivisation. The Minister of Agriculture, Julius Duriš, said at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party, that in only 208 villages out of 13,000 were farm co-operatives operating (*Lidové Noviny*, 28th May, 1949). There had been many cases of almost open revolt at village meetings convened by the Communist Party to launch

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423 cooperatives, while other meetings had been boycotted by the
474 peasants. The General Secretary of the Party, Rudolf Slansky,
668 went as far as to say: 'The Party has failed to organise an explanatory campaign within its own rank and file, with the result that some Party members, not having been made to understand the significance of the co-operatives and not having been persuaded of their usefulness, have begun to waver and to fall under reactionary influences.'

Poland has had its troubles too. The Government was obliged to supply the wheat growers with far more industrial products than it had planned to do, and at lower prices than were prevailing on the free market. (*Glos Ludu*, May 4th, 1948). Other manifestations of peasant resistance disturbed the countryside. According to *The Times* of 25 January, 1949: 'During the last few weeks of 1948 at least 20 cases were published in the Government-controlled newspapers of Communist organizers killed while on duty in country districts. Most people think the figure much higher'. The Government in alarm retreated, and instead of carrying out its ambitious plan of organising 7,400 co-operative farms in 1949, reduced its target to a mere 200. (*The World Today*, August, 1949). The peasant resistance, although strong enough to slow down the collectivisation drive, did not divert the Communist leaders from their aim. On April 1st, 1949, there were 40 producer co-operatives in Poland; by October 1st, 145; by February 1st, 1950, 332, and by March 5th, 590. Of these 590 co-operative farms, 345 have been founded on a statute similar to that of the Russian kolkhozes, 192 are of what is called the second lowest type: 30-40 per cent of their net income is distributed as rent for land and implements pooled in the co-operatives and 60-70 per cent as wages for labour. 53 were of the lowest type: common cultivation of privately-owned land. (Roman Zambrowski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the P.P.R., in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* March 10th, 1950). We may assume that the tempo of 'collectivisation' will be accelerated after the first experiments have been completed. An important step in hastening the 'collectivisation' was the decree that put the zloty at par with the Russian rouble: every peasant had until 13th November, 1950 to give up 100 old zloty for one new one, while as regards workers'

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wages and prices three new zloty were changed for 100 old zloty. With their meagre savings swept away, the peasants' resistance to collectivisation will be weakened. 423 474 668

Rumania has also experienced great peasant resistance to 'collectivisation'. In June, 1949, the government had to take strong measures against a partisan movement in the countryside, strongest in the Banat region. The government called the resisting peasants 'kulak hooligans', but a mere glance at its extortionate demands from the peasants belies this accusation. Every farm, down to the very smallest, must deliver large amounts of grain for low prices. For example, a peasant who has a farm of only 3 hectares must deliver 22 per cent of the yield for less than 20 per cent of the free market price. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 7th April, 1949). No wonder the peasants rebel. The 'collectivisation' of Rumanian agriculture is still at its beginning: in September, 1949, the number of co-operative farms was only 55.

In Hungary the government was very careful in approaching the problem of 'collectivisation' and for a long time denied any intention of proceeding with it. Thus, for instance, in a speech before a peasant meeting in Debreczen on June 29th, 1947, Premier Lájos Dinnyes said: '. . . if the Government had any intention of creating kolkhozy it would not have carried out the land reform. What is good in one country is no use in another. A Hungarian Government which aimed to give up the principle of private property would be digging its own grave and the nation's. We aim to fortify the new peasantry'. (*The Times*, 30th June, 1947). After a certain amount of manoeuvring, nevertheless, the Hungarian Government did proceed to 'collectivise' agriculture, but it did so carefully and slowly. Up to November 1st, 1949, co-operative farms made up only 3.5 per cent of all the arable land of the country, and state farms another 3.5 per cent. Since then it has advanced considerably. In May, 1950, co-operative and state farms made up 17.8 per cent of all the land under cultivation. 423 474

In general it can be said that the process of 'collectivisation' is full of contradictions. Its aim is to secure food supplies and agricultural raw materials for the towns and for export, in order to facilitate industrialisation, as well as to get the necessary supply of labour power for industry and public work

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423 474 The greater the speed of industrialisation, and the smaller the existing amount of capital relatively to labour, the greater the speed of 'collectivisation'. Hence Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have gone much further along this road than the other 'People's Democracies'. At the same time, the greater the tempo of industrialisation, and the greater the subordination of the people's consumption to the needs of capital accumulation, the less the readiness to wait for the establishment of 'collectives' until the technical conditions for large-scale agricultural production (sufficient tractors, combines, etc.) exist, and until the peasants are convinced that large-scale agricultural production is superior, a conviction which depends largely on the readiness or otherwise of the government to supply the peasantry with industrial consumption goods. Social-political factors—the fear of the government, first of all, that it will be isolated or strongly opposed by the peasants—can modify the extent, the speed and the ruthlessness of the 'collectivisation' process.*

The Primitive Accumulation of Capital

000 When the British bourgeoisie first arose it had to drive the peasants off the land in order to get the surplus agricultural produce for the towns as well as the reserves of labour it needed for its growing enterprises. Britain went through this phase of development mainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of which Marx wrote: 'The history of this . . . is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire'. (*Capital*, Vol I, p. 786). In its rise the Stalinist bureaucracy must repeat the same process so as to get the wealth of the country under its control.

But much more blood flowed in Russia during this 'primitive accumulation' than in Britain. Stalin accomplished in a few hundred days what it took Britain a few hundred years to accomplish. The scale on which he did it and the success with which he carried it out completely dwarf the actions of the English landlords who let the 'sheep devour man'. They bear grim witness to the superiority of modern industrial economy concentrated in the hands of the state, under the direction of a ruthless bureaucracy.

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*See pp. 246-8

871 Austrian Galicia they underwent a great cultural revival in
563 the latter part of the nineteenth century, and this was the only area in which schools and universities using the Polish language could develop freely. The Polish population in Prussia lived under better educational conditions than did their co-nationals in Russia, but in both countries they were subjected to vigorous programs of denationalization.

871 The state of popular education in Eastern Europe is re-
212 vealed by illiteracy figures for the years 1920-21, before the new independent states had exerted an influence on education. The rate of illiteracy for males and females of school age and over was 7 per cent for Czechoslovakia, 15 per cent for Hungary, and between 30 and 40 per cent for Poland and Yugoslavia. The rate was between 40 and 50 per cent for Rumania and Bulgaria, and in Albania it was much higher. These figures may be compared with illiteracy rates of under 1 per cent for Great Britain and Germany, 6 per cent for the United States, and about 50 per cent for Russia.

[873] It is worth noting that the low level of literacy in most of Eastern Europe did not prevent the development of a high level of culture among educated persons. The universities of Prague, Cracow, and Budapest were the most distinguished among many of high level, and very significant contributions to European culture in the arts and sciences came from this region. The "intelligentsia," as those with higher education and professional skills were referred to, provided both the leadership of the national movements and the statesmen of the nations born at the end of the First World War. As individuals they were the equals of the political leaders of the great powers and included in their number many great Europeans.

566 Agricultural improvement, or the increase in produc-
●423 tivity and in the welfare of the population dependent on
178 agriculture, is a complex process. In Eastern Europe, it involved in particular the release of the peasants from feudal

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servitude, the adoption of improved techniques of agricul- 566
tural production and marketing, and the improvement of 423
the lot of the individual peasant through land reform and 178
the combined efforts of the landlords and the state. Most of European Turkey had never known feudalism in the Western sense, and the peasants of Serbia and Bulgaria emerged early as independent landowners with a sound understanding of their own interests. In many areas of Rumania, Austria-Hungary, and the Polish sections of Germany and Russia, however, the peasants were freed from feudal restrictions only to sink into a deeper misery, sometimes called "neo-serfdom," that stemmed from lack of capital and the resultant economic dependency on the landlords. As a consequence, while independent peasant political parties began to develop among the Czechs and southern Slavs shortly after the turn of the century, the peasants in Russia in 1905 and in Rumania in 1907 resorted to the desperate method of revolution.

The agrarian backwardness that characterized the greater 178
part of Eastern Europe was a great challenge to social and 433
political philosophers, and it was not surprising that the First World War left in its wake attempts at radical solutions by leaders acting in the name of the proletariat or the peasantry. The recommendation of the economists, in the presence of this agrarian poverty and overpopulation, was that agricultural improvement be accompanied by the extension of industry and trade. In the areas where large landowners exercised full political control, this recommendation was not welcomed as the landowners tended to favor fiscal policies that kept the price of grain high and the peasant poor. In other areas, however, important industrial development took place. Thus, the Austrian provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, with their preponderant Czech population, accounted for a little over one half the entire industrial output of Austria-Hungary. This production included coal and

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1947 but not to the years following. The period of the New 656 Economic Policy in Russia was called “the period of a certain revival of capitalism”; in reality, it was a kind of retreat of communism from economic difficulties.

E.

In the captive countries there was no “period of revival 656 of capitalism.” Since the very inception of communism, there 185 has been a systematic liquidation of all private property, 423 carried out in premeditated fashion within the limits of existing conditions and possibilities. In the beginning, the question of private property arose only in regard to small trade, dwelling houses, building, crafts, and, in a larger degree to peasant farming. Hence, the Communists advocated the principle of a three-sector economy, composed of state economy—after an immediate nationalization of medium and heavy industries, landlords' estates, and forests—of cooperative economy, and of private economy.

The fact that this period, the traces of which we still 665 find in the constitutions of the captive countries, was planned 661 from above as no more than a transitional period, is best proved by the accusation leveled against the former Communist Vice-Premier of Poland, Gomulka, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Warsaw, in 1948. Gomulka was told then that his main guilt was not that he agreed to the principles of the three-sector economy but that he acted according to these principles. It was explained to him then that he had proceeded as though he wanted to keep the system although he knew that it was transitional.

In 1947, after the falsification of the elections and the 665 destruction of the opposition of the independent peasant parties in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland, the Cominform was established and Communist policy abandoned its nationalist line and adopted the line of internationalism. A special declaration of the differences between Communist internationalism and the “cosmopoli-

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661 cal parties, legislation, courts, and the police who protect
565 the security of the citizens. The state authority is the mediator in the last resort in disagreements between labor and business.

661 The Moloch, which is the Communist state, has on its
466 side the party, the police, and the courts. Special laws con-
641 stantly increase the penalties for the plunder and destruction of the nationalized public property. Because the state is a "people's state" and "does not do injustice to the people," the trade unions act as a tool of the state in raising the productivity and quality of production and fixing the norms of work. The Stakhanovite work system, based on high norms of production and granting starvation-level wages with no means of protection against these, destroys the strength and health of the worker. Strikes are punishable because they are crimes against the interests of the state, and special laws provide discipline of work, penalties for failure to fulfill norms, and forced labor camps for "idlers" and "loafers."

661 Communism deprives the peasant of his beloved land,
641 turns him into a Communist serf, and chains him to the
423 state or collective farm in which the Communist bureaucracy demands of him ever-increasing physical efforts to produce for the insatiable state. After the liquidation of the remnants of private initiative in small business and crafts, the *kulak* peasant, the biggest "capitalist blood-sucker," is dealt with. He is destroyed by tax levies and forced deliveries of agricultural products and is finally evicted from his own farm.

642 Thus, behind the façade of People's Democracy, Communism practices dictatorship in every sphere of life—personal, political, economic, religious, and social. The Communist system creates privileges for the party and makes the citizen economically dependent upon the state. It debases human dignity, wrests faith out of human hearts, kills

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5 Land Reform and Agricultural Improvement

LADISLAV FEIERABEND

I

162 167 369 Eastern Europe was overwhelmingly peasant between the two world wars. The peasantry, for whom land was not merely a means of production or of income, but the established basis of family life, formed the majority of the population. The main problem of this region was rural overpopulation. In the period before the First World War, the surplus young people emigrated in considerable numbers to the United States and to other overseas countries. After 1918 this outlet was closed, and everybody had to remain on his home soil. There was too little land for too many people: roughly twice as many people were living off the land as was the case in Western Europe.

● 423 241 Everybody wanted land and therefore the price was enormously high. After money was spent to buy the land, there was not enough left to buy the numbers of cattle that the holding could support or to improve farming techniques. Lack of capital was responsible for the fact that farming methods remained the same as they had been for fifty or more years. The yields were very low, and there was no possibility of increasing them. In fact, yields decreased be-

423 cause the land was becoming exhausted. This was due to a
241 lack of manure and fertilizer and to the peasants' ignorance of land preservation techniques.

[464] Labor remained so cheap that the introduction of labor-saving devices did not pay. Overpopulation meant that there were more people living on holdings than were needed for the farm work. This situation caused underemployment. Since overpopulation decreased the output per man and with it the earnings per man, a very low standard of living resulted.

423 The size of the farms, which on the average was barely
656 ten acres, was a problem in itself, and the custom of dividing
185 land after the death of a peasant made the situation even more acute. The holdings consisted of many small and scattered strips so that it was impossible for the peasant to use machines, even when they were available. However, the land reforms, carried out after the First World War by the different governments, did have some success in equalizing the amounts of land held by the different peasants.

The land reforms grew out of political and national considerations rather than out of social and economic policy. The first and main objective of the agrarian parties was to expropriate the big landowners and to transfer their land to the peasants. The usual procedure was to fix a maximum acreage, usually about five hundred acres, and to decree tha all land in excess of this amount should be sold to peasants, either to create new farms or to add to the area of peasant farms already in existence. Under these reforms, about twenty-five million acres were distributed, for the most part in quite small plots, averaging one hectare, or 2.4 acres. The smaller farms were given more land than the large, so that there was some leveling of the incomes derived from farming.

162 These reforms did not remedy the unhappy condition o
464 the peasantry, since they were unable to remove the main
511 causes for distress. If all the agricultural land of this region

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728 frontiers were another cause for great migrations. Four mil-
167 lion Poles moved from the territory which was incorporated
into the U.S.S.R., and millions of Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks moved into districts formerly inhabited by the Germans. Although these changes alleviated the problem of rural overpopulation in Eastern Europe, there was still, at the end of the Second World War, a surplus population estimated at nine million.

665 The Communist parties in various Eastern European
•423 states knew very well how to exploit this situation. They
656 knew that it was vital to the success of revolution that the
peasantry should not be opposed to it. They knew that the Russian Revolution had been achieved only because Lenin was fully aware of the desire of the peasant for more land.

471 Orthodox Marxist theory required that the land be nation-
423 alized and that it be administered by the state. Land was
662 considered the most important means of production, and it
656 had to be treated as such. This dogma was abandoned by
Lenin for tactical reasons. He nationalized land in the Soviet Union during the revolution of 1917, but distributed it under ninety-nine-year leases to small and medium peasants for private exploitation. It was the political pressure of the peasants which forced Lenin to change his political doctrine and implement the agrarian program of the Populists, his political opponents. Lenin and his followers did not approve of the peasant who, according to them, was a relic of the precapitalistic society. It was Lenin's view that "small, individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale," and that in the future classless society the peasant was to assume the status of a worker on the land as his fellow in town was a worker in industry.

Political expediency determined Lenin's change in tactics. He supported small agrarian property holders only because

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he regarded the peasant as indispensable to the success of his 471
revolution and to the consolidation of his dictatorship. This 423
policy was reversed by Stalin after 1928 when forced col- 662
lectivization of land in the form of pseudo-cooperatives (col- 656
lective farms) was introduced in the Soviet Union.

Lenin's agricultural policy was adopted by all Eastern European Communist parties after the end of the Second World War. Being minorities in power, they knew that this was the only attitude they could take to the peasantry, the largest social group in this region. Therefore, they supported small agrarian property holders in the first stage of the development of their agricultural policy. There was only one difference between the Communist agricultural policies of Eastern Europe and Russia. Nationalization of land was not a part of the Eastern European policy, as it had not proved expedient in the Soviet Union and therefore was not contained in the agrarian policy of the Comintern for Eastern Europe in the inter-war period.

The Comintern had taken much interest in the Eastern 668
European agrarian question. In 1923 a Red Peasants Inter- 656
national was formed in Moscow as an effort to rally the 427
peasantry to the Communist ideal and to combat the influence of the peasant parties united in the Green International in Prague. The Soviet move to collectivization within the U.S.S.R. in 1929 was not followed by any shift in the agrarian policy of the Comintern. Any mention of collective farming was frowned upon and the whole emphasis was upon attracting or neutralizing the middle peasant by assisting the individual and by supporting with new land reforms the peasant's struggle for more land. This policy was not changed when the Cominform took over the role of the Comintern after the Second World War.

"The land to those who till it personally," was the slogan 471
of all Eastern European Communist parties, and land re- 423
forms were carried out in all countries. In Hungary, Albania, 656

471 and in parts of Poland, land reforms were overdue, while in
● 423 other Eastern European states expropriation and expulsion
656 of the Germans formed the main basis of land reforms. Some forty-eight million acres, including forest land, were expropriated by the governments of which thirty million acres were distributed to some three million peasant families. The remainder was retained by the state.

To dispel any doubts as to the ultimate outcome of these reforms, the distributed land was declared the private property of the new owners, and in most countries it was laid down in the constitutions that "the land belongs to those who till it." The price to be paid by the beneficiaries was low, usually the equivalent of one year's harvest payable in ten to twenty installments. No compensation was paid to the old owners for the expropriated land.

The attitude toward the church and its landed property was less uniform than toward the secular owners. However, after some hesitation, most of the church estates exceeding the maximum size laid down in the land reform laws were also expropriated. In this way the church was deprived of its financial independence and of its economic influence on the rural population.

Even in the Baltic States which were incorporated into the Soviet Union, Stalin's methods were not followed. All the land and its resources, as in Russia, were declared public property and nationalized, and all the land in excess of seventy-five acres was expropriated for distribution, but no collectives were formed. However, through a system of differential delivery and farm taxes, the way was paved for ultimate collectivization.

423 All these land reforms had done nothing to solve the old
656 agricultural problem of Eastern Europe. On the contrary, they aggravated the situation. The land became more split up than ever, as larger farms were abolished. The reforms did not solve the problem of technical progress, and made the

reorganization of agriculture even more necessary than it 423
656
had been before.

Land reform was a political measure. Its aim was not the 661
reorganization of production, but the redistribution of income. Its aim was to win the small peasant for the Communists, and to weaken the political influence of the agrarian parties. Therefore, the Communists stole the programs of the agrarian parties and publicized them as their own. Beside private ownership, these programs called for mechanization, consolidation of scattered strips, good and guaranteed prices for agricultural products, expansion of credit, reduction of taxes, and social insurance for all peasants.

The smallholders felt quite happy, generally speaking, on their new land. It may have produced less than it had in the hands of its former owners, but the smallholders' income was larger than it had been when they were employed as agricultural laborers. Many of them started believing the Communists and joined the Communist parties. One of the Communist aims was fulfilled.

IV

It should have been obvious to all that the Communists 474
were preparing a program of land collectivization, and that 423
the second stage of their agricultural policy would be similar to what it had been in the Soviet Union. But sufficient attention was not paid to these trends. Practically all forests and large stretches of arable land and pastures became state property and were organized as Communist state farms. District cooperative or state stations were established and equipped with heavy agricultural machinery, which was not practical for use on small fields. The Communists favored the allocation of equipment to cooperatives rather than to private persons. The cooperatives, which performed many public functions such as bulk purchasing of food and supplies, began to

474 ●423 be controlled by the state machine and not by their members, the peasants. At the same time, the independence of the church and its economic influence on the rural population was broken.

Once the Communists were established safely in power, they shifted their agricultural policy. Except in the Baltic States where the Communists resorted to deportations and in Rumania where they evicted some seventeen thousand Rumanian families from their homes, collectivization was started smoothly and was not recognized as such. The Communists did not speak about collectivization, but about transforming uneconomical small-scale enterprise to large-scale cooperative farming. They are still making great efforts to convince the small peasants that as members of production cooperatives they till their own land and manage their own affairs.

Collectivization is being instituted by a clever transformation of the cooperatives. This process begins with a number of peasants being instructed to form some such organization as a communal laundry, a chick hatchery, or a calf station. Then, usually before sowing or harvest time, the members are persuaded to share their labor, teams, and farm machinery, which sounds like nothing more than neighborly cooperation. The farms continue to be made up of separate private parcels. The next type of cooperative eliminates boundaries and plows out border strips. The expanded fields are worked by the cooperative, with systematic planning for crops, fodder, and hay. Thus, collective mass production is introduced, but the land still belongs to the members.

Collective management is a function of the third type of cooperative. In this type the crops belong to the cooperative, not to its members. The owners of the land give up all their rights of disposal and of management. The members contribute their livestock and most of their agricultural equipment to the organization. Cattle are kept in common barns,

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but a member may retain one cow and a calf, some pigs, 474 sheep, goats, and poultry. He also retains a garden plot of one 423 and one-fourth acres which he can cultivate according to his own wishes. Ten to 20 per cent of a season's profit is deducted from the whole profit and distributed as separate compensation to those members who contributed land for the use of the cooperative.

In the fourth type, no percentage is paid for use of land although the fields still belong to the farmers in the title registers. All profits are divided according to the labor units of the members. This is the real Soviet collective farm, in which private property has become a fiction. Members receive advances in money or supplies during the year for their work. At the end of the year their accounts are balanced on the basis of production and sales.

Collectivization is proceeding at a rapid pace in all the countries of this region. According to the latest news, over 40 per cent of the agricultural land has been collectivized or, in other words, is in the hands either of state farms or of production cooperatives.

Production cooperatives are not genuine cooperatives according to the Western definition of the term. The communist philosophy of subservience rather than freedom, class hatred rather than understanding, aggression rather than tolerance, coercion rather than mutuality, is against all genuine, fundamental cooperative principles. True cooperatives can be founded only on the initiative of their members. Those instigated by authority cannot be considered true cooperatives, nor can those which are under the domination of outside influences. There can be no true cooperatives in Communist countries, because the will of the members cannot be expressed.

Production cooperatives are excellent examples of the Communist pseudo-cooperative. They are created by the government and are dependent upon it. They must accept a

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474 government-dictated constitution. Cooperative members, in-
423 stead of being the masters of their cooperatives, are their servants. They have to perform tasks which have been fixed without their knowledge or consent. In higher type Communist cooperatives, the members assume the status of landless laborers.

If the complete dependency of the cooperatives on the State Tractor and Machine Stations and on the Communist Party is taken into consideration, it is clear that production cooperatives are no more than state enterprises under the disguise of cooperatives. There is only one difference between a state farm and a production cooperative: the members of a cooperative have to bear all production risks. It is true that *de jure* they remain owners of their land, but *de facto* they cease to be owners as they cannot be sure of getting their fields back when they leave the cooperative. According to the constitution of these cooperatives, a member must accept other fields, if return of his own fields would disrupt the cooperative.

474 The Communists declare they prefer that peasants join
661 cooperatives voluntarily. However, they are not above per-
565 suading private farmers to join by such methods as higher taxes and higher delivery quotas, less fertilizers and other production means at higher prices, and charges for all services higher than those paid by cooperative members. At the same time, they give private farmers no credit, no field hands, and no opportunity to use agricultural machines, while collectives enjoy almost unlimited credit and other facilities. Members of production cooperatives are rewarded by the government with free vacations in the best hotels at winter resorts and with free group travel to the Soviet Union; they are a privileged class in every respect.

In contrast, well-to-do peasants who used hired labor in free times are denounced as being "village rich," a term which is used in Eastern Europe to describe the equivalent of the

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829 Although Populism exerted some influence on the establishment of the Rumanian peasant movement, it had very little influence upon the other peasant movements in Eastern Europe. At the time when Populism was already an organized political force in Russia, the peasantry in Eastern Europe was still politically inactive. When the peasant mobilization began, more than two decades later, it was influenced little, if at all, by the Populist ideas.

668 The main reason for the relatively late organization of the
565 peasantry in Eastern Europe was the presence of political
423 and economic conditions essentially different from those prevailing in Tsarist Russia. Whereas regular political life was unknown in Russia, European liberalism favored the formation of political parties which would try to win the sympathies of the peasants by promising them the realization of their desires. Collective ownership of land was not a common institution in Eastern Europe. However, the prediction of Marx relating to the accumulation of capital and further expansion of large estates proved to be incorrect. On the contrary, many large land holdings, unable to accommodate themselves to modern capitalist management, commenced to disintegrate. The land was usually bought, in spite of heavy material sacrifices, by land-hungry neighboring peasants, and thus many new independent peasant holdings were created, which contributed considerably to the strengthening of the peasantry.

Hence, the establishment of a revolutionary peasant movement was checked by existing political conditions: the traditions of the Eastern European peasantry were opposed to collective forms of land ownership and to the socialist tenets of Populism. However, none of the existing political groups was fit to meet the increased desire of the peasantry for an organized action of their own, and, at the turn of the century, on an independent basis and in opposition to the contemporary political and social groups, peasant organization began.

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The common source of the peasant movements resided in 668 the political, social, and economic evils of the liberal regimes, 565 but immediate motives varied slightly in the different coun- 423 tries. In some countries, the emphasis on the necessity for peasant organization was a reaction to the adverse economic conditions to which the peasantry was exposed. In other countries, this move was a political and economic reaction to political and national oppression, economic exploitation, and the contempt of the ruling ethnical groups for the peasantry of subordinated nations. Finally, the Croatian peasants had special motives. Their peasant movement was organized chiefly to struggle for the social and political equality of the peasants against the dominating bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy. The latter, although it represented an insignificant minority in the nation, had monopolized Croatian political life.

The first to outline the philosophical principles of a peasant 668 movement was Ante Radić in Croatia. Influenced by French 565 Romantic philosophers, especially Michelet, Radić published, in 1896, his work, *Osnova,* in which he set forth his concept of the people (in peasant countries this meant the peasantry), and indicated their significance in the political and economic life of the nation.

The first coherent peasant organizations were those of the Bulgarians and the Czechs who both founded their first peasant political organizations in 1896. They were followed shortly by the Croatians in 1904, and by the Serbians and the Poles in 1905. The first steps for a peasant movement in Rumania were initiated in 1907, while in Hungary the appearance of a genuine peasant movement was retarded by political and socio-economic conditions until 1908. In the Baltic States, true political life started only with the independence gained after the First World War. Subsequently, powerful peasant political organizations were founded in Estonia and Latvia. In Albania the initiative for a peasant political or-

641 participate in national elections and thus intensified the activities of the peasant political organizations. Only a decade earlier, because of the tax census system, none but a limited number of the peasants were entitled to vote, but in the national democratic states this right was granted to every male citizen over twenty-one years of age.

● 423 In Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, a considerable number of agrarian reforms were accomplished which distributed large surfaces of arable land to individual peasants. They thus became economically independent and from then on were valiant champions of the peasant program. No substantial land reform was carried out in Hungary until 1945.

642 Unfortunately, the initial success of the peasant parties was not given political effect everywhere and, where peasant regimes were established, they were not of long duration. The advances of the peasant parties were neutralized soon by the counter actions of totalitarian elements which were opposed to democratic principles in general, and to peasant political and social concepts in particular. The peasant parties, faithful to their programs, favored and supported genuinely democratic systems and cooperated with other democratic groups but, with the disappearance of the democratic order, their own position became precarious. It must be admitted that the complicated machinery of a democratic regime was unable to run smoothly at all times in the newly established national states, except in Czechoslovakia. However, this deficiency should not be interpreted as a lack of interest in democratic institutions nor as a disapproving attitude toward the principles of freedom which symbolize Western political thought. The democratic regimes came up against a complex of problems whose complete, satisfactory, and early settlement was somewhat unreasonably expected by the newly created national states. Profiting from these adverse and interrelated domestic conditions, the totalitarian elements found inter-

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vention possible. They usually claimed that this intervention 642
was necessary "to save the country from the total chaos in
which it was driven by the unsatisfactory operating of democratic institutions." What was even worse, new regimes were supported often by the Western democracies who used the unjustifiable excuse that "no other solutions were possible."

Despite the mistakes and failures of the democratic regimes, today even the most bitter opponents of peasantism must admit that the peasant parties, as political organizations, were stalwart champions of democratic government and did not, in general, support the established dictatorships or their undemocratic methods.

The greatest achievement of all the peasant groups was 665
that of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union. From its modest be- 642
ginnings in 1896, the Union grew steadily. In the first post- 423
war elections it received a strong relative majority in the 185
National Assembly, and in the elections of April 1923, 212 deputies out of 245 were allotted to the Agrarian Union. At the relatively early date of October 1919, the first Bulgarian peasant government of Aleksander Stambolisky was formed. The most significant of its numerous political and economic achievements was the agrarian reform based on the principles that the land should be the property of those who till it and that every peasant is entitled to only as much land as he and his family are able to cultivate. In spite of the certain weaknesses and deficiencies of this peasant government which contributed to its downfall, its democratic basis cannot be denied. Its reforms converted Bulgaria into a country of small and medium peasant holdings which, despite the forcible overthrow of the peasant regime in June 1923, remained unchanged until the end of the Second World War.

In Czechoslovakia, the Republican Agrarian Party was the 665
strongest party in the Parliament and the most important 642
pillar of the Czechoslovakian democracy. After the political

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tantly or not at all. Unemployment became worse than it 178 464
had ever been.

Thus social tensions persisted or grew worse. Sometimes 186
they appeared as growing tensions between left and right, 578
with the political middle-of-the-road parties increasingly threatened by fascists or by communists. Sometimes they appeared as tensions between different nationality groups, such as between Serbians and Croatians or between Czechs and Germans. Often the same angry and frustrated individuals could be found backing communism in one year, extreme nationalism in another, and some more or less supranational fascism in a third. Whole districts voted for right-wing radical candidates in one election and for left-wing radicals in another. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus the symptom of a more fundamental maladjustment, even though nationalistic policies, once adopted, often served to make this maladjustment worse. Nationalistic govern- 642
ments, as well as most other governments in this region, were 208
becoming increasingly unpopular and during the 1930's showed increasing reluctance to face their own voters. By 1939, before the first German or Russian soldier stepped on their soil, every country of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Finland and Czechoslovakia, had succumbed to some form of dictatorship. Nationalism had thus failed to cure the fundamental maladjustments of Eastern European political and economic life. From some points of view its failure was hardly less shattering than the failure of the supranational empires that had preceded it.

It was nationalism which first undermined and in part 642
destroyed the traditions of property and the respect for 423 ●
property in Eastern Europe. This attack against property 563
began as early as the era of Prince Bismarck in Germany. The so-called Polish legislation sponsored by the German government and by the German nationalists during and after the Bismarck era showed scant respect for the property

642 rights of the Polish minority in Germany. It was designed
423 to prevent them from acquiring what was considered German
563 land and to deprive them of such German land as they had managed to acquire in the past. In addition to driving the Poles from German soil, this policy was also designed to eliminate Polish minorities in Eastern Germany by assimilation or expulsion, and the German word *ausrotten*—or exterminate—leaves little doubt as to the ruthlessness of the determination behind this policy. After the First World War, when certain parts of Silesia were incorporated in Poland, former German properties in industrial corporations and other valuables had a way of coming into Polish hands. When from 1939 to 1944 German armies in turn occupied a large part, and later all, of Poland, large amounts of Polish property were again transferred to Germans.

425 In one shape or another, with or without benefit of legal
563 form, this game of transferring property from the temporarily weaker to the temporarily stronger nationalities was played in large areas of Eastern Europe. When in the course of the First World War the Austro-Hungarian government collected large amounts of taxes and additional amounts of ostensibly voluntary war loans for the war efforts of Germany and Austria from the unwilling Czech, Slovakian, and Polish populations, the Austrian empire was in effect transferring important parts of the national wealth of these regions into German hands to be spent for German political and military purposes.[3] After the First World War, formerly Austrian or German mines, banks, and industrial enterprises in Czechoslovakia had a way of becoming Czechoslovakian. After 1939, when the Nazis occupied this country, Czecho-

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[3] Cf. G. Gratz and R. Schuller, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-188; Wilhelm Winkler, *Die Einkommensverschiebungen in Osterreich während des Weltkrieges*, (Vienna and New Haven: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky and Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 74-78, 219-221; Alois Rasin, *Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia during the First Year of Its History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), pp. 7-25.